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ABSTRACT
Knowledge elicitation, semantics and inference.
The elicitation of knowledge from experts for the purpose of
building expert systems has been automated with varying degrees
of sophistication. The extent to which a human being or a
machine can comprehend verbalised expertise depends in part on
knowledge of the basic or non-technical words of the language
and the domain-independent inferences that it is possible to
make from them concerning the technical words of the discourse.
Lexical entailments have traditionally been characterised in
terms of selectional restrictions. These tend to proscribe
all metaphorical language from the most abstruse and poetic to
the most ubiquitous and prosaic. A principled method of
semantic inference and disambiguation is needed.
The Introduction gives an account of the history of the
research and its provenance. Chapter 1 surveys existing
knowledge elicitation techniques and Chapters 2 and 3 give an
account of philosophical and linguistic approaches to the
problem of word meaning. Chapters 4 to 7 outline a
principled method of lexical inference and disambiguation
characterised by the Principles of Prediction and Coercion and
Chapter 8 discusses semantic inference in general, from strong
uncancellable logical entailments to weak connotative
suggestion. Appendix 1 contains the Principles of Prediction
and Coercion in a tabular form and Appendix 2 implements these
Principles in a program.
This thesis is the work solely of Mrs. A.G.T.M. Pittock.
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Not everything we read or hear is immediately comprehensible
to us. This may be for a number of reasons. Speech can be
inaudible or writing illegible. If neither of these is the
reason, speech may be disfluent or writing ungrarnmatical.
However, even when there is no physical or grammatical barrier
to our understanding we may still fail to understand. This may
be because what is being said or written is meaningless. If
this is not the case we fall back on a number of possibilities.
People may use words we have never heard before or have
forgotten the meaning of. They may use words we know that have
a secondary meaning we don't know or have not applied. Even if
the meaning is transparent to us we may say we don't understand
because we cannot see the relevance of what is said to the
conversation or situation or we cannot construe the
metaphorical or poetic usage.
Despite all these obstacles we are rarely completely
baffled. In speech, clues can be picked up from gesture and
intonation and, in text, the syntax and semantic province of an
unknown word is circumscribed by its neighbours. Words, like
people, can be known by the company they keep. The influence of
a word's neighbours varies from a strong logical coercion to a
weak suggestive connotation. Propinquity is not the sole
criterion of neighbourhood. The various semantic influences
that operate in a sentence are related to the logical form of
that sentence.
The aim of this work is to characterise a principled method
of construing the meaning of unknown or anomalous words and
phrases. The motivation of this work is partly theoretical, to
furnish a contribution to lexical semantics, and partly
practical, to provide a mechanism to assist in automated
knowledge acquisition in the field of artificial intelligence.
0.2 History of the research.
The work is a continuation of work done in 1936 and 1987
in Aberdeen as part of an Alvey project. Part of the project
was to design a computer program that would accept domain
knowledge provided by an expert in that domain and, by way of
intelligent questions, elicit more information. A simple
program was written where the interface was a graphical one and
the only acceptable input was in the form of binary links or
two-place predicates in a network diagram, for example, in the
input
creampuffs cause spots,
the word "cause" would be matched with the canned response "do
they cause anything else?" and so on. The system was written in
the language InterLisp-D and there was no parser, logical
representation, database and thus no query facility about
knowledge entered. The system seemed to have potential on a
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limited subset of language but did not work in conjunction with
any knowledge representation system, which was a disadvantage.
Moreover it could not properly be said to be intelligent nor to
embody any linguistic theory of lexical semantics and
inference. It seemed that an extended program might serve as a
vehicle for a linguistic theory and, at the same time, have
potential as a knowledge elicitation system in the field of
expert systems.
The Aberdeen implementation was in a dialect of the language
Lisp which was useful for string-processing and pattern
matching but not so appropriate for knowledge-representation
and inference. Since a knowledge acquisition program that
doesn't store the knowledge elicited isn't much good, it seemed
a better idea to use the language Prolog that is good for
handling databases but can also cope with string-processing and
parsing.
0.3 Contributions to linguistics and artificial intelligence.
This work is intended to be a contribution to linguistics.
Aitchison (Aitchison 1978) identifies two of the central
questions of linguistics as 'how does language work?', and
'what do all languages have in common?'. As stated above, our
second aim is to assist in automated knowledge acquisition.
However this is dependent on our first aim, namely to provide a
principle of lexical resolution of anomalous and unknown words
and phrases. This may be considered as an, at least partial,
answer to the question of how language works. As to the
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applicability of such a principle to languages in general, this
question is outside the scope of this thesis although it might
be noted in passing that the principle is founded on certain
metaphysical claims about the ontological classes of words and
one might conjecture that these metaphysical foundations are
language independent.
The linguistic assumption under examination is based on the
premiss that in any domain there is a large set of words that
one would find in any other domain. In other words, not all
words are technical. It is suggested that the domain-specific
words are usually nouns, but also a percentage of the verbs.
There are however a great many other words, including some
nouns and verbs but also most adjectives, prepositions, adverbs
and so on, that turn up in all subjects but which convey
information and from which inferences can be drawn. These words
provide the raw ingredients on which our principle of lexical
resolution depends.
As an exercise the reader might try replacing all the uncommon
nouns in a passage of text with nonce words or variables. The
resulting text is surprisingly informative. This is why one is
able to have the semblance of a conversation with someone even
though most of the technical terras he uses are unknown. It is
suggested that there would be theoretical linguistic value in
demonstrating that a text or conversation can be coherent even
though a large part of the nouns and verbs are not previously
known to one of the parties.
The sort of information that can be derived from non=
technical, basic, everyday words concerning unknown words can
be causal, hierarchical, meronymic, functional,
set-theoretical, logically-sequential, temporal, spatial,
thesaural, quantificational and so on.
This work can also be considered as a contribution to
artificial intelligence.
Artificial intelligence has two strands, commercial artificial
intelligence, which has concentrated heavily on knowledge based
expert systems, and academic artificial intelligence where
systems tend to be idiosyncratic, simulating a particular bit
of cognitive behaviour. This work can be considered as a
contribution to both, following in the footsteps of, for
example, Power's John and Mary system (Power 1974) which
simulates conversations, and Davis' Teiresias (Davis and Lenat
1982) which is an expert system knowledge elicitation
interface.
0.4 Problems and assessment.
Problems anticipated at the beginning include the choice of
a lexicon of basic words of English to be used in
conjunction with the lexical resolution principle to resolve
anomalies and lexical arcana.
Another important factor is the need to provide a parser and
grammar of sufficient power to handle natural
language sentences.
Remaining and lesser problems include the implementation of the
program and involve pragmatic questions such as the need to
avoid a combinatorial explosion of inferences and questions
from the user's input and the best way to arbitrate between a
number of them.
Assessment of this research, like its aims, is twofold. On the
one hand, it is easy for us to test the validity of the
predictions and resolutions made by the lexical resolution
principle as to the meaning of unknown words since we have
independent lexical authorities like dictionaries to provide us
with those meanings.
The other aim of this research is to enhance automated
knowledge acquisition. One method of assessment of this
function is for the conversation generated by the expert in
conjunction with a computer program based on this research to
be compared with a human interrogator working with the same
expert.
Incidentally, it is important to retain a sense of proportion
about the value of natural language computer interfaces.
Despite the conclusions of the Alvey Initiative Formal
Semantics Workshop (SERC 1987) that, in general, natural
language interfaces are of value, and that natural language
interfaces make a large range of computer applications
available to a wider public, especially since English is a
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leading international language, nevertheless, it is quite
apparent that graphics, touch-screens, multiple-choice menus
and other such devices are adequate and even preferable to
natural language for many applications.
However, it is conceivable that knowledge acquisition may, at
some time, be possible directly from physical texts with the
aid of optical character readers, without the mediation of a
human expert or knowledge engineer. In such circumstances som
sort of lexical semantics component of the kind to be
characterised below would be needed.
0.5 Possible applications and further possible developments.
Possible applications for a system like this with an
embedded theoretical lexical semantics component might be
interviewing, machine-assisted translation, market-research,
teaching, remedial-teaching or therapy. The system could also
be used for revising or planning papers on. The primary aim
here however is theoretical, in showing the potential of the
basic words of English to elucidate the meaning of obscure and
anomalous words and phrases.
There are various ways in which this research could
develop. One obvious extension is to write an enhanced compute
program to generate inferences and questions according to
mechanisms other than the ones realised in our semantic
principles. A possible development would be to generate system
responses from unknown words by virtue of their occurrence in
more than one piece of input, but without any regard for their
meaning. This enhancement obviously involves transcending the
bounds of the sentence and having some method of discourse
representation and analysis.
Discourse representation would also enable questions to be




X is a type of Z
it would be meaningful to ask whether all types of Z caused Y,
regardless of the meanings of X, Y and Z. It should be obvious
what input would generate the follox^ing responses:
X and Y are related to Z; how is X related to Y?;
Z is X and Z is Y; when something is X is it always Y?
However, the current research is primarily concerned with the
lexical semantics of the sentence, and thus, at this stage,
excludes extra-sentential inferences and also marginalises
logical inferences on which much research has been
concentrated already.
Enhancements to the lexical resolution principles would include
using not only words that stand in a certain syntactic relation
to an unknown word to infer the meaning of that unknown word
but also CybUtTl the whole sentence in the knowledge that
every word in a sentence may have a semantic influence on the
meaning of an unknown word in that sentence.
0.6 Parsing and building logical form.
While parsing is not the subject of this thesis a few words
should be said on the subject.
The young linguist can be dismayed by textbooks stuffed with
italic script that deluge him with tortuous and unruly data.
The examples come thick and fast and one abandons any intuition
one had that language is basically tractable. This is largely
an illusion. Just as a programmer spends 90% of programming
time on that 10% of input which is non-standard, so architects
of linguistic theory must account for those things
practitioners of the language would call oddities. It is as
important not to abandon one's intuitions for the sake of non
typical data as it is not to abandon the data in favour of a
favourite grammar.
There is, however, a multitude of common phenomena that we
might want a natural language processing program to handle. It
is probably true though that a program that could not
handle them would not be restricting the transfer of knowledge
so much as restricting the fluency of expression of the user.
There are usually other ways to say things. What is important
is that information is not lost.
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It is important for morale, however, to find a vantage point
from which the linguistic jungle can be surveyed and charted.
We forfeit granularity for the sake of a manageable
classification system. The premiss is that most linguistic
constructions can be assimilated under one of the following
syntactic types: nominal, verbal, adverbial or adjectival.
Thus, the group of linguistic constructions we call nominal
includes all nouns including proper nouns, dates and
abbreviations but also gerunds and dummies like 'it' and
'there', for example,
eructating is rude
there is an oubliette under here
and also some infinitives
to eructate is rude.
The nominal class also includes noun phrases
the man that should our king hae been
quantified noun phrases, for example,









A number of different constructions besides simple adjectives
and gerundives can be deemed adjectival, for instance, relative
clauses
that should our king hae been
tough-complements, for instance, (the non-parenthesised)
(Birkin is) impossible to rouse
verbless clauses,
(Rose Macaulay entered,) the camel behind her
post-modifiers
(the Church) militant
(why does she walk through the field) in gloves
(the fat white woman) whom nobody loves
(the man) to do the job (is Fingers Bailey)
and many predicative adjuncts that behave in an adjectival way
but include noun, verb and prepositional phrases
(Trampleasure is) eager to go
(Greeble is) easy to dupe
(Birkin is) clever at ping-pong
(Birkin is) in the fireplace
(Greeble is) the boss.
Curiously, passives are more adjectival than verbal and in some
cases have crystallised into adjectives:
(the loggia was) painted
(the cleats were) well-wrapped
Verbal constructions include all the verb tenses, modals and
phrasal verbs, for instance,
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wrap up (the cleats Birkln)
(Trampleasure) is going to see (the proprietor)
Adverbials include verbal and sentential adverbs and
prepositional phrases, for instance,
(don't do it) again (Birkin)
(do it) thoroughly (this time Birkin)
(stand) beside the fancy goods (Birkin and for goodness' sake
smile)
Of course, the above analysis is incomplete and linguistically
facile. Moreover, it does not address the problem of conjoined
or embedded sentences nor other sorts of sentence (for
instance, the interrogative). However, it does provide a rough
and ready classification system for linguistic phrases that
serves to disentangle somewhat the rebarbative syntax of
sentences.
There remain two not insubstantial obstacles to successful
parsing in the form of incomplete and disjointed sentences.
Sentences can be disjointed as a result of unbounded
dependencies of many kinds including relative clauses,
wh-questions, topicalisation et cetera
gravadlax, I like
the man that should our king hae been, wore the royal red and
green
of all the plumbers I know, Heptonstall is the best
I will wrap the cleats up for you, sir
They may be incomplete as a result of gapping or ellipsis.
Birkin likes Victor Mature and also Gloria Swanson
Trampleasure lives near Greeble
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It is beyond the scope of this research to write
a grammar that can handle all the above linguistic
constructions and build logical forms for them. In any case
such an enhanced system would not necessarily be a better
vehicle for use in testing a theory of semantic inference. For
this reason many of the above constructions have been
disregarded.
A possible source of confusion should be eliminated here.
Parsing can be discussed at a number of levels. Primitively,
it is merely the analysis of a sentence or phrase in terms of a
grammar, and as such, this is the meaning that is assigned to
the word when parsing is taught in school. Before the advent of
automatic parsers in the form of computer programs, the notion
was straightforward since one was not interested in how
children managed to parse as long as the answers were right.
Artificial parsing programs, however, in common with other
systems designed to exhibit cognitive skills, must incorporate
a specific parsing algorithm which governs the precise manner
in which a sentence or phrase is traversed in order to carry
out a grammatical analysis. Such parsing algorithms have been
the subject of much research and, consequently, the term
"parsing" has bean used to refer specifically to a traversal
mechanism independently of, and without reference to, any
grammar.
A further confusion arises when writers and practitioners use
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the word "parsing" to refer to the whole business of their
natural language program. The temptation is strong. Just as,
for a grammarian, to scan a sentence is to syntactically
analyse it and construe its meaning as well (it is hard to look
at a sentence without reading and understanding it), so, some
programs traverse, analyse and construe sentences in one fell
swoop. Thus, Sparck-Jones (Sparck-Jones and Wilks 1983) says
that she is using "parsing"
to cover both the syntactic and the semantic analysis
of a text in order to build a meaning representation
for it.
Of course the functions are separable but the compositional
semantics adopted allows one program to scan each word and
assign a syntactic and semantic analysis to it.
This is not to say that an exhaustive semantic analysis is
included in such a process. "Semantic representation" usually
refers to some kind of logical form. That there is more to
semantics than this is often forgotten (van Riemsdijk and
Williams 1986):
an LF-representation is a partial representation of the
meaning of a sentence, representing what might be called
its "structural meaning" (abstracting away from such other
aspects of meaning as the meaning of lexical items and
conditions on "appropriate use" of sentences... ),If Logical
Form were taken to be the complete explication of the
meaning of a sentence ...then certain conclusions would
follow: Logical Form would have to represent word meanings,
since clearly word meanings partially determine the meaning
of a sentence; it would have to define (or allow for the
definition of) the "truth conditions" of a sentence, since,
as philosophers have said, to know the meaning of a
sentence is to know, perhaps among other things, what
circumstances the sentence would truly describe;
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and it would contain, or directly allow for the definition
of, the specification of the roles that a sentence
could potentially play in such larger entities as discourses
and logical arguments.
The logical form spoken of is a version of predicate
calculus. This account of logical form applies to such theories
as model-theoretic semantics which claim additionally that
logical form will yield a set-theoretical interpretation of
meaning.
Thus, the work of some semanticists rests on the assumption
that it is possible to characterise sentence meaning without
reference to context. This can be stipulative: in other words,
any rules that transcend sentence boundaries (like those that
concern anaphora) can be deemed to be rules of discourse
meaning not sentence meaning. Even allowing for such
restrictions, it is evident that a great deal may still be
encompassed by the simple activity of parsing.
The question remains: which linguistic constructions should our
principle of lexical resolution handle? It is tempting to
think that the more comprehensive the grammar the more we would
be able to demonstrate about the meaning of words. Tnis may or
may not be true. However, our assumption is that every simple
sentence (that is, without conjunctions) can be reduced to a
set of linguistic structures whose function is one of the
following: nominal, adjectival, verbal and adverbial, and it is
at this level that semantic classification, prediction and
resolution take place.
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Thus, our concern is not primarily with parsing or grammar but
semantics and consequently, in, for example, the sentence
the U.S. forces' fight in Vietnam lasted longer than the
Falklands War
we are less concerned with the non-trivial parsing problem of
the subject noun phrase than with the semantic contribution the
phrase makes to the understanding of the rest of the sentence.
The lexical principles are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 to
7. Chapter 1 deals with different methods of knowledge
acquisition and how they compare with the one under discussion
here. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the field of general semantics
and its contribution to lexical semantics.
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Chapter 1. Knowledge elicitation.
1.1 Preview.
The Egyptians extracted the contents of a Pharaoh's head prior
to mummification with a little pipe. This chapter is concerned
with the systematic elicitation of knowledge from cooperative
living sources. By 'systematic' I wish to exclude the
acquisition of knowledge by virtue of desultory chatter or
drug-induced indiscretions. By 'elicitation' I mean to
exclude all kinds of pedagogy which is rather concerned with
the systematic dissemination of knowledge. By 'knowledge' I
wish to exclude say, the results of the disingenuous midwifery
of Socrates, which merely brought forth his own progeny. By
'cooperative living sources' I want to exclude not only
Pharaohs and torture victims but also texts and other media
since this work is primarily concerned with the acquisition of
knowledge from human beings, typically experts in some domain,
although some of the techniques described later could be
applied to a corpus of knowledge acquired directly from texts
by, say, an optical character reader.
As we saw above, automated knowledge elicitation is one of the
two arms of this research. Knowledge elicitation is a subject
that has exercised the minds of psychologists, knowledge
engineers and even philosophers.
Knowledge elicitation in artificial intelligence is the
automatic extraction of knowledge (definitions, facts, rules,
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heuristics, strategies and so on) from someone or something who
knows, and the storing of it in a computer as the foundation
for some kind of knowledge based system or expert system. Such
systems are typically designed for a particular task such as
medical diagnosis or oil prospecting or something of that kind.
They are heavily dependent on a specific domain of knowledge as
opposed to general purpose systems like, say, file handlers
that can perform a number of general functions on any old
files. Knowledge based and expert systems are a natural
extension of one of the computer's original functions which was
the storage and retrieval of information. Now computers are
required to do something intelligent and this means not just
storing transient information like, for example, 'Mr Podsnap's
insurance policy number is XYZ123 ' but domain information such
as 'if a man has smoked for forty years his premium will be
increased'.
Knowledge elicitation is sometimes called knowledge
acquisition. (A confusion should be guarded against namely that
in expert systems the phrase knowledge acquisition can mean the
process that takes place when the system has already been built
but is running a diagnosis and requires more data from the user
to enable it to reach a conclusion. In artificial intelligence
the phrase knowledge acquisition is sometimes used in
association with machine learning. While there are parallels
with knowledge elicitiation and machine learning, the latter is
less concerned with interaction between man and machine and
more with abstraction of principles from a large body of given
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data. To that extent it is only tangential to this work.)
It is obvious that the sort of domain knowledge or expertise
described above must be got into the computer somehow. This
is a hard enough task when the information is merely raw data
such as that on a library catalogue where the acquisition of
the hardware and software may be greatly in advance of the
collation of the thousands of book titles. It is a much
harder task when the knowledge base must be built painstakingly
out of the knowledge and expertise, perhaps as yet
unformulated, of a living expert. This is why knowledge
elicitation systems, designed to help experts give up their
secrets, are important.
Of course, what knowledge is, and what different kinds there
are, is a philosophical question in itself. A number of
dualisms pop up frequently: declarative versus procedural,
compiled versus uncompiled and physical versus mental. While
this question will be discussed in more detail later on, a few
myths should be exploded. Declarative knowledge (like facts,
conceptual knowledge and classificatory knowledge) can be
expressed as procedural knowledge and vice versa. Comoiled
knowledge (which includes heuristics and automated skills)
could, theoretically, be represented as uncompiled knowledge
and vice versa. (See Bundy (Breuker 1983) on heuristics as
meta-level knowledge. See also Heeffer (TIeeffer 1984) on an
inductive method of turning grand-masters' chess heuristics
into rules comprising features and background knowledge.)
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Experts may claim that what seems to be compiled knowledge is
just intuition or a hunch (Waterman and Newell 1971). All we
are saying is that the raw content of knowledge may not be as
disparate and unruly as our habitual forms of expression of
knowledge may suggest.
The relevance of knowledge elicitation to us as a body of
research is limited to those techniques that do not involve a
schema or higher order plan but are restricted to lexical
extrapolation from what has been said. It is true however that
lexical inferences themselves can sometimes impose a schema on
the verbal exchange taking place. The main difference is that
while, in medicine, one might have a knowledge elicitation
schema for, say, cirrhosis, containing slots like degree of
alcoholism of patient and colour of tongue, in this research,
on the other hand, there are meta-schemata of generic knowledge
structures like animacy or concreteness, or class-membership or
sequentiality. Thus, if our knowledge-source volunteered
X precedes Y
Y pursues Z
lexical inferences generated by the words 'precedes' and
'pursues' could be invoked, concerning logical, physical and
temporal precedence, animacy and so on.
What direct precursors are there to the current work in
knowledge elicitation research? Knowledge elicitation
techniques include multi-dimensional scaling, repertory grids,
Weizenbaum's ELIZA (Weizenbaum 1966), interviewing techniques,
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conversation transcripts and so on.
The aims of disparate disciplines have of course bean different
although their subject matter is the same. Philosophy, or that
branch of it called epistemologv, is predominantly concerned
with verification and has only a tangential concern with
eliciting knowledge, although Plato's Socratic dialogues, on
the occasions when they do not come uncomfortably close to
bludgeoning into submission, might possibly be seen as devices
for teasing out the confused and fibrous mass of knowledge in a
pupil's head.
Psychologists concerned with knowledge and cognitive modelling
have been interested in general domain-independent strategies
across tasks that have a family resemblance.
Knowledge engineers, and those in artificial intelligence and
computing, have a different perspective again. Psychological
research into the best way to extract knowledge from people or
assess their knowledge, has been exploited by a number of
computing systems which will be surveyed briefly. At the back
of one's mind though one will be aware that such knowledge
elicitation systems have been designed as an interface to
expert systems which, typically, are not domain-independent but
special-purpose. (Some attempts have been made however to
develop domain-independent interfaces to expert systems, for
example TEAM (Grosz 1987).)
Thus, there may be an implicit belief that the knowledge
elicited is appropriate for the construction of rules or the
hierarchical representation of problem-solving. This can drive
and circumscribe what the expert user is allowed to say. In
fact the system won't 'listen' to that knowledge that it can't
encode.
Another important point is that research in knowledge
elicitation for expert systems is not motivated by a desire to
improve the elicitation process so much as by the fact that
knowledge representation systems are so complex that they
require a human or automated intermediary to make them
accessible to an expert. As Davis says of the knowledge
elicitation system TEIRESIAS (Davis 1977):
part of the task ...involves...extablishing a
discourse at a level high enough that we do not
end up effectively having to teach ...[the expert]
...how to program.
A number of systems still depend on a system designer's or
programmer's expertise when running their knowledge acquisition
facilities, for example Ginsparg's system (Ginsparg 1983),
LDC-1 (Ballard 1984), EUFID (Templeton 1983), IRUS (Bates 1983)
and Chat-80 (Warren 1982). Others require the user to have
knowledge of natural language processing and database concepts,
for example, ASK (Thompson 1983).
It is impossible to overestimate the degree of opacity a
computer system has to the new and even experienced user. A
non-existent or partial model of the system in the user's head
trammels him in what he wants to do. Some recommend that the
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user be shown the structure of the system's knowledge base or
examples of other domains as long as the system is not more
obfuscating than the interface.
We should now look at existing knowledge elicitation methods
and compare them with the elicitation method of lexical
inference.
1.2 Personal construct theory and repertory grids.
This technique, described by Gaines and Shaw (Gaines and
Shaw 1980) was invented by Kelly (Kelly 1955). The 'personal
scientist' that is you, me or anyone, acquires a model of his
world; he continually builds constructs or 'templets' to filter
perception to allow past experience to relate to future
behaviour. The idea is that we anticipate the future
by construing the replication of events.
Kelly's notion has been endorsed in other quirky
formulations such as Brown's (Gaines and Shaw 1980):
a universe comes into being when a space is severed ...
by tracing severances you can uncover the basic forms
of linguistics, maths, physics and biology.
Adams-Webber (Adams-Webber 1979) describes how to elicit
from someone the constructs that he filters perception with:
...a triad...[of persons or objects]...is presented to the
subject and he is asked to 'think of some important way in
which two of these three persons are similar to one another
and different from the third'. Whatever the subject states
to be the basis of perceived similarity and contrast is
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recorded verbatim as a single bi-polar construct, for
example, reserved-outgoing. A series of triads ... is used
to elicit twenty or thirty bi-polar constructs from each
subject.
Weightings assigned to each construct determine the relative
significance attached to similarities between elements.
The technique can generate a repertory grid where equivalent
constructs can be discovered and clusters of constructs mapped.
In the system AQUINAS (Boose and Bradshaw 1987), a set of
elements or objects are chosen by the subject. A number of
traits are chosen which serve to group the objects in different
ways. Sometimes three objects are isolated and an odd-man-out
test will reveal a relevant trait. A grid is then built with
the objects or elements along one axis and the traits along the
other. The traits are expressed as polar pairs. The expert then
fills in the grid with ratings, say, on a scale of 1 to 5.
AQUINAS offers a tool to help the expert build such grids, as
does the PLANET system (Gaines 1987). Boose claims also that
the distinctions captured in such grids can be converted to
other representations, for example, production rules, fuzzy
sets or networks of frames, but doesn't say how. Possibly the
expert has to do it himself.
Here is an example dialogue where personal construct theory
is being applied.
Q What's the domain?
A My colleagues.
Q Choose 6 elements of the domain.
A Maud, Arthur, Vernon, Stanley, Alf and Beat.
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Q Choose 2 of the following, Maud, Arthur and Vernon, that are
the same and 1 that's different.
A Maud is different.
Q What 2 words describe the poles in this polarisation?
A Pretty and plain.
Q I will assign 1 to pretty and 5 to plain; please assign




Q There's a 95% match between the elements Maud and Beat; do
you want to conflate them?
A No.
Q Think of 2 words to describe a polar distinction between
them.
A Part-time employee and full-time employee.
Q I assign 1 to part-time employee and 5 to full-time employee;
please assign numeric values for the other 4 people.
• • • •
Q There's a 75% match between constructs fat/thin and
happy/unhappy; if you don't want to conflate them, name the
element that differentiates between them.
and so on.
This dialogue resembles quizzical exchanges that even
children can handle.
Q Who's your friend?
A Vernon.
Q Who's he like?
A Alf.
Q Why?





Q What's she like?
A She's got freckles.
Q Has Alf got freckles?
and so on. Thus, the identification of traits prompts for more
elements and vice versa.
Gaines and Shaw's system PEGASUS (Gaine3 and Shaw 1980)
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elicits personal constructs, with analysis and feedback and
directs further elicitation. It builds a repertory grid and
re-groups constructs according to the user's ratings. It also
conflates constructs that are used in the same way. This
technique is also used in the KRITON system, a knowledge
acquisition tool for expert systems (Diederich et al 1987).
AQUINAS (Boose and Bradshaw 1987) is an advanced version of an
earlier system called ETS (the Expertise Transfer System). It
claims to build rapid (two hour) prototypes and to create
knowledge bases for various expert system shells such as SI,
Ml, 0PS5 and KEE.
Among its sophisticated operations are handling knowledge
elicitation from more than one expert, reasoning at different
levels of abstraction, the elicitation of traits, the
decomposition of problems, the handling of uncertainty,
case-driven and knowledge-driven elicitation and the employment
of an enhanced personal construct theory.
The structure of the system is as follows.
dialogue
manager <-
! repertory grid tool









Before looking at this system in more detail, two things
stand out. One is that the system is built using the
object-oriented architecture Loops which facilitates
programming by using inheritance lattices of objects. A number
of programs have been built on top of this kind of structure
but we should remember that each stands on its own merits.
Object oriented programming is labour saving for programmers
but this doesn't necessarily mean that it is the best way to do
knowledge elicitation, knowledge representation or whatever.
The second point is evident in the diagram. AQUINAS claims to
offer an integrated toolbox. However, it seems the only
integrating property is the box. (Motta's system KEATS (Motta
1986), developed at the Open University, is an example of a
bundle of knowledge elicitation aids that are only integrated
in a geographical sense.) An enabling mechanism is not really
the same thing as a helpful one. A spade may enable one to dig
a garden but one would require more positive action from it for
one to describe it as helpful. Similarly a mechanism that
merely enables one to give up one's knowledge cannot be said to
positively elicit it. Of course a good representation method,
for example, a sketchpad to a cartoonist, undoubtedly results
in a greater transfer of information and it is for this reason
that some of the methods outlined below have been called
elicitation techniques when they are really representation
techniques. After all a representation technique can
sarendipitously reveal a structure inherent in knowledge that
the user didn't know was there and may inspire him to be even
more forthcoming.
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Gammack and Young (Gamraack and Young 1985) describe the
advantages of repertory grids.
....this technique seems
appropriate when there are a number of closely related
concepts, typically not well differentiated by novices,
and expertise consists in being able to make
discriminations. In addition there may be no specialised
vocabulary to describe such subtle distinctions and
relationships ...In such cases repertory grid can elicit
finer-grain criteria than can the interview method...
Clustering gives the structure that differentiates
these domain objects from one another.
A further technique is multi-dimensional scaling where it is
assumed that the concepts are in multi-dimensional space;
pairwise similarities are obtained between all objects and an
algorithm is applied to determine the number of dimensions and
the best-fitting placement of objects. If, for any two
concepts, all elements of the domain are construed in the same
way in relation to them, then they are zero distance apart and
equivalent constructs. If a number of constructs are close
they can be clustered.
There are certainly interesting questions that can be
generated from Kelly-type grids, for instance:
Is there any solution that you would give rating 2 for trait X
for?;
A is less 3 than C; is there anything that is more 3 than A but
lass B than C?;
A and B have rating 5 for trait X and C has rating 4: what
trait do A and B have that C doesn't?;
Rating for trait X and Y are always the same; is there an
example where they aren't?.
Boose (Boose 1985) admits grids are best suited for analysis
problems (like diagnosis and classification) rather than
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synthesis ones (like design and planning) or causal, procedural
and strategic knowledge elicitation. Even so it is not clear to
what extent conceptual knowledge is as tractable and modular as
Boose's method suggests.
Boose admits experts find it hard to decide on questions of
modularity and levels of granularity. He also says that there
may be a clash of levels. For instance, suppose the objects (or
options) in a car repair problem are 'engine', 'battery' and
'electrics'. They would not necessarily occur at the same level
in a hierarchy of objects.
As Boose points out, there are abiding problems with repertory
grids, for instance, their inability to represent deep or
causal knowledge or representation chains or non-unary
predicates, the restriction to one level of abstraction and the
difficulty in comprehending large grids.
I think the latter is a problem inherent in all computer
representation formalisms however. One of the prime functions
of computers is the storage and retrieval of vast amounts of
knowledge. We should not be suprised that we cannot apprehend
it all in all its complexity at once. Indeed one of the
motivations behind expert system development is to enable the
collation of evidence from more than one source, expert or
discipline. Experts find it hard to keep up and communicate
with bordering disciplines (Hawkins 1983). A knowledge based
system on an oil rig, for example, would draw on many diverse
branches of expertise that no one person could assimilate .
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There does seem evidence however that large repertory grids are
unmanageable and fatiguing to use.
Another problem is the non-binary nature of some traits. How do
we polarise, for instance, a black man, a white man and a
yellow man into two groups according to colour? Boose claims
(Boose and Bradshaw 1987) to have extended the elicitation
methods to handle other types of rating, for example, by
allowing nominal values (e.g. A,B,C,; Chinese,French,German),
interval values (e.g. 32 degrees F - 212 degrees F) and also
values with an absolute origin (e.g. 0.0, 0.1, 0.2).
There is another problem with the acquisition process of
AQUINAS. Suppose the expert is describing possible solutions
for a problem in his domain. He is asked for the problem, the
solutions, traits that these solutions share, a suitable rating
scale for traits and also for a rating of the importance of
each trait to the problem in hand. It seems unlikely to me
that one could rate the importance of one trait in isolation.
Suppose that the problem is
What should I do at 5 p.m.?
and the solutions are to return a library book or to ring
Arthur. The trait that they share is thriftiness since to
return the book will save me a fine (thrifty) but to ring
Arthur will cost me 50 pence (unthrifty). The importance of the
trait to the problem I rate highly because I am penurious.
However Arthur may offer me a job in which case the rating
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would change. In other words we often cannot say "solution Z is
better than solution Y" but only "if W then solution Z is
better than solution Y".
This problem is one we could really have anticipated since
the knowledge elicitation method employed is really only
suitable for gathering concepts and not for procedural or
heuristic knowledge. Other systems, such as the MOLE
system, acknowledge the complexity both of inter-related
evidence in problem-solving and the algorithm for finding
solutions. Evidence can be explanatory, expressing a tendency,
expressing a negative tendency, expressing a positive or
negative correlation, refining or supporting.
Another problem with all knowledge elicitation systems that
require an expert to give ratings, weightings or probabilities
is that it is not particularly easy to do nor a favourite
method of expression, though ranking or frequency rating is
easier (Kidd and Cooper 1985). Expert assessment has been found
to be inconsistent, empirical rather than statistical, and
undeliberated:
Widdecombe is painfully shy; is he more likely to work as a
librarian or a shop-assistant?"
will elicit a response according to prototypicality, namely
"librarian", regardless of the fact that there is a much
greater population of shop assistants than librarians.
Weights are even harder to calculate. Co-occurrence suggests
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causation but non-co-occurrence and negative weights are
usually not noticed (Wason 1972). Subjective fouling is a
hazard: people usually think saving 10% of £10 is better than
saving 1% of £100 although this is only true in one sense. A
probability rating is a bit of a black box anyway since
all the reasons it rests on are lost. Precision of
ratings doesn't necessarily help problem solving or machine
efficiency anyway. A rating scale with verbal
calibrations is less rebarbative and slightly easier to handle
(for example, not very probable, quite probable, probable, very
probable, almost certain).
In the PROSPECTOR system (Duda 1978), the experts' verbal
ratings (for example, "encouraging evidence") are converted and
refined. We need, after all, some method of storing vague
information. The medical diagnosis expert system shell MOLE
defaults to giving high values for traits spontaneously
mentioned and low ones for others.
Another problem with Boose's system is that AQUINAS, like
other systems, asks sophisticated questions like:
Why is trait X important?;
Under what circumstances would solution Y have trait X?;
Under what circumstances would the maximum value of trait X
increase?.
Just as a schoolboy learns how to ask "Ou se trouve le
Louvre?" long before he can comprehend all the possible answers
that he will get, so it is easier for elicitation systems to
ask canned questions than to parse or process the answers
- 32 -
intelligently.
1.3 Concept-sorting and hierarchical clustering.
Gammack and Young (Gammack and Young 1985) describe another
knowledge elicitation technique, namely, concept-sorting:
obtain a set of concepts that broadly cover the domain
...from a glossary or text...The next step is to transfer
each concept to a card and ask the expert to sort the cards
into a number of groups describing what each group has in
common. The groups can then be iteratively combined to form
a hierarchy. The method is applicable when there is a large
set of concepts, ranging across the whole domain, which
require a suitable structuring to become manageable.
This technique is similar to laddering where the expert is
asked to name the important concepts in the domain and the
knowledge engineer asks about broader and narrower terms
related to them. These terms can be known as supertypes and
subtypes, classes and subclasses or generalisations and
specialisations. Laddering can also be performed on concepts
representing actions or goals (Gaines and Shaw 1980). The
question
How do you achieve goal X?
will generate sub-goals; the question
Why do you attempt goal X?
will generate higher-order goals.
Similar reservations must be made about this technique as
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about the ones above. While claiming to elicit concepts, it is
not proven that concepts are as modular or tractable as this.
Kelly (Kelly 1955) says:
there is a natural hierarchy among constructs...constructs
are construed by means of other constructs and so
on ... to form a system.
However, pace Kelly, a hierarchical structure is not
inherent in every domain of knowledge. Some domains appear to
contain identifiable concepts but ones that stand in
associative or net-like relations. What are the concepts of
mathematics and what is the hierarchical structure inherent in
literary criticism? In Eshelman's system MOLE, it was
discovered that doctors failed to recall some elements of their
domain unless they could work through a test-case or particular
example. They also had a proclivity to think in causal chains
anyway rather then in terms of objects.
Hierarchical clustering (Olson 1936) is a similar technique.
Those items that are most similar are clustered together and
then this cluster is assessed for similarity with the other
items, and so on until a hierarchy is built up with an ultimate
cluster that contains all the others. Similar methods are
ordered-trees-from-recall (Olson 1986) and drawing closed
curves (the latter yields sets rather than a hierarchy) (Olson
1986).
Under this heading, in the field of machine learning, we should
also mention taxonomic classification programs like CLUSTER
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(Michalski and Stepp 1983a) that determine hierarchies of
sub-categorie3 within a collection of objects. Such programs
are particularly suited to practical classification problems
involving conceptual descriptions, and have been used to
classify soybean diseases (Michalski and Stepp 1983b) and for
the classification of Spanish folksongs.
1.4 Automatic thesaurus construction and text analysis.
This method of knowledge elicitation is taken from the world
of information retrieval systems and was devised by Salton
(Bezdek 1986). While it addresses the question of converting
textual knowledge into some formal representation nevertheless
there are enough similarities between texts and human
conversation for it to be worth looking at.
A frequency count is taken of the words in a document
collection. Each document is identified by the high-frequency
words in it. The information is represented in a matrix (being
terms x documents) and then similarity coefficients between
terms are computed, based on co-occurrence characteristics of
the terms in the documents. (This notion of word frequency
analysis has incidentally been taken up in semantics as a
technique to elucidate word meaning and also in discourse
analysis, repetition being deemed to be an indicator of the
deep structure of discourse (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975)).
It is stretching a point to call this a knowledge elicitation
method as it does not really elicit new conceptual knowledge.
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Static knowledge such as documents and books has been
considered as a source of knowledge elicitation, both
traditionally as the required 'homework' of systems analysts,
and in computer systems, for example, the KRITON system will
supply word frequencies for use in conjunction with its other
knowledge elicitation methods. This method has also been used
to extract action-event models (Nishida et al 1983) and for
discourse representation (Frey et al 1983). Krippendorff
(Krippendorff 1980) gives an introduction to its methodology.
1.5 Concept mapping.
This is described by Novak (Novak 1986).
Concept maps are intended to represent meaningful
relationships between concepts in the form of propositions.
Propositions are two or more concept labels linked by words
in a semantic unit ...for example 'sky is blue' would
represent a simple concept map forming a valid proposition
about the concepts 'sky' and 'blue'.
He goes on to describe the uses of the method.
Concept mapping is a technique for externalizing
concepts and propositions...Undoubtedly we may develop
new concept relationships in the process of drawing concept
maps especially if we seek actively to construct
propositional relationships between concepts that were not
previously recognised as related ...we have frequently
found that concept maps are remarkably effective tools for
showing misconceptions.
Callman (Callman et al 1985) suggests how the technique
could be automated.
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When a new concept is entered, the computer should prompt
the user with an appropriate sat of relationships. Menus
should be available summarising all available
relationships ...
Such maps can help you know what you know and what you don't
know. Some graphical computer interfaces like Xerox-Pare's
Loops environment can help you construct very large concept
maps on the screen. The main and fundamental disadvantage is
that unless one wants to restrict one's expressive power to
two-place predicates, that is binary links, then one has to
invent some more sophisticated formalism for the graphical
representation. This has of course been done in the wide field
of semantic networks for knowledge representation. However this
severely compromises the intuitive 'sketchpad' quality of the
original concept mapping idea.
The technique of path analysis or influence diagrams (Olson
1986) is designed to show functional relations between items
and the relative weights of these links. The completed diagram
should show which links are the most significant in a knowledge
system where there are functional connexions between the
concepts.
1.6 Interviews and questionnaires.
This is the oldest and most obvious method of getting
someone to tell you something and any technique of knowledge
elicitation involving two human beings could be described as
interviewing. If you know the domain already and merely want to
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know the values of its variable data in this particular
instance, then a verbal or written questionnaire is all that's
needed. This kind of menu-driven knowledge acquisition has even
been used in domain-independent systems like TEAM (Grosz 1987)
(although strictly speaking the domain is English grammar) and
the knowledge acquired can be terminology from any domain.
Questionnaires are the usual method of data collection for
on-line interactive systems in business and industry. They are
translated to the VDU but are no different in principle from
the kind of clipboards wielded by market researchers in the
street.
Questionnaires are a very good way of securing discrete and
relevant packets of information about something. In an
interview, on the other hand, as with protocol analysis below,
even a highly manipulative interviewer cannot guard against
receiving irrational, illogical, probabilistic,
non-deterministic, vague, incomplete or compiled (Ericsson
1980) information. On the other hand one can focus on a
particular subject or explore low probability events.
Gammack and Young describe one approach (Gamrnack and Young
1985):
....ask the expert to...lay out the main themes and ideas
of the domain. Later systematic probing interviews can
pursue the relevant areas to a greater depth ...[by]...
generalised checklists ...critical incidents ...[etc]....
Among non-automatic interviewing techniques Grover (Grover
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1933) includes forward scenario simulation which involves an
expert describing a problem scenario and identifying the terms,
concepts, required information and reasoning strategies
involved. A number of these scenarios or cases can be collected
and clustered or sorted according to prototypicality. This is
similar to critical incident analysis where an especially
memorable event or problem is discussed (Flanagan 1954). This
is more accurate than theorising about generalities if the area
of expertise is not task analysis but problem solving.
Other strategies are goal decomposition where the expert
analyses a problem into sub-goals and methods of achieving
them, goal-distinguishing, where each diagnosis is taken and
the expert is asked what evidence is necessary and sufficient
to distinguish it from others, what is a typical ca,se of it,
what evidence would support it and what evidence would rule out
every other hypothesis (Clancey 1986). Alternatively the
reclassification method can be used where each goal is
reclassified into the set of facts that produced evidence for
it and these re-classified until facts are reached that are
data observable by the expert (Grover 1983). Some problem
solving data may be so tractable that a symptom/fault grid can
be used (symptoms x faults). A more top-down method is typing
where a case and a class of cases are taken and the knowledge
engineer will ask:
doe3 the case fit the class?;
what is the evidence for and against the fit?
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and so on.
Induction from examples can also be used as an interactive
method of knowledge elicitation (Michalski 1983).
Protocol analysis (see below) can also be conducted as an
interview as can the various concept-sorting techniques we have
seen above.
Interviewing techniques can be hard to implement on a
computer. The nearest thing to interviewing is performed by
systems like TEIRESIAS (Davis and Lenat 1982) that use a
sub-set of language to confirm or qualify knowledge entered by
the user.
TEIRESIAS was developed because, in MYCIN (a production rule
expert system), it is hard to set up and trace rules. The idea
is that TEIRESIAS provides a link between the expert's natural
language expression of his expertise and the highly formalised
rule notation of the expert system. The current rule-base is
presented to the expert in a palatable form and he is prompted
for amendments and alterations that will improve the system's
diagnostic abilities. It is important to realise that the
structure of the system is rigid and the interview engaged in
is highly schematic and circumscribed. Davis and Lenat (Davis
and Lenat 1982) say
Natural language has not been a major focus of this work...
All questions and responses from TEIRESIAS are either
pre-formed or based on a simple template completion
mechanism...Responses from the users are of three general
types: single token answers to multiple choice questions,
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strings belonging to a synthetic language with a formal
grammar, and heavily stylised natural language sentences
using a restricted vocabulary...
Nearly all systems have this restriction. PEGASUS (Gaines
and Shaw 1980) claims to engage in 'conversational dialectic'
but the authors would probably agree that it is conversation
of a laconic sort. TEIRESIAS can indeed formulate complicated
questions of the sort:
what is it that you know and the system doesn't that allows you
to avoid making that same [diagnostic] mistake?
but it is not clear, as with AQUINAS above, how well it would
cope with processing the answer. There are indeed other
artificial intelligence programs that ask questions but again
only in highly formalised micro-worlds, for instance, Heeffer's
chess strategy induction program (Heeffer 1984) can ask yes-no
questions and reconstruct a chess position.
One should mention an automated interviewing system at the
opposite end of the scale in terms of expressiveness and
functionality. Weizenbaum's ELIZA allows uninhibited expression
of natural language to be entered but has no knowledge
representation or inference component. It simulates a
psychologist giving therapy, providing template-built responses
triggered by input words. Hasemer (Hasemer 1984) says
The intelligence lies in a clever pattern-matching
algorithm which can pick the key-words out of input
sentences; in the set of keywords itself which clearly
embodies some notion of how a sentence is understood by a
human listener; and in the set of responses that the
machine can generate...
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An example exchange from a version of ELIZA might be:
USER My mother hates me
ELIZA Tell me more about your family
Recognition of the keyword 'mother' generates template-built
questions about family relationships. The conversation can be
can be both convincing and provocative. It is however easy to
confound ELIZA.
USER I must be going now
ELIZA How does it feel to be going?
USER I am going now
ELIZA Do you know anyone else who is going?
USER I am going now
ELIZA Do you belive it to be normal to be going now?
and 3o on!
This cannot properly be called a knowledge elicitation
system because it does not store the knowledge received nor
does it have a principled method of extracting it. However the
parallels are obvious in that the system does accept
information, recognise words in it and prompts for more.
Although the algorithm seems facile to us now, it has yet to be
demonstrated that the most efficient programs are the ones that
embody the most exhaustive set of grammatical and semantic
mechanisms. Cognitive simulation and computational efficiency
don't always go together. Moreover it is not yet clear what
cognitive processes are employed in conversations anyway. Boot
and Koppelaar (Boot and Koppelaar 1982) say
A natural language understander does not attempt to parse
everything he reads or hears. He determines what is most
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interesting and concentrates on that ignoring the
rest...This verbal depth of processing is based on the
extensive use of patterns learned in the past...We should
give our machines the same knowledge of those patterns.
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1.7 Protocol analysis.
This method is suitable for eliciting the expertise involved
in problem-solving or manual tasks. Gammack and Young (Gammack
and Young 1985) describe it.
....behaviour (verbal or otherwise) is recorded as an expert
works through a problem and thi3 protocol is transcribed
and analysed, by (ultimately) converting it to a set of
productions that transform one solution state to the next...
... by reconstructing the system using inferred production
rules the expert's knowledge can be modelled ...such a
method is particularly useful for eliciting procedures
that experts use in problem solving, which they may not be
able to articulate...
Waterman and Newell (Waterman and Newell 1971;1973) describe
a protocol analysis program. The utterances of a human problem
solver are tape-recorded. The program segments and reduces the
transcription to:
a) entities about which something can be known;
b) expressions about the entities;
c) a production system (i.e. rule = condition + action) that
can be applied to b).
The system PAS-I elicits knowledge about cryptarithmetic. It
is not clear to what extent the segmentation and
rule-production tasks are automated. Waterman explains that
topics can be identified using syntactic and prosodic
information but doesn't say how this is achieved.
The system KEATS (Motta 1986), described as a 'knowledge
engineer's assistant', has a knowledge elicitation interface
built on protocols as has KRITON (Diederich et al 1987).
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However, these systems merely allow protocols to be entered
which must then be segmented by the user, either by a bottom-up
search for patterns that can be used to modularise the text,
or top-down segmentation according to a prior hunch about the
structure of the problem.
One of the difficulties about any discursive account of a
process, it seems to me, is that the structure of the
peroration is not necessarily isomorphic with the structure of
the process. For instance, a carpenter might say something
like: 'if the sanding belt is damaged whilst sanding this may
be because of projecting nails so always make sure you have
hammered them all in first' rather than 'first find any
projecting nails; then, hammer them in ; then ...' and so on.
By analogy, there is no reason why a lecture on, for instance,
anatomy snould be isomorphic with a skeleton.
The overriding strategy of protocol analysis can be to produce
one of three things (Breuker and Uielinga 1983):
- a flow of control (i.e. in the form of a goal/subgoal
analysis), for example, peel the spuds, chop the chins, boil
the oil etc.;
- a flow of data, for example, charting the course of a King
Edward through the oven-bake chip factory;
- a body of rules, (possibly acquired by translation from
declarative information), for example, '.if the potato is more
than 3 months old the chip will be flaccid'.
Protocol analysis, or 'thinking aloud', can be tortuous and
lengthy, especially if the expert is thinking in images. It may
be impossible if he depends on recognition of given objects
rather than a verbal description he has committed to memory.
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Recognition is easier than recall. (It is difficult to
recollect a penny, for instance.)
Protocol analysis can be concurrent with the problem solving
itself or retrospective. Recollection in tranquillity may seem
attractive but it is slightly hazardous.
A systems analyst once told me that, when he was automating a
woolmill, a retrospective protocol analysis failed to provide
enough information for the system to be written. On taking a
stroll round the plant to observe and question the staff in
action he found a machine operator tossing a ball of wool into
the air: 'What are you doing that for?'; 'Well we wouldn't know
it was the right weight otherwise would we?' Needless to say,
this crucial part of the procedure had not been recollected.
Protocols have the advantage of allowing the expert to
ramble freely without loss of expressiveness. This of course
means that the resulting text may be discursive, sequential,
highly deictic, generalised, highly specific, anecdotal,
unstructured, capricious, superfluous and abounding in
terminology, text-book fictions (Feigenbaum and McCorduck 1983)
and shorthand explanations. The one thing it probably won't
be is in the form of rules! In fact it seems more than likely
to me that the problem-solving process is more like a
procedural computer program (Barstow 1979) than a set of axioms
and that a program qua algorithmic device is verbalised most
easily as a set of questions, answers and actions. The
knowledge engineer can manipulate the dialogue if he is
sufficiently well briefed in advance.
Protocols are also not immune, as any other elicited
knowledge, from incompleteness, error, lacunae, partial memory
and post hoc justifications.
1.8 Review.
In a critique of the above methods the declarative/procedural
distinction comes in useful, as it often does. This is because
most of the methods cited above are either overly concerned
with concepts (personal construct theory, multi-dimensional
scaling, concept-sorting, automatic thesaurus construction,
concept mapping, hierarchical clustering, drawn closed curves,
ordered trees from recall, influence diagrams) or procedures
(interviews (with the exception of ELIZA) and protocol
analysis).
There are problems in the elicitation of concepts. As Gaines
and Shaw remark (Gaines and Shaw 1980) of personal construct
theory, there are other more meaningful relationships between
concepts than just similarity. The poles of two constructs may
be distinct in terms of equivalence but close in terms of
entailment (alive and dead?). (Gaines1 and Shaw's system
attempts to extrapolate such knowledge from repertory grids.)
Another problem is that if one admits of shades of grey between
the two pole3 of a construct one doesn't really know whether
the mid-point means:
this element is halfway between the poles;
this element is assigned to both poles;
this element is applicable to neither pole;
this element is under one pole sometimes and the other other
times;
this element is I don't know where;
this element cannot be construed this way.
The other methods of eliciting concepts have problems too.
For one thing they may capture conceptual relations but not
logical, causal, functional and other relations. Path analysis
captures functional but nothing else. The need for developing
functional, causal and structural models of the domain has been
stressed in artificial intelligence (Davis 1983; Sembugamoorthy
1986; Clancey 1986; Patil 1981). Also, conceptual knowledge may
require a backing group of other types of knowledge like
examples and analogies (Newell 1973):
American psychology has largely identified the central
problem of conceptual behaviour with the acquisition or
formulation of concepts, which in practice has turned out
to mean the induction of concepts from a set of presented
exemplars.
It is a pragmatic question whether those exemplars should
themselves be considered as part of a person's knowledge or
whether knowledge should be considered to be just those
concepts he has derived from them. Most expert systems, in the
absence of a facility of inductive inference, would not know
what to do with such information. Quinlan's induction program
ID3 (Ouinlan 1982) and Niblett's CLEAR (Niblett
1983) have experimented with this method. The expert chooses
examples and attributes and then inferences are made. Quinlan's
method does not however handle probabilistic reasoning.
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Rasaarch in machine learning has also tried using examples
as data from which to extrapolate rules and concepts
inductively (for example, Heeffer 1984, Michalski 1983b and the
METADENDRAL system)).
Concept mapping is, in one sense, more versatile than other
methods in that it allows uninhibited expression of the varied
relationships between concepts. This is however, as we have
seen, at the expense of syntactic sophistication, binary
relations being the only ones allowed. Of course, notations
exist for handling complex linguistic constructions
graphically. Sowa (Sowa 1984) has a detailed theory of
conceptual graphs that does this. However a simple statement
like 'Arthur knitted a sweater' would have to be transformed
into 'Arthur caused a sweater to move along a path from
non-existence to existence' before it could be represented in
one of Sowa's conceptual graphs. Semantic networks of this kind
are usually non-intuitive formal notations. They are
nevertheless required if one wants to represent graphically
sentences like the following:
the difference between A and B is C;
if X and Y then Z;
in the seventeenth century artists thought Rubens' painting of
nudes was influenced by his dissipated lifestyle;
the red button must be pressed if the green light is on;
if it's raining or you are cold wear a coat;
the concept of X is central to the domain;
when the lever goes down the arm rotates;
Vernon knows Alf's 'phone-number is ex-directory.
Another problem with a diagrammatic modular representation
is that modularising one way always prohibits modularising in
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another (is 'Alf's 'phone-number' one concept or two, or
sometimes one and sometimes two, or both?). Another point is
that different analyses of one domain will identify different
concepts. A functional description of a car may deploy
different concepts from a structural description and they may
be at varying levels of granularity.
Other techniques are preoccupied with eliciting rules.
Under this heading I have included interviewing and protocol
analysis. Although interviewing between two human beings need
have no such limitations, computer implementations of
quasi-interviewing techniques have been driven by rule-based
production systems and, as a consequence, are dedicated to
eliciting rules. This is a pity. Likewise, protocol analysis is
associated with human problem-solving which is dependent on
procedures and as a result this is the type of knowledge
protocol analysis elicits best.
Is there anything wrong in restricting knowledge elicitation
to the elicitation of either rules or concepts? After all
expert systems are often built on production rules. Kidd (Kidd
and Cooper 1985) think that expert system shells can inhibit
the user's delivery of knowledge:
...prior to the acquisition process, our understanding of
the problem domain was not deep enough for us to make an
appropriate judgement on what shell would be suitable.
Another problem was that our prior familiarity with
AL/X's knowledge structure strongly influenced the type of
questions we asked of the expert and therefore biased us to
eliciting only those expert rules that fitted into AL/X.
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This Procrustean solution is a common hazard. It is also a
tempting mistake to conceptualise the system in a maximally
efficient way that's out of tune with the expert (Davis and
Lenat 1982).
Similar problems occurred in the MOLE medical diagnosis
system. Experts couldn't always distinguish between types of
objects that the system had chosen for knowledge
representation, like observed symptoms and inferred symptoms,
or explanatory evidence and tendential evidence. In this
respect personal construct theory is preferable as it doesn't
create or employ constructs the expert doesn't already use.
Grosz's system TEAM (Grosz 1987) encoxintered the same problems.
The acquisition of different verb forms confounded
non-linguists and the acquisition of feature field values
confounded naive users. TEAM, however, found it possible to
communicate with the user by framing example linguistic
constructions for affirmation or denial, for example:
Is it grammatically acceptable to say 'Paris countries',
meaning those countries whose capital is Paris?;
Is it acceptable to say 'Fords', meaning those cars
manufactured by Ford?.
The ASK system (Thompson 1983) also supplies stylised patterns
of verb endings to enable the user to compare the new verb with
the verb he wants to enter.
Another problem is that the expert's conceptual structures may
change over time as a result of the elicitation process. The
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knowledge structure once chosen and revealed manipulates
the user. Of course this may be advantageous: a
half-built system with bugs, for instance, can prompt the
expert to give up his secrets.
The elicitation of rules may not be straightforward
(Shortliffe 1976). Ramsey (Ramsey et al 1986) says:
...it is often difficult to represent knowledge in terms of
rules especially if one already has available descriptive
information...rules are not a convenient way to organise
knowledge in many domains... Part of the problem is due to
the fact that the 'directionality' of production rules can
present problems. For example, the rules used in diagnostic
rule based systems are typically of the form "IF
<manifestations> THEN <cause>". However, much of the
knowledge used to create such rules...is descriptive and
goes in the opposite direction: if some cause is present
then certain manifestations will typically occur.
Moreover some skills that suggest that an underlying set of
rules are in operation, prove to be highly 'compiled' or
heuristic skills. Whether one believes in heuristic knowledge
as something different in kind from other sorts, or just thinks
of it as a yet unformalised coincidence of rules, the fact
remains that it is not a trivial task to provide a set of rules
when one's knowledge is heuristical. Heeffer (Heeffer 1984)
found chess masters stumped when asked to identify the relevant
features of a chess position that determined their next
strategic move. It appears such features are numerous, chunked
together somehow and not really available for mental
inspection. Heeffer had to do a number of cunning experiments
to discover the conceptual grain-size of the features of a
chess posiition. A grand-master's ability to memorise it in
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five seconds suggested that he must be seeing large grain
patterns of some sort.
But the point is that even in apparently rule-based skills the
rule base is often unknown and inaccessible to the expert. One
chess player, when asked how many possible moves he would
consider at each junction of the game, said "Only one: the
right one": hubris or honesty?
The transformation process from declarative knowledge to
rules is also an extra overhead for the expert or knowledge
engineer in the elicitation process. Gammack and Young
(Gammack and Young 1985) agree that
expertise in a technical domain comprises knowledge of more
than one kind, not all of which can reasonably be
represented in the form of empirical rules.
Also, an expert may not be able to give exceptions to rules
unless he sees the system make a mistake with the rules it has
already got (McDermott 1980). Sometimes posing
counter-examples can help.
Translating from procedural knowledge to declarative knowledge
is not much easier either. A meticulous regard for an exact
formulation can lead to what a philosopher once called 'the
death of a thousand qualifications'. We might call it the
'all-things-being-equal' problem. An algorithm can branch
infinitely. A body of declarative propositions, however, must
encapsulate all eventualities, constraints and implied rule
precedence. This is a difficult task.
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Some expert systems accommodate both conceptual and rule-based
knowledge. For example, PROSPECTOR (Johnson and Keravnou 1985),
the geologists' ore-detecting system, and its knowledge
elicitation system KAS, are rule-based but have taxonomies of
concepts explicitly represented in the knowledge base.
TEIRESIAS (Davis and Lenat 1982) also recognises the
distinction between rules and facts:
There are ... two major forms of knowledge representation
in use in the performance program:
1) the attributes, objects and values which form a
vocabulary of domain conceptual primitives, and
2) the inference rules expressed in terms of these
primitives.
There are correspondingly two forms of knowledge
acquisition:
1) the acquisition of new primitives - to expand the
performance program's vocabulary of concepts, and
2) the acquisition of new rules expressed in terms of
existing primitives.
Compare also Swartout (Swartout 1983).
[There are] two bodies of knowledge. The first, called the
domain model, contains the descriptive facts of the domain...
the second body of knowledge, the domain principles, contains
the methods and heuristics of the domain - the 'how to'
knowledge.
The knowledge acquisition tool KRITON, built on the Loops
system from Xerox, uses a combination of tools to elicit both
kinds of knowledge. The expert suggests concepts by engaging in
forward scenario simulation; repertory grid analysis is
performed on them and then they are sorted by laddering and
represented in a Loops lattice hierarchy which can support
completeness checks since the nodes of the lattice are
structured objects with slots. An empty slot or a node floating
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apart from the .lattice generates a question prompting the user
to supply the missing cog or link. Some systems are capable of
exposing patterns, groupings and gaps in rules that prompt the
expert to fill them, and in TEIRESIAS (Davis and Lenat
1982), diagnostic errors give a context for rule formulation.
Consistency checkers are used, for example by EMYCIN, to prompt
for clarification and correction.
Procedural knowledge in KRITON is acquired via protocol
analysis, partitioned according to pauses and sorted according
to domain concepts occurring in them. Diederich admits this is
tricky and seems to suggest (compare the KEATS system) that it
is largely a text-editing job imposed on the expert who chooses
propositions as the antecedents and consequents of the rules,
although the system does recognise some lexical items
expressing common relations, for example "X is smaller than Y".
Motta (Motta 1986) concludes that knowledge elicitation is not
a well defined methodology but a collection of techniques and
so the best one can do is to offer a set of tools to perform
them. Motta's system KEATS runs on a Symbolics in ZetaLisp and
offers facilities for protocol analysis, graphical
representation of a domain and knowledge representation and
inference. It should be pointed out that these text-editing,
grapiiics and object-oriented programs are part of the Symbolics
system and not developed by KEATS. (To digress momentarily it
is interesting to speculate to what extent applications of a
system can be called innovative. To use a lawnmower as a
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lawnmower is not vary inventive. It certainly falls short of
using a log as a wheel. On the other hand Watt is credited with
one of the most brilliant inventions of the industrial age that
was more properly a brilliant transformation of a much earlier
system. In fact Hero of Alexandria invented the aeolipile.)
The four parts of the KEATS system are a protocol analysis
facility: basically a text-editor but allowing segmentation by
the user; a graphical sketchpad facility that allows one to
'draw' a domain model that will be represented in the knowledge
representation language; an object-oriented knowledge
representation language and a production system rule
interpreter.
A typical interaction with the system would involve the
following. A knowledge engineer records an interview with an
expert which is typed into the machine. The knowledge engineer
segments this protocol. The conceptual structure that emerges
can then be depicted by the knowledge engineer diagrammatically
using the graphics facility and this diagram is stored
automatically as an hierarchical structure. The production
rule interpreter can then be used by the knowledge engineer to
model problem solving and run the hierarchical network
structure.
Another system comparable to these is KADS (Breuker and
Wielinga 1985) which offers a package of different knowledge
elicitation methods. Eshelman's system MOLE also combines
conceptual and procedural knowledge acquisition, asking the
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expert to list relevant objects (for instance, hypotheses and
symptoms) of the domain and to draw associations between them,
which it then turns into rules.
Gammack and Young's conclusion (Gammack and Young 1985) is a
pluralistic one.
...even in a single domain of expertise, the expert's
knowledge is of several different kinds. These different
kinds of knowledge almost certainly will demand different
knowledge elicitation techniques to capture them most
effectively.
1.9 An alternative knowledge elicitation system.
We have seen above that concept-based, graphical and
rule-based methods of eliciting knowledge all tend to
circumscribe the captive sage in the expression of his wisdom.
Elicitation of concepts prevents one from discursive
elaboration about the domain in general and from giving
functional and procedural accounts of it. Elicitation of
diagrammatical representations constrains the natural language
expression of information and the elicitation of rules imposes
an unintuitive burden of translation from declarative facts to
rules on the user.
The reason such systems appear to be intractable is, of
course, that they are driven by a knowledge representation
process that can only trade in artificial constructs and not in
the full uninterrupted richness of natural language. Also, it
is the primary concern of architects of expert systems to
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assemble useful and relevant information. Weiss and
Kulikowski (Weiss and Kulikowski 1933) say
A mistake of many novice expert system designers is
to dwell on the preliminary knowledge acquisition phase
of systems development... One will be overwhelmed with the
mass of information, without getting closer to the
development of the expert system.
It may be necessary for rapid prototyping to restrict the
domain to a sub-domain that is representative, or a set of
subtasks that the big tasks are built of.
Davis and Lenat (Davis and Lenat 1982) have similar
pragmatic goals.
The knowledge should ... be decomposable into small
modular "chunks" that can be expressed with a simple
syntax.
But what if it is not? Kosko (Kosko 1986) hits the nail on
the head.
The fuzzier the knowledge representation, the easier the
knowledge acquisition and the greater the knowledge-source
concurrence. But the fuzzier the knowledge, the harder
the (symbolic) knowledge processing.
The reason Tfeizenbaum's system ELIZA is so flexible in
accepting natural language is because it doesn't attempt to
parse its syntax or represent its semantics but merely
pattern-matches key words. One of the two aims of this
research is to build a knowledge elicitation program. Is it
possible to build a program as approachable as ELIZA that can
elicit and store knowledge?
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We saw above that the success of such a program depends on the
choice of key-words and the choice of responses. The problem is
how to make such an elicitation mechanism domain-independent if
it has to be triggered by key words? ELIZA is domain-dependent
in psychology. One could not really talk to her about how to
mend a car (although one might try).
Moreover, to represent the knowledge elicited we would need a
parser, grammar and semantics building program. These extra
requirements are discussed below. However the first problem is
to provide the program with a lexicon and a set of responses
that words in this lexicon will generate.
No system can be truly domain-independent since it is
situated, like ourselves, in the world. At the very least the
boundaries of the world are the boundaries of our domain. This
seems to suggest that our system should recognise every word in
the language and produce an appropriate response when it does.
This is obviously not feasible. What we need for a
domain-independent knowledge elicitation system is a lexicon
that contains those words that can be deemed to be a common
linguistic core across domains and have a common semantics in
all those domains, that can be used to produce responses
appropriate to all domains.
Thus, just as ELIZA recognises the word 'mother' and invokes a
question about families, so we may recognise the word 'under'
and invoke questions about spatial relationships, or the word
'think' and invoke questions about human agents. The choice of
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lexicon is discussed in Chapter 4.5.
Since this system will perform a type of interviewing we should
adhere to some recognised principles of interviewing (Breuker
and Wielinga 1983):
- know the domain (or in this case the common core of English)
well enough to ask sensible questions;
- know the discourse well enough to ask sensible questions;
- know when to specialise and when to change the subject
(asking for justifications at each step can be very
off-putting (Grover 1983).)
Since this system also aspires to being domain-independent we
should consider criteria of assessment of domain-independence
(Grosz 1987) too:
- can it handle all linguistic domains?;
- does it require undue expertise on the part of the user, for
example, expertise in systems, linguistics, databases or the
current system?;
- how comprehensive is the parser/grammar/lexicon?; can it
handle all natural language or only a sub-set or a technical
sub-set ?;
- to what extent can the user control the dialogue?
Having chosen a suitable lexicon to incorporate into our
elicitation program there are a number of different classes of
questions that can be generated from the words of that lexicon.
Suppose, somewhat improbably, that the propositions
volunteered by our domain expert are:
Bosky is a member of Opus Dei.
Bosky wears a biretta.
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a) lexical elucidation.
The system can ask questions to supply lexical elucidation ,
based on its knowledge of the semantic entailments between
words (Schubert 1976).
...action predicates as different as "give"and "tell"
both involve an agent, an entity directly acted upon..."
For instance, the word 'wear' may generate:
What sort of a garment is a biretta?
Semantic entailments and selection restrictions are
commonplace concepts in linguistics as we will see later. They
are also by no means innovative in artificial intelligence and
expert systems, being variously called integrity constraints or
semantic checkers (e.g. UNITS, KAS, AIMDS etc. (Hayes-Roth
et al 1983)) and being used for maintaining the integrity of
data by checking that the attributes of an object do not
conflict with its super-type in a type hierarchy. We,
however, are interested in their use as knowledge elicitation
devices.
This function of the knowledge elicitation program is discussed
in Chapters 6 and 7.
b)spreading activation.
The system can also ask spreading activation questions that
concern the whole domain, rather than merely the lexical items
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adjacent to the recognised word. For instance the word
'member' may generate the question:
Are there any other members of Opus Dei?
This function of the program is discussed in Chapter 3.
c) inferential.
Another kind of question is the inferential question. This
also concerns the whole domain rather than the lexical items of
the input and results from the comparison of more than one
piece of input.
Do all members of Opus Dei wear birettas?
Another example of a question the system might produce is:
X is Z and Y is Z; how do X and Y differ?
This kind of inferential questioning is exploited by
production rule systems that offer truth maintenance and
completeness checking. It can be used to eradicate the
following problems (Sowa 1984):
conflict: two rules match the same input data but produce
different results;
redundancy: two rules match the same input data and produce
the same results;
subsumption: one rule matches a subset of the cases matched
by a more general rule and the two rules always generate the
same result;
incompleteness: certain combinations of input data are
possible but no existing rule matches that combination.
This function of the program is discussed in Chapter 8.
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d)conceptual.
Another kind of question is the conceptual one. This might
be generated when an unknown word (like 'Bosky') has been used
very frequently.
Tell me more about Bosky.
One could exploit the personal construct techniques as well,
without the constraint that the grids or ratings impose on
them. Dietterich and Michalski (Dietterich and Michalski
1981), in their work on induction, identify 'discriminant'
knowledge or knowing those properties that distinguish a set of
objects from another fixed set of objects, and 'characteristic'
knowledge or knowing those properties that distinguish a set of
objects from ALL other sets of objects. Thus our questions may
include:
How is X different from Y?;
How is X different from everything else?
This function of the program is discussed in Chapter 8.
As we have seen above, this research has two strands, the
enhancement of automated knowledge acquisition and the
characterisation of a set of lexical principles.
Thus, there are two main areas of research that inform the
current work. One is the field of knowledge elicitation which
has been the subject of this chapter. The other is the field
of semantics, especially lexical semantics.
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Before a detailed exposition of the lexical resolution
principles and their role in knowledge elicitation we will look
at the field of lexical semantics. This will be the subject
of the next chapter.
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Chapter 2. Semantics and inference. I.
2.1 Interdisciplinary semantics.
To do justice to a study of lexical semantics one cannot
afford to be circumscribed by the confines of one discipline,
but is a synthesis of semantic theory possible? A wider
question is implied: is a synthesis of disciplines possible?
Not to try would be pusillanimous. In Charles Ives' work
'Three Pieces from New England', a number of brass bands, all
playing different band music, converge on a town. Nhat is
the result? They are all engaged in the same sort of
endeavour. Their directions are converging. But is the result
cacophony or an integrated whole, albeit to the educated ear
alone?
If one were given three texts by, for example, Hume, Piaget and
Saussure, on semantics, they would not appear to be different
parts of one and the same discourse. One would recognise each
discipline as different, even though one had never read these
authors before, because of some distinct quality. This quality
is not the set of things talked about, for example, concept,
sensation, image and meaning. Nor is it the set of questions
to which the writers address themselves, for example, what is a
concept?; what is the definition of meaning?
The difference seems to lie in the the types of inference
deemed valid, the evidence deemed admissible, the answers that
are deemed to be answers, the vocabulary, and most of all,
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what constitutes a theory for the author we are reading.
Variations in vocabulary amongst intellectual groups are
predictable. Types of inference vary as well; induction and
heuristics in psychology, linguistics and natural sciences;
deduction in artificial intelligence, philosophy and formal
systems.
Some disciplines scorn empirical evidence; others are founded
on its study. Some scholars, predictably from a background of
empirical science, discount hypotheses not supported by
empirical evidence. Others, from a philosophical tradition,
eschew such methodologies. What constitutes an answer or a
theory in response to the questions asked is a thorny problem
too. To violate the unwritten methodology of one's discipline
can provoke scepticism or derision: 'that may be true but is
it very interesting?'; 'that is merely a description not a
predictive theory'; 'your theory is normative' or
'unfalsifiable' or 'unsupported by empirical evidence'. Even
theories of the utmost intellectual rigour may just be of no
use outside the discipline they were nurtured in. As Woody
Allen said of philosophy, it isn't much use outside the
classroom, although perhaps he should have distinguished
between philosophical subject matter and philosophical methods.
Another problem is one of style. Sartre's Being and
Nothingness contains various mutually contradictory claims
which can be overlooked in such a long book. However, that
there should be contradictions in six hundred pages is not very
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surprising. It is more rewarding to ask oneself why such a
work is not necessarily undermined by such flaws. The answer
is that rigorously logical thinking does not have the monopoly
in the intellectual marketplace and it is pointless to assess
everyone in the same light. One would not send a critic of
French impressionism to review Tallis's forty part motet.
Another snare is that one is tempted to set up naive dualisms
between different kinds of thinkers (Carnap versus the later
Wittgenstein for example or Russell versus Strawson) when a
moment's thought would suggest that in all probability such
writers had a grasp of both sides of the question but chose
one avenue only to explore. Russell (Russell 1946) in his
History of Western Philosophy takes a similar line. One
should adopt an attitude of 'hypothetical sympathy', he says,
to the theories of great minds (a recommendation to which he
himself pays rather scant regard). This is neither contempt
nor reverence because if we are contemptuous we will never
manage the feat of imagination necessary to comprehend the
theories and if we are reverent we will be blinded to any
errors that may come to the surface. Dualisms may only be
possible at a higher level: formalism versus natural language
philosophy; calculi versus conceptual structures.
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2.2 What is required of a linguistic theory?
There are two arms to the current research. One is knowledge
acquisition; the other is lexical semantics.
One obvious source (and destination) for a theory of lexical
semantics is the field of linguistics. Semantics, a victim of
changing fashions, is nevertheless part of the proper study of
linguistics.
Before assessing semantic theories per se we should ask what is
required of a linguistic theory. For the early Chomsky,
linguistics was a branch of cognitive psychology and any
grammar needed to have descriptive adequacy; that is, it
should have psychological reality for native speakers.
Moreover it should have observational adequacy, that is, it
would account for all and only the permitted sentences of a
language. It should also be exhaustive, consistent and
economical.
Gazdar (Sparck-Jones and Wilks 1983) supports this: an adequate
formal theory of grammar must permit natural languages qua
sets of strings to be generated. It must also permit
significant generalisations to be expressed and support
semantics, that is, provide the basis on which meaning can be
assigned to natural language expressions satisfactorily.
What is a semantic theory? For linguists like Katz it is
one that accounts for the following: synonymy, ambiguity,
redundancy, entailment, presupposition, superordination,
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incompatibility, self-reference and also truth/falsehood by
virtue of meaning. Tarski says (Tarski 1944) that such a
theory also formulates the conditions under which a sentence
of a language may be asserted.
Kempson (Kempson 1977) broadly agrees: the requirements of a
semantic theory are that it assign meaning(s) to each word and
sentence in the language under consideration. Thus in the case
of words it will provide some sort of dictionary and in the
case of sentences some set of rules to show the function from
word meaning to sentence meaning. This is not straightforward:
contraception is a sin as any fool can plainly see
does not, happily, mean the same as
contraception is a sin as any see can plainly fool.
Moreover, word-order may not only alter the meaning of a
sentence but even the meaning of its constituent parts.
Father Blaney has something to do
Father Blaney has to do something
Another requirement of a semantic theory, Kempson claims,
is to show how the meanings of words are related to each
other, that is, by synonymy, entailment and so on ('man',
'woman', 'child', 'girl' share definitive characteristics
in a way 'isard', 'hubris' and 'bradawl' do not). Eikmeyer
(Eikmeyer 1981) agrees: a semantic theory should associate
expressions with meanings and identify semantic
relations (such as hyponymy, meronymy, entailment,
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contradiction and co-occurrence in a semantic field) when they
occur.
A semantic theory should also generalise over sentences rather
than giving an explicit account for each one. This may seem
obvious given that, while the total number of words is finite,
the total number of sentences is infinite. This is not in the
sense that the natural numbers are but in the absence of any
rules prohibiting, say, more than ten conjunctions in a
sentence.
It seems to me that there is a distinction here. The number
20,192,837,463,029
is not equally conceptually rebarbative as the sentence
I know he knows I know he knows I know he is a left-footer
or even
I dreamt I was a butterfly, a-dreaming it was me
since the incremental nature of numbers gives us a principled
way of interpreting them while very recursive or
much-conjoined sentences often involve insurmountable problems
of interpretation.
Until Chomsky and the birth of transformational grammar and
the rise of formal methods, semantics, in linguistics at
least, was more a descriptive pursuit than a formal one:
semantics but not semantic theory. Indeed, interest in
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semantics was minimal in the early days of linguistics. The
first stirrings of linguistic analysis in the eighteenth
century were in response to perceived structural similarities
between languages and in an endeavour to chart the evolution of
language change. In the early twentieth century there was a
shift of interest to synchronic study of language but only as
a descriptive exercise not as a formal analysis. Saussure is
considered the father of structuralism which, in its later
manifestations, was extended to word meaning although
semantics was still an embarrassment to the American
structuralist linguists of the 1930s-1960s. Bloomfield
(Bloomfield 1946) thought the study of meaning wa3 the weak
point in language and would remain so.
The novel approach of Chomsky's generative grammar in the 1950s
did not advance semantic theory greatly (this was not his aim)
despite his efforts to incorporate a semantic level into his
scheme. It is interesting however that here we have perhaps a
partial synthesis between the disciplines of linguistics and
philosophy, in that transformational grammarians like Chomsky
on the one hand and formal semanticists like Russell on the
other, independently laid the foundation stones for the
subsequent belief that natural language could or should be
characterised in a way similar to mathematical or formal
languages, with a formal semantics.
It must be remembered, however, that one cannot prove the
correctness of any theory, linguistic or not, which
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encompasses an infinite range of data since every unobserved
case is a potential counter-example.
2.3 Different definitions of meaning.
The aims of linguistic semantics seem unassailable. Discussion
of meaning in terms of notions like entailment, synonymy and
so on, accords with the assumptions of dictionary writers, and
dictionaries are the most commonly used authorities concerning
meaning.
One should not overlook however how differently other people
have addressed the subject of semantics. Here are some
possible definitions of meaning that demonstrate the diverse
phenomena that can be marshalled to explain the meaning of
words.
The first group of definitions situates meaning in the external
world.
- the meaning of a word is supplied by the necessary and
sufficient conditions for that word to apply;
- to know the meaning of a sentence is to know under what
conditions that sentence would be true (Davidson 1967);
we know the meaning of a sentence if we know when it has been
falsified (Dummett's theory of meaning);
- the meaning of an expression for a speaker is the sum of
situations in which the speaker has heard it (Paul 1909);
- extensionalism: the meaning of a word is the object to which
it refers;
- meaning is systematic relations between types of situations
(Barwise and Perry 1983);
- meaning is use (later Wittgenstein).
Secondly there are the definitions that anchor meaning within
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the head.
- meanings are the mental ideas for which words stand as
external signs (Locke);
- meanings are mental images associated with verbal behaviour
(early Wittgenstein);
- the meaning of an utterance/sentence is what the
hearer/reader thinks you mean (Fay Weldon: you never read
what you write);
- behaviourism: meanings are the stimuli that elicit verbal
responses; 'the meaning of a sign ...is a dispositional
property of the sign where the response, varying with varying
attendant circumstances, consists of psychological processes
in a hearer and where the stimulus is his hearing of the
sign' (Stevenson 1944);
- 'S meant something by X' is (roughly) equivalent to 'S
intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in an
audience by means of the recognition of this intention'
(Grice 1957);
- Strawson's reformulation of Grice: to mean something by X, S
must intend: a) S's utterance of X to produce a certain
response R in a certain audience A; b) A to recognise
S's intention A; c) A's recognition of S's intention (a) to
function as at least part of A's reason for A's response
R (Strawson 1971);
- the meaning of a word is just what the speaker intends it to
mean (Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty) for instance 'glory'
means a nice knock-down argument).
Last of all there are the abstract and recursive definitions in
terms of language itself that seem quite independent of human
beings and the physical world.
- meanings are some kind of eternal archetypes (Plato);
- meaning is 'that set of necessary and sufficient conceptual
features that make it possible for the speaker to separate
the referential potentiality of any one lexical unit from
that of any other unit which might tend to occupy part of
the same semantic domain'; 'a meaning is not a tiling in
itself but only a set of contrastive relations' (Nida 1975)
(cornponential analysis);
- 'the meaning of a word is constituted by its contextual
relations' (Cruse 1986);
- the meaning of a word is a semantic field containing all the
sentential contexts of the word and all the possible
substitutes within those contexts, there being a focal area
of the most normal contexts and substitutes (this is the
paradigm versus syntagm dualism) (Haas 1964; compare Firth
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1957);
- the meaning of a word can be known by the company it keeps
(Firth 1957).
Such a proliferation of definitions of meaning fills one with
dread. Even more so since our concern here which is lexical
ineaning seems to play a very minor role in many of the
definitions, be they formal or pragmatic ones. We need not
founder if we bear in mind that there are really only three
places meaning can be found, crudely: in the world, in the
head and in the abstract. Thus we are talking about three
ontological types: physical objects, mental objects and
abstract objects.
In all semantic theories meanings are the progeny of these
three to greater or lesser degrees of miscegenation.
Here is a brief outline of the main philosophical positions.
2.4 Meanings in the world.
2.5 The referential theory of meaning.
Linguists and their forebears have, understandably, in the pa;
if not the present, devoted much time to the study of the
meaning of words but of course, alongside them, have been
psychologists interested in the meaning of mental objects or
concepts and philosophers concerned with the meaning of
meaning, and all these endeavours interleave.
A longstanding philosophical approach is to equate meaning with
reference. This is extensionalism or 'the meaning of a word
is its relation to the objects to which it refers'. So,
proper nouns refer to individuals, common nouns to sets of
individuals, verbs to actions, adjectives to properties of
individuals and adverbs to properties of actions (Russell
1902).
There are well-known problems in this approach, for instance,
in accounting for the different reference of a word when
referring to a class, a null class, a specific set or any set,
for example:
cleats have many uses
cleats are non-existent now
Biddulph is looking at the cleats
I need at least three dozen cleats
Another problem is that abstract nouns ('happiness'), function
words ('and', 'whether', 'in', 'very') and mythical words
('behemoth', 'leviathan') don't seem to have objects of
reference.
Of course a totalitarian approach would extirpate all those
words like 'behemoth' that were neither logical operators nor
had reference. This is the road to logical positivism that a
number of thinkers have strayed down over the centuries.
Swift, in his 'Gulliver's Travels', satirised Sprat of the
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Royal Society by inventing a society where, since words were
only allowed to stand for things, people carried the things
themselves around with them instead. This policy, designed to
eradicate unnecasary floridnesses of style, has the effect, if
taken to extremes, of eradicating all that is abstract,
poetical, metaphysical and metaphorical. (Kant was in favour of
restricting the conceptual machinery of our experience to
physical experiences. He believed there to be twelve concepts,
not learnt from experience but provided by the understanding,
that we apply to it and are indispensible in this regard.
However to attempt to apply them to metaphysics is erroneous
and speculative metaphysics is a natural error.)
Frege describes a logically perfect language (Frege 1892)
where no new sign can be invented unless it has already been
secured a reference. Thus, in language, as in mathematics,
ontological errors can be avoided.
'The will of the people' can serve as an
example; for it i3 easy to establish
that there is at any rate no generally
accepted reference for this expression.
It was the absence of reference for the subject of sentences
like 'the King of France exists' that led Russell to deny that
the meaning of a definite description is the object that it
designates. This makes sense really. Definite descriptions
seem to be more like properties. A similar linguistic
phenomenon is the usage of the word 'is' where 'is' does not
imply identity, for example in the English form of words used
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to rafer to age. We do not suppose that the sentence 'Didier
is six years old' expresses an identity relation between two
objects: the more appropriate relation is revealed in the
French rendering 'Didier a six ans'.
Russell construed the logical form of the sentence 'the King of
France exists' as
there is a King of France and no more than one King of France.
This interpretation, of course, as Strawson pointed out, cannot
be imposed on 'the lightbulb is broken'. Strawson would
rather say that such sentences are neither true nor false in
themselves but can be used to make a true or false statement.
Incidentally, one has to say that it is easier to make
objections to Russell's theory than propose a counter-theory.
It is surely the case that once we have established a
discourse entity as focus, namely a particular lightbulb,
then, for the purposes of our conversation, there is a
lightbulb and no more than one lightbulb. Strawson's
distinction between referring and saying what we are referring
to is harder to counter.
Russell's line of argument forced him to give up the assumption
that proper names are names but rather to say (with Frege)
that they are 'abbreviated descriptions'. Thus 'Pegasus' would
be rendered as 'the winged horse of Greek mythology'. This of
course allows the objection that
Pegasus is the winged horse of Greek mythology
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can be rewritten after substitution as
the winged horse of Greek mythology is the winged "horse of
Greek mythology.
This solution also fails to provide a definite description for
'Fred' or 'Ena': there may indeed be many or no set that
uniquely picks out the individual.
Others (Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975) have also claimed that the
classical view that proper names differ from other concepts in
that they have reference but not meaning is incorrect. Thus,
it is true just as much for 'peccary' as it is for 'Praise-God
Barebones' that its reference is fixed by an initial act of
baptism and maintained by the continuous usage of the term.
There are other reasons for abandoning a referential theory of
meaning besides the inability of the theory to accommodate
logical operators, abstract words and so on. One of the most
convincing reasons for this is the philosophical one traceable
from the Stoics down to Russell and Husserl. The Stoics
distinguished between the sign, the meaning and the external
thing or situation referred to by a word, describing the
meaning as 'the thing we perceive as subsisting within our
thought' or 'what the barbarians do not understand when they
hear the Greek words spoken'.
For Husserl, the fact that the phrases 'the victor at Jena' and
'the vanquished at Waterloo' refer to the same man, Napoleon,
but have different meanings, conclusively drives an
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ontological wedge between meaning and reference. (This is
another variation of the substitution objection above.)
Another example is the well-known referential equivalence of
'creature with a heart' and 'creature with a kidney',
expressions that nevertheless seem to have different meanings.
(That two words may have the same intension but different
extensions is also a possibility as Putnam demonstrated
(Putnam 1973).)
Another problem with the referential theory of meaning (or
rather the same substitution problem in another guise) is that,
as Frege knew, the verbs 'say', 'hear', 'think', 'conclude',
'perceive', 'know' ,'is unaware', 'is surprised' and 'fancy'
take complements that cannot be substituted. Quine calls
these words 'referentially opaque'. This is true also of modals
('9 is necessarily greater than 7' cannot be rendered as 'the
number of planets is necessarily greater than 7') (Quine
1971).
Another problem with the referential theory of meaning is that
we may understand the meaning of an expression, say, 'the
fattest Catholic priest in Connaught' without knowing the
reference. For physical sensations, paradoxically, to know
the sense is to know the reference. The proposition
I have got a pain
has not got independent sense and reference.
There are various lines of defence in the face of all these
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objections. One is to abandon referential meaning in favour
of some mentalist or structuralist theory; another is to
modify the referential theory so that it refers not to the
external world but to a set of possible worlds which can
contain all sorts of objects, for instance, extinct ones,
unborn ones, the total class of any object and so on.
Perhaps a referential theory of meaning is a misconception
anyway. It is surely no accident that we have two expressions
'means' and 'refers to': they are certainly not interchangeable
in the following two sentences.
the name 'Alf Trampleasure' refers to our janitor
gibbous means pregnant
2.6 Truth conditional semantics.
It is clear, from the above concern that referential semantics
be truth-preserving, that the referential theory of meaning is
closely bound up with truth conditional semantics, an idea
that comes from the ancient Greeks. The basic terminology for
discussing language was developed by the Greeks and adapted by
the Romans. Plato, and then Aristotle, distinguished between
onoma (subject) and rhema (predicate). For Aristotle, a noun
plus a verb made up a complete thought, and this notion
pervaded mediaeval grammar studies. For example, for Petrus
Hispanus (Pope John XXI) the noun and verb were the main parts
of the sentence, the rest being syncategorematic. Aristotle
had made the same distinction between onoma, rhema and
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syndesmoi. (Incidentally, it is claimed that Hispanus also
identified adjectives, proper names and definite descriptions,
and distinguished between intension and extension, object
language and meta-language, universal, existential and
indexical statements, and between paradigmatic and svtagmatic
choice. The building that he built to study in collapsed and
killed him: an unfortunate end for an architect of linguistic
theory.)
Truth conditional semantics, as Aristotle pointed out in his
Metaphysics, operates not at the level of the word but at the
level of the sentence.
An onoma or rhema by itself [roughly, a subject or a
predicate] resembles a concept that is neither combined
nor disjoined. Such is 'man', for example, or 'white'
if pronounced without addition. As yet it is not true or
false.
To 3ay of what is that it is not, or of what is
not that it is is false, while to say of what
is that it is, or of what is not that it is not,
is true.
Aristotle's views on semantics were also adopted by Leibniz,
Frege and the early Wittgenstein among others. Indeed, right
up to the present day there persists a strong disinclination in
philosophy to separate the studies of meaning and truth (for
example, Blackburn 1984). Truth conditional semantics is
important but there is a lot more to the meaning of words than
this, in the form of lexicography, etymology, philology and
lexical relations. Clouds of dust rise from the page at the
mention of certain of these rather nineteenth-century concepts
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and philosophers and formal semanticists are uncomfortable
discussing them. It is not clear why this is so and one aim of
this research is to show that a rigorous and principled
approach to lexical semantics is possible.
Suffice it to say, for most philosophers of language, the
relation between meaning and truth is the one that most
occupied their thoughts. Wittgenstein's Tractatus looked for a
logical form that encapsulated logical relationships and the
inferences from a proposition. This theory of meaning was
elaborated in the logician Tarski's (Tarski 1944) theory of
truth which stated that a sentence S is true if and only if P,
where S is the name of that sentence and P the set of
conditions which guarantee the truth of that sentence, for
example, 'snow is white' if and only if snow is white. Tarski's
theory cannot contain its own truth predicate because of the
existence of paradoxical sentences. Kripke's solution is to
allow such paradoxical sentences to fall into truth value gaps
(Fitting 1986).
Tarski's theory of truth is not adequate though. As Kempson
(Kempson 1977) points out, it may be contingently true that
the sky is blue if and only if the sun is shining but we would
not want to say that the one is a specification of the meaning
of the other; compare also 'snow is white' if and only if
grass is green.
Another problem with truth-conditional semantics is that we may
not be happy with the two-valued logic that it is based on.
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Russell and Strawson, as we have seen above, took issue on
this subject when considering sentences like
the King of France is bald
(Russell 1902; Strawson 1950). Russell, to ascertain its
truth value would decompose it into the concatenation of a
number of propositions and if they were all true the sentence
was true otherwise it was false. The situation described by
the original sentence did not obtain at the time and thus was
false.
For Frege and Strawson (Strawson 1950), however, this
conclusion is meaningless for the very reason that there was no
King of France at that time. The existence of the King of
France is a presupposition. Presuppositions, unlike
entailments, follow from a sentence whether it is true or
false. If we believe that a theory of meaning is defined in
terms of entailment then there is no place in this theory for
presuppositions. Of course the problem is that if we accept
this idea of presupposition our original sentence is neither
true nor false and cannot be dealt with by two-valued logic.
Not only noun phrases have presuppositions; verbs like
'regret' and 'realise' presuppose the truth of the thing
regretted or realised as they do also when preceded by a
negative. This, as Kempson points out however, suggests that
one cannot logically deny the proposition in the same
sentence. However, consider
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1 Vernon regretted eating Bim's pie
2 Vernon didn't regret eating Bira's pie
3 Vernon didn't regret eating Bim's pie because he hadn't eaten
it
Most people would be happy with 3 which implies either that
there is another type of negation (external as opposed to
internal negation; denial of a previous assertion as opposed
to negative description) under which presuppositions are not
maintained or that we should abandon the idea of
presupposition and talk only of entailment. Gazdar (Gazdar
1979) identifies seven kinds of presuppositional construction.
1 the man who ate it should pay up (definite description)
2 Pons regrets that Ponce suffered the bastinado (factive)
3 George has stopped doing it (aspectual)
4 Emily managed to disguise it (implicative)
5 the dog has defiled the pergola again (iterative)
6 it was the lord-lieutenant who won the knitted pilch (cleft)
7 what the housemaster ate was my india rubber (pseudo-cleft)
Another problem with presupposition is what happens in the
conjunction of two propositions if the presupposition of one
is what is being asserted in the other, for example
Vernon is married and his wife has a road haulage company
Suppose Vernon is not married. Then the second conjunct is
neither true nor false, according to Strawson and Frege, while
the first conjunct is definitely false. How would we build a
truth table for 'and' under these circumstances, or indeed any
of the other logical operators? What are the semantic rules
that pair a sentence with its truth conditions?
Quine has argued (Ouine 1953) that the terms analytic truth,
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meaning, definition and synonymy are interdefineable and so it
is vacuous to try and explain any of them in terms of any
other. Moreover, he claims that the analytic/synthetic
distinction is mistaken. Others disagree (Fodor, Bever and
Garrett 1974) that while the total number of analytic
sentences may be small and all too familiarly dreary they do
exist by virtue of the properties of language, for example,
if Vernon is a bachelor then he is not a married man
if Vernon kissed Vera then Vera was kissed by Vernon
Kempson points out too that circularity is inevitable in
self-contained systems like mathematics and logic, as Quine
seems to allow (Quine 1960 but see also 1953).
Truth conditional semantics per se equates meaning with the
logical form of a sentence and this theory of meaning enables
one to make logical inferences only. However, there is
obviously more to meaning than this, not just in terms of
analytic but also synthetic inferences. Componential theories
of meaning make inferences as a result of lexical
decomposition that cannot be made merely on the basis of
logical form. This distinction is crucial and accounts for the
curious inability to communicate between logicians and
linguists on the subject of semantics. For logicians
entailment is a logical relation (example 1); for linguists it
can be a semantic one as well (example 2).
1 Vernon is a plumber and Vernon uses a molewrench
Vernon uses a molewrench
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2 Arthur is a widower
Arthur had a wife
There is a middle ground between these extremes, governed by-
new and extended logics, that would account for
Socrates is a man and all men are mortal therefore Socrates is
mortal (predicate calculus);
Arthur knows he is a curmudgeon therefore he is a curmudgeon
(epistemic logic);
if it is raining then it is possible that it is raining (modal
logic)
and so on. However, broadly speaking, the two domains of
formal semantics and lexical semantics do not make comfortable
bedfellows. Kempson is happy to define synonymy as mutual
entailment but this in itself does not give us a procedure for
detecting synonyms unless we can independently establish
entailments.
Another problem with truth conditional semantics is its
inability to give a full account of the semantics of
non-indicative sentences: questions, commands, performative
utterances ('I name this ship Podsnap') and so on. Aristotle
knew this to be true. Like Protagoras, he recognised various
sentence types including, interestingly, the question,
statement, command and prayer and suggested that, for example,
a prayer has neither truth nor falsity.
There are also a large number of function words that are deemed
not to affect the truth conditions of a sentence like 'even',
'really' and so on that are nevertheless not quite
semantically empty. Aristotle identified Greek particles as
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expressions that 'do not have meaning
meaning] but link those that do'.
[that is, referential
We should also remember that the truth or falsity of a sentence
is not necessarily the most important thing about it. This is
not only true of various kinds of speech act ('well that was a
clever thing to do, to go to Didsbury without a waterproof')
but also of poetic or aesthetic pieces of language. As Frege
says (Frege 1892) of epic poems:
The question of truth would cause us to abandon
aesthetic delight for an attitude of scientific
investigation... it is a matter of no concern
to us whether the name 'Odysseus' ...has
reference....
This is not only true of the aesthetic and poetic. If I state
the proposition
opposite my window is an old man in a coral pink jumper
climbing the steps to a house and a girl in a Saxe blue vest
walking by eating a Cornish pasty
the reader has no means of verifying the claim which
incidentally is no longer true. But who cares? One thing is
certain. The reader does not need to ascertain the truth of
the proposition before constructing a mental concept or image
or reflecting on the intra-sentential lexical relations. Nor
would the image be abruptly extinguished on discovering that I
had lied. Indeed, it is sometimes forgotten that (except for
certain acts of faith) we have to understand the meaning of
something before we can say whether it is true or not.
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However, this position of Frege's misses the point. Whether
my proposition about the Cornish pasty is true or not is indeed
irrelevant but that does not undermine the fact that to know
its meaning we must know what state of affairs would have to
obtain for it to be true.
Another problem with truth-conditional semantics is that it may
also seem unintuitive that the reference of a sentence is its
truth value giving all true sentences the same reference and
obliterating all that is specific to a particular true
sentence.
One of the most uncomfortable discrepancies between classical
logic and the semantics of natural language is the law of the
excluded middle, tertium non datur, P or not P. Once, when I
was working in a shop, an American boy came up, pointed at the
cash register and said: 'Is that a washing machine or
something?' When I said it wasn't he replied 'But everything
is a washing machine or something.' Thus classical logic, P
or not P, made a brief and inappropriate appearance. However,
one does not need to have very conservative tendencies to
cling on to this above all axioms. This is not only because
to abandon it causes one's truth tables to disintegrate, but
because it takes the extension principle with it and opens the
door to non-monotonicity.
However, there are numerous occasions on which we would want
to say, in response to a question, 'yes and no' or 'it is and
it isn't'. It is not possible to say whether a newspaper is
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black, yes or no. It is and it isn't. The mistaken belief
that a property must apply throughout, to a plenum, rather
than to differentiated parts, allows the following amongst
other expressions: 'his work is both good and original, but
the parts that are original are not good and the parts that are
good are not original'. Not everything is as
undifferentiated as the curate's egg no doubt was.
In conversation with the linguist David Cram on the laws of
proverbial logic he argued that the logic of proverbs and saws
is quite different from classical logic. 'You can't tell a
book by its cover' and 'the apparel oft proclaims the man' seem
to suggest the axiom P and not whe-n Lojkei*.
It is also non-intuitive to say that not not P implies P.
Problems such as this inspired intuitionistic logicians to
develop an alternative to classical logic without the axiom P
or not P. Here, in every situation, every statement is either
true or fails to be true. Something that fails to be true can
become true but not vice versa. Thus everything that is
intuitionistically provable is classically valid.
Entailment from negation is a thorny problem. 'I don't dislike
Bevis' as we have seen does not entail 'I like Bevis'. This is
an interesting phenomenon and is related to the idea of
oppositeness. It is well known that we do not call things
opposites unless they share a common dimension. They must be
opposites on some axis (for example, 'hot' and 'cold' on the
axis of 'heat') (Cruse 1986). Mere remoteness of concepts ('bow
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tie' and 'truculsnce' for example) is not a sufficient
condition for us to call them opposites. Negation however does
not constrain us to any particular semantic axis. If something
is not hot this does not mean it is cold. We may be talking
about a piece of music or something of which heat is not a
property.
If someone says 'I don't know what I am accused of', does he
mean he doesn't know if it is P or Q or that he hasn't a clue
which of all the laws on the statute book he is accused of?
Negation doesn't commit itself. We can get round this in a
dialogue system by asking the user to be specific of course.
'I dislike Fred' unilaterally but not mutually entails 'I do
not like Fred'. 'I like Fred' unilaterally but not mutually
entails 'I do not dislike Fred'. Lyons discusses a taxonomy of
oppositeness relations (Lyons 1977).
Entailment from negation in sentences can of course be very
complicated. Consider the possible entailments from the
following sentence fragment.
it wasn't that the house master with the wall eye said that the
boy had abused the swimming pool
We cannot tell what exactly is being negated here.
It is clear that language is vaguer and more ambivalent than
logic.
Truth conditional semantics is useful in characterising
synonymy or, what Cruse calls, cognitive synonymy (Cruse
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1986). Synonymy is a lexical relation of antiquity among
other rhetorical devices observed by the Sophist Prodicus.
Cognitive synonyms, according to Cruse, have to be
syntactically identical and yield the same truth conditions
when substituted for one another. Cruse suggests 'fiddle' and
'violin'. Sentences that are identical except for the
replacement of words by their cognitive synonyms, stand in
mutual entailment to one another.
Synonymy might conceivably be a useful relation for
knowledge elicitation purposes. If, for the sake of argument,
one believed that 'is a subordinate of' is a synonym of 'is a
member of' then any inferences that one could make from the
first could also be made from the second.
Some synonyms are only partial which makes this more difficult,
for example,
I almost killed him; I practically killed him;
we're almost there; we're practically there.
The trouble is that to exclude all partial synonyms would
probably leave us with none.
Other synonyms are bound by syntactic constraints only and so
can be considered synonymous for semantic purposes, for
example,
go and hide; *go and conceal;
I have finished; *1 have completed.
It is the flexibility of words and their shifting strata of
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semantic traits that makes the characterisation of synonymy so
difficult. Substitution without change of meaning is not
enough. For example 'my iVihe-F has got brown eyes' can
undergo successful substitution and become 'my jpacept has got
brown eyes' but one would not say that 'parent' and 'father'
are synonyms. Substitution in both directions is required.
Some synonymy is vague. Some synonyms are better than others:
• sofa'-'couch' are possibly better than 'dirty'-'soiled' (Cruse
1986). One might think it was to do with the number of
semantic traits two words shared. Cruse shows this is not so.
'Spaniel' and 'alsatian' share many but are not synonyms or
near-synonyms. There has to be a concomitant decrease in
contrastiveness.
There are various definitions of synonymy: having identical
contextual relations (Cruse 1986), having identical meanings,
being identical on all relevant dimensions of meaning (Lyons
1981). Applying such criteria reveals the rarity of true
synonyms. Fortunately for knowledge elicitation purposes such
theoretic niceties are largely superfluous. It may be that
recorded differences do not have any effect on entailment
which is our main concern here. For instance, 'munch' and
'chew', though good candidates, are not substitutable in 'John
was chewing gum'. However most of the entailments we might make
from 'munch' are entailments from 'chew' too, for instance
there is an animate agent, a mouth is involved and so on. Many
differences appear to be merely differences of convention.
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Semantic nuances are difficult to identify, for example,
he looks almost Chinese
he looks nearly Chinese.
One can see the oddity while being reassured that entailment is
the same from 'nearly' and 'almost'. It could be argued that
identical entailments are a criterion of synonymy.
In any event however, we should not expect a lot from a study
of synonymy when so many words have subtly different senses,
for example,
I am about to build a chapelle ardente
I am about to throw up
I met my wife in Paris
I met the Vicar in Safeways
A synonym is required to share all the senses of the word in
question.
Plesionyms, or words that differ very slightly in meaning and
do not preserve truth but yield sentences with different truth
conditions, are really mora common than synonyms, for example,
foggy-misty; fearless-brave; pretty-handsome. In other words
you can assert one and deny the other.
Synonymy is rare as one might expect from the plurality of the
real world despite frequent claims of identicality. Of
course one would not construe such claims as ones of numerical
identity but even qualitative identity is rare despite
peculiar claims one comes across.
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this cot is identical to the Rosalind cot you ordered but has
been substituted due to unavailability
It is not clear what this claims except almost-identicality.
It is odd that synonymy has excited such attention from
linguists, being often quoted as one of the phenomena a good
linguistic theory must account for. The virtual
non-existence of synonyms, except when taken from different
linguistic registers ('begin', 'commence'), perhaps suggests
that it is of more marginal interest than is believed and
should be put away with other dusty linguistic beasts like
zeugma, synecdoche and the rest.
Thus, another projected use of truth conditional semantics, to
underwrite synonymy, 3eems rather vacuous. It seems that those
linguistic phenomena that can be encompassed by the referential
theory of meaning and truth conditional semantics are of a dry,
logical or objective kind and the shifting subtleties of
lexical semantics perpetually elude them.
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2.7 Performative semantics.
Referential and truth conditional semantics place meanings 'out
there' in the world. There are many other theories that also
explain meaning in terms of real things siich as physical
objects, situations, utterances, actions and so on. I call
the following theories performative for want of a better
blanket term to describe the theory of meaning as use, the main
proponents of which are Grice (Grice 1975), Austin (Austin
1940) and Searle (Searle 1969). As Austin (Austin 1940) says:
It may justly be urged that, properly speaking,
what alone has meaning is a sentence... We say
'look up a word in the dictionary' but words and
phrases have meaning only in the sense that there
are sentences in which they occur....You might think...
that you could ask: 'What is the meaning of a word?', i.e.
a word in general, any word, no particular word. This is
spurious. It is like saying: 'What is the meaning of X?'
when X is uninstantiated. Its the philosophical fallacy
of asking about Nothing-In-Particular.
Perhaps this is partly true: it is certainly hazardous to try
and use abstract words one has discovered in a dictionary
('degringolade') without a few contextual authorities. I don't
really feel this is true of concrete ones though. Waving
discovered that 'spraynts' means otter-dung I feel fairly sure
I could use the word correctly if I ever came across any to
talk about.
For Austin, concepts and abstract ideas are fictitious entities
but most people still think there is something that is the
meaning of a word. Hampshire believes that there is not one
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meaning of a word but that the meaning of a word is a class of
'similar particular ideas'. Austin, however, says that this
class is just as fictitious an entity as a concept or abstract
idea. Morris says that 'a meaning' is not 'simply located'
somewhere that can be referred to without the total activity of
'semiosis', but then he goes on to talk of the 'designatum' of
a word which is a kind or class of object. Austin says that
this is as fictitious an entity as a Platonic idea.
Austin (Austin 1940) claimed some utterances were obviously not
just descriptions of events (for example, 'I promise to stew
the windfalls'). The meaning of such utterances is not best
characterised by reference or truth conditions but by the
function or use to which the utterance is put, the action it
performs and the presuppositions inherent in it. Thus, an
utterance's meaning may be to insult, inform, warn and so on.
The theory is more complex than this. Suppose I say 'I promise
to return your tain o' shanter' . There are three acts going on,
according to Austin: the locutionary act of just uttering the
sentence (voicing those six words); the illocutionary act
(actually making a promise thereby, not just referring to one)
and the Derlocutionary act (getting the hearer to respond, for
example, by lending the tarn o' shanter).
Thus, a logical, lexical or truth conditional analysis of
the utterance is somehow missing the main point of what such an
utterance means. (Kempson points out, however, that a
truth-conditional account may be possible; it's just that, for
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example, making a promise is part of its own truth condition
(Kempson 1977 )).
One cannot be entirely happy with this analysis. It seems
stretching a point to say that someone's ulterior motives in
uttering a sentence (purloining someone else's tarn o' shanter)
are part of the meaning of that utterance. On the other hand
the theory is really the only explanation of certain wry and
ironic comments. There is no doubt that the sentence 'Oh
you're here' is of little descriptive import and short on
information as people usually know that they are immanent
(compare the SDP's vacuous slogan 'the time is now'). Thus
Austin (compare Searle 1969) says the question is not one of
the truth value of an utterance but its appropriateness
according to certain conditions (that have sadly to be
painstakingly enumerated).
An observation by Putnam (Putnam 1973) seems to support the
'meaning as use' school of thought. It is surely a fact that
many of us use words in good faith without any formal
verification method or lexical safety net but just because they
have worked for us before and have a conventional usage.
everyone to whom the word gold is important for
any reason has to acquire the word 'gold';
but he does not have to acquire the method of
recognising whether something is or is not gold.
Such a task is accomplished by the division of linguistic
labour.
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One is always tempted to generalise from a good theory. Thus
the performative semanticists, although their theory is
restricted to the spoken word, tried to extend it to all
utterances, not just ones that were obviously self-referential
events of the 'I-name-this-ship' variety, or non-indicative
utterances. We will see below that more modern theories of
semantics (situation semantics) have also felt the need to
invoke the context of use and the situation of utterance to
characterise meaning but it seems eccentric to reject lexical
and referential information when it has an obvious bearing on
the meaning of a word.
The desire for parsimony, to develop a general-purpose
semantics, does tempt us to abandon common sense even when it
serves our purpose well. The fact that behemoths don't exist
doesn't mean a referential account of the meaning of the word
'bucket' is useless. The fact that buckets exist doesn't
mean an ideational account of the meaning of the word 'centaur'
is useless either. Hume, Locke and others (Hume 1739,
Locke 1690) considered that the only explanation of the
thoughts 'centaiir', 'unicorn', 'golden mountain' and other,
perhaps fanciful, ideas, came from a combination of a number
of impressions that referential objects like 'man', 'horse'
and 'golden' gave rise to.
Thus, there is a danger that, in spreading a performative
theory of utterances to cover all language, the theory becomes
very thin indeed. It also seems to drive an unnecessary wedge
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between spoken and written language. Any text that is not
writ ten in the first person is fairly inaccessible to a
semantic account like this yet it is potentially equally
comprehensible to a native speaker as the utterances of his
fellow countrymen are. He doesn't have to wear different
interpretative hats for spoken and written language.
It may be that implicatures or just ellipsis ('The time [most
suitable for David Owen to be elected] is now') provide as good
an explanation as speech-act theory. At the end of the day
speech-act theory does not give a satisfactory account of the
intrinsic meaning of words which seems to be what makes all
kinds of discourse comprehensible to speakers of the language.
A more hopeful development of this theory is to replace an
analysis of meaning by an analysis of the conditions for the
appropriate use of words and sentences (Fillmore and Langendoen
1971). Thus, (if it is possible to enumerate such a set of
conditions at all without coming to the conclusion that every
sentence is multiply ambiguous) we may draw on the external
world ('that bucket'), speaker's presuppositions ('my son is a
plumber' presupposes I have a son), hyponymic entailment ('my
son is a plumber' entails I am a mother), speaker's intention
('I promise to return the drain-rods' effects a promissory
speech-act) and so on.
Such a powerful procedure is difficult to gainsay. One thing
must be said. Formalising such a theory would be difficult.
The logical flavour of words like 'entail' may suggest to us
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that such a theory is merely a common sense extension of
truth-conditional semantics and logical form. However, the
conjunction 'but' is an indicator of pragmatic implicature, for
example 'my brother is a plumber but he suffers from
hydrophobia' implies that most plumbers are sanguine about
water. In logical form 'but' would be replaced by the 'and'
connective and the implicature is lost. It i3 not a trivial
task to define a formalism that would render the sentence
complete with all its attendant presuppositions.
Also, Kempson (Kempson 1977) points out that such a theory
doesn't intermesh with transformational grammar. A semantics
of use would be associated with the performance level rather
than semantics of logical form that is associated with
competence at the level of deep structure. One is uneasy about
the increasing chasm between sentence meaning and utterance
meaning that this theory forces us towards, although this may
be unavoidable.
From the consideration of meaning as use, it is a short step to
theories of communication. If some utterances are only
explicable in terras of 3ome function that they have in a
conversation ('Oh you're here') then perhaps this is the key
to a thorough-going account of all utterances and even written
language. The best known contribution to a theory of
communication is that of Grice (Grice 1975).
As we saw above, Grice attempts to give a principled account of
why people say things. The theory is based on the implicit
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subordination of interlocutors to the Cooperative Principle
which embodies constraints on what one normally has regard to
in a conversation, for example, quantity, quality, relevance,
perspicuity, clarity, brevity and so on. The theory is that,
if the Principle is flouted in a manner obvious to both
parties, then it is being flouted with some other purpose in
mind that is itself compatible with the Cooperative Principle.
Such collusive violations are called conversational
imDlicatures and convey some kind of meta-meaning over and
above the intrinsic meaning of the sentence, a meta-meaning
which is not predictable from that sentence but peculiar to
the participants in the situation of utterance.
The first thing to say is that the theory is normative not
predictive or deductive (Grice 1975).
Since to calculate a conversational implicature
is to calculate what has to be supposed in order
to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative
Principle has been observed, and since there may be
various possible specific explanations, a list of which
may be open, the conversational implicatum in such cases
will be a disjunction of such specific explanations;
and if the list of these is open the implicatum
will have just the kind of indeterminacy that many
actual implicate do in fact seem to possess.
This seems to be more realistic than Gazdar (Gazdar 1979)
because indeterminacy is hard to handle formally
I shall mostly ignore it... a fuller
treatment of implicature would not be guilty
of this omission which is really only
defensible on formal grounds.
As Rieger warns (Rieger 1981), we should not seek to 'make
imprecise phenomena precise in order to render them accessible
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to exact analysis'.
Theories of meaning as convention, which include both
performative and pragmatic theories, have interested
philosophers since Plato and the ancient Greeks. In the
Socratic dialogue Cratylus, the debate concerns the source of
language as convention or the physical world. The physis-nomos
dispute concerned whether there is a natural connection between
the shape of words and what they stand for. Aristotle says
an onoma signifies this or that by convention.
No sound is by nature an onoma: it becomes one by
becoming a symbol.
However this is a long way from the meaning of whole sentences
being a matter of convention, or is it? In his later work
Wittgenstein abandoned a picture theory of meaning for a
theory of language as use or language as a tool or game with
which to effect communication. Harris (Harris 1990) believes
that Wittgenstein (in his post-Tractatus philosophy) and
Saussure (in his posthumously published lectures) shared a view
of how language works as a rule-governed game. For Saussure
this conclusion was linked with his belief that the value of
words was derived from other words rather than from a one-to-
one correlation with extra-linguistic entities. Likewise,
Wittgenstein believed that the meaning of a word was its use,
not some object for which it stood as a surrogate. Both
compared words with pieces in a game of chess.
This, incidentally, has some similarities with game theoretic
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semantics. Game theory is a mathematical theory dealing with
game-Like situations in which participants wish to maximise
some property from a position of uncertainty with respect to
the state of nature and the actions of other players. This
involves predicting another's actions and predictions. It has
been applied to semantics by Hintikka and others (Hintikka
1975). Game theoretic semantics is similar to Dummett's theory
of meaning (Dummett 1976). The meaning of a sentence
links the content of an assertion with the
commitment that a speaker undertakes in making
that assertion; an assertion is a kind of gamble that
the speaker will not be proved wrong.
Kempson suggests that perfomative and pragmatic theories of
language can be assimilated into a Ghomskian model if it is
allowed that they are theories of performance that do not
militate with semantic theory at the level of competence. It is
not clear what this claim amounts to. Unless the
transformation rules are explicitly formulated then presumably
no theory of performance would be incompatible with any theory
of competence. It i3 not clear what value there is in trying
to coerce language use conventions into a formal structure. It
is at any rate hard to give a purely semantic explanation of
why I say 'Is that your hat in the bath?' if I really mean
'Recover your hat from the bath'.
2.8 Formal semantics.
Under the heading 'meanings in the world' I would include
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formal semantics (oaca Frege and his followers, who believed
either that meanings were 'graspable' abstracts or mental
intensions), since formal semantics, or more precisely model
theory, characterises meanings in terms of models or possible
worlds.
Formal semantics is the interpretation of a formal language,
that is, a means of assigning truth-values to the sentences of
that language or systematically linking a formal language with
a semantic universe or domain of discourse. There are three
important notions: a precisely defined language, a semantic
universe and a function that maps each well-formed formula of
the language onto its meaning in the semantic universe.
Montague semantics is the main formal semantic development in
linguistics. It was born of Montague's initial conviction that
formal and natural languages are fundamentally the same, in
that they give the meaning of a sentence by connecting it to
tne world. (This can be contrasted with the linguistic
semanticists Katz, Jackendoff and Lakoff, who give the meaning
of a sentence by translating it into another language.)
Montague semantics is built on categorial grammar but goes
beyond it, translating the syntactic structiires of English
into intensional logic and then giving them a set-theoretic
semantic interpretation. Model theory is a branch of
mathematical logic that studies the properties of formal
systems via their models, through 3et-theoretic
interpretations as opposed to proof-theory. Thus we can see
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from the outset that the chief concern of one of the main
branches of formal semantics is not lexical semantics but
logical semantics as revealed by the syntax of natural
language.
Categorial grammar, on which Montague semantics is built, has
its roots in the discipline of philosophy but since then it
has been taken up in many guises by philosophers, namely
formal semanticists like Montague, Lewis and Cresswell,
linguists and computational linguists.
Husserl (Reichl 1982) wanted an a priori universal grammar
which specified the laws covering the combination of
meaningful elements. The idea is that (as in the discussion of
grammatical functions) the meaningfulness of a sentence such
as 'this tree is green' doesn't depend solely on the meaning
of its individual components but rather on the possibility to
see it as an instance of the schema 'this S is P' where S and P
are meaning categories standing for nominal and adjectival.
He wanted to assign categories to words according to
functional substitutability, specify which combinations of
categories ace possible and state laws for assigning
categories to those combinations.
As extended by Ajdukiewicz (Ajdukiewicz 1935), and still,
broadly speaking, today, the theory specifies two basic
categories, the sentence S and the name N. Derived categories
are built out of these, for example, an intransitive verb like
'sneezes' is defined as requiring an N (for example 'Vernon')
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as an argument in order to become an S (that is 'Vernon
sneezes' ). The category of 'sneezes' under certain variants
of categorial grammar would thus be N\S or 'something looking
backwards for a noun to become a sentence', directionality
being required to exclude 'sneezes Vernon'. The idea when
parsing is to cancel out.
Saumjan's (Reichl 1982) version of categorial grammar handled
lexical decomposition too (for example 'autumnal' is derived
by applying a function to 'autumn') and also case grammar (for
example, the agentive 'runner' is derived by applying a
function to the verb 'run'). Tie also had categories denoting
aspect, tense, mood, causatives, diminutives and so on.
Long distance dependencies are the main challenge for any
grammar. This theory is open to the same objections as
phrase structure grammars in that it is restricted to surface
structures (it cannot handle 'Birkin wrapped the cleats up')
unless other techniques of analysis than straightforward
cancelling-out are adopted.
Categorial grammar follows the strong competence hypothesis of
Bresnan, namely that there should be a direct correspondence
between the rules of grammar and the rules of processing.
Current theories of categorial grammar attempt to show that the
cancellation process can be applied incrementally to an input
string and that at any point there will be a semantic
interpretation for what has bean consumed so far, rather in
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the way that we jump to semantic conclusions in real life. It
seems likely however, that we invoke far more world and lexical
knowledge in pruning possible parses than is available in the
lexicon of a simple categorial grammar. Moreover, categorial
grammar categories may be intended to, but do not always,
parallel semantic types, nor do combination rules always
parallel semantic operations. Also, despite the intuitive
appeal of an incremental theory as opposed to one involving
deep structure, it does have trouble with simple sentences
like 'Vernon ate the porridge quickly' since the sentence has
been cancelled out completely before the word 'quickly' has
been reached, requiring a new cancellation to be carried out.
Steedman's solution to this is to add functional composition as
a combination rule, based on the combinators of Curry and
Feys. The combinators can be considered as the semantics of
the language. They define abstraction without bound variables
which are computationally expensive to keep track of (for
example, LISP). Type-raising can allow a purely left-branching
analysis for an English sentence. The problem is that such
rules are too powerful, allowing far too many cancellations. If
one is concerned, as Steedman is, with psychological reality,
one might equally easily come to a different conclusion, that
is, not that we parse and interpret incrementally but that we
can hold partial information and synthesise it at the earliest
sensible opportunity.
The simplicity of a theory that could build a syntactic and a
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semantic representation incrementally as humans do is
tempting. A number of grammars have been built on these lines
despite some unprincipled fudges required to parse left to
right. The potential of categorial grammar has been exploited
by a number of theories in formal semantics, for example
Montague grammar.
Montague grammar has a sophisticated machinery for semantics
incorporating lambda-abstraction, meaning postulates, higher
order quantification, intension and extension operators and a
model theoretic interpretation. Since Montague it has been
recognised that expressions of the typed lambda calculus
provide an excellent means of expressing the semantics of
language whose syntax is analysed using categorial grammar.
This is because categorial grammar uses the syntactic
equivalent of function application in many of its rules.
The order of operation of the rules in Montague grammar is of
crucial semantic significance. For each syntactic rule there
is a unique corresponding semantic interpretation rule. It is a
powerful tool to use in conjunction with syntax as it obviates
the need for various operations in the syntax such as
quantifier movement, NP movement or deletion and co-ordination
reduction transformations. This appeals to advocates of
context-free phrase structure grammars like Gazdar
(Sparck-Jones and Wilks 1983) although problems remain such as
the binding of pronouns in dislocated constituents and the
nesting of equative and comparative clauses.
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Montague grammar is built on intensional logic. By intension is
meant, according to Frege, sense or meaning, as opposed to
extension which is denotation or reference. We saw above when
discussing philosophical theories of meaning that we must
reluctantly abandon the meaning as reference theory ('Pierre
thinks Londres is great' does not entail 'Pierre thinks London
is great'; 'Vernon wins' is extensional but 'the person who
gets the most points wins' is intensional).
What is the intension then of, say, a name? The answer,
according to Montague, is that it is a concept. Likewise the
intension of a predicate is a property and the intension of a
declarative sentence is a proposition. The extension of a
name, on the other hand, is an individual; the extension of a
predicate is the class of individuals to which it applies and
the extension of a sentence is a truth-value.
Part of Montague's definition of intensional logic is his
semantics. Its purpose is to correlate the meaningful
expressions of the language to their denotata. The denotation
of an entity expression is an individual. The denotation of a
sentence is a truth value. The denotation of an expression of
type b/a is a function with the denotation of a as argument
and the denotation of b as value. The denotation of an
expression of the type a/s (that is, a function that's looking
for a sense to give an a) is the denotation of the expression
of type a under all possible circumstances, that is, the set of
possible denotations is a function with the set of all possible
-109-
worlds as argument and the set of denotations of a as value.
So, what is claimed is that the semantic structure mirrors the
syntactic structure and that model-theoretic semantics is
adequate for natural language analysis. This can only be
partially true however since an analysis of parts of speech in
terms of their logical or set-theoretic function leaves
untouched the whole realm of lexical semantics, let alone
connotative and pragmatic meaning.
The traditional view of language is that the distinctions
between parts of speech correspond to distinctions in
denotation: nouns denote people, places and things, adjectives
denote properties, verbs denote actions or states. This is not
as straightforward as it seems however. Nouns as well as
verbs can denote actions ('the journey of the Magi'); nouns as
well as adjectives can denote properties ('a curch of linen').
It is possible to extend Montague semantics to include other
factors. For instance, for Lewis, intensions are functions
whose values are extensions and whose arguments are indices
where an index is an 8-tuple of co-ordinates, namely, possible
world, time, place, speaker, audience, indicated object,
previous discourse, assignment. Lexical semantics are, to all
intents and purposes however, omitted, being included merely as
a cursory adjunct in the form of some meaning postulates.
Possible world semantics has its origins in Leibniz (see also
Wittgenstein's possible states of affairs) and is an attempt to
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get round the problems of representing the meaning of those
sentences that are not true in one model, say the world at
this moment, but would be true if the world were slightly
different, that is, the way it was yesterday or could logically
be tomorrow. For Carnap, a possible world for a logical
calculus S would be a class of sentences in S which
contained, for every atomic sentence, either that sentence or
its negation, but not both, and no other sentences. Such a
class of sentences gives a complete description of a possible
state of the universe of individuals with respect to all
properties and relations expressed by predicates of the system.
For Cresswell, a possible world is any subset of the set of all
space-time points. For Lewis, a possible world is a possible
totality of facts determinate in all respects. Lewis' system
is a complicated system designed to handle, respectively,
ordinary model theory, tense, spatial deixis, first person
pronouns, second person pronouns, anaphoric pronouns, discourse
deixis and the domain of variables. Its complexity suggests
situation semantics.
2.9 Situation semantics.
Another theory that places meaning (largely) 'out there' in the
world is situation semantics. This idea is not new although
not previously formalised. For example, for Malinowski
(Malinowski 1960) and Firth (Firth 1957) and the London school
of linguistics, meaning was a relation between the components
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of the situation, namely people, their verbal and non-verbal
actions, objects, events and effects. Thus, situation
semantics attempts to invest model theory with psychological
realism, not by enhancing the lexical component but by
replacing possible worlds with human situations.
Nida (Nida 1962) took up this idea using the notion of
environments, namely the objective and subjective environments
but also, of course, linguistically, there are the contextual
and structural environments. The formal characterisation of
contexts (closely bound up with the frame problem) is a
pressing problem recognised by others (Eikmeyer 1981):
contexts... should be given by appropriate context=
description which would have to be as detailed
as possible in every relevant respect...As far as we can
see nobody has provided yet a workable solution for
determining the relevant properties of contexts in a
non-adhoc way.
It is possible situation semantics can be reformulated as
simple model-theoretic semantics but including speaker and
hearer as part of the model, thus refining and qualifying
further the possible meanings of an utterance. The important
distinction situation semantics makes is between two sentences
that describe the same situation but carry different
information: 'the linguistic meaning of an expression greatly
underdetermines its interpretation on a particular occasion of
use' (Barwise and Perry 1983). One can draw analogies here
with the later Wittgenstein's notion of 'language as use'.
Model theory (and its natural heirs) and Wittgensteinian
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philosophy hava been polarised because the latter was dubbed
pragmatic when it was a rude word. Now a reunion is possible
(Wittgenstein 1958):
what must be added to the dead signs [i.e. the orthography]
in order to make a live proposition is something immaterial,
with properties different from all mere signs. But if we had
to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should
have to say that it was its use.
For Barwise meaning is 'systematic relations between types of
situations'. For Cooper (Cooper 1987) it is 'a relation
between utterance situations and described situations'.
To measure meaning by changes of information states seems odd;
because X makes all sorts of inferences and acquires new
information from what you tell him, it does not mean that that
information was somehow conveyed by your utterance. There is a
difference between giving someone money and enabling them to
make money. They may make more money than you had in the first
place! Another point must be made, namely, that written
discourse is not incoherent, yet the significance of
'speaker', 'hearer' and 'situation' are minimised if not, on
occasion, absent. What X means does not equal what X entails
('that cloud means rain'). One must have some sympathy with
this line however. One does not utter every proposition that
is true but only those that are significant at the time:
significance and meaning intersect.
The approach is especially helpful when dealing with proper
names. The sentence 'Humphrey sneezed' may depend heavily
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for its reference on the speaker and context of utterance.
This is not necessarily true however. I may indeed be
referring to ray doctor Humphrey, a fact only my friends and
interlocutors may know. On the other hand I might be writing
and append the explanation, 'the winner of the cracker-eating
competition at Uppingham School on July 1st 1914'.
One difference between situation theory and model theory is
that situations are partial: they do not support all the facts
that obtain at a given location in time and space. Cooper's
motivation is a desire to build a theory that will help explain
the nature of information processing by humans and machines
and provide an underlying theory for natural language
semantics.
Situation theory incorporates the notion of semantic
appropriateness where situation types can be custom-built to
prohibit such sentences as 'Humphrey smiles' where Humphrey is
a dog or 'running kissed Anna' if we so wish. Cooper does
acknowledge the problem that we may always want to
meaningfully assert the negative of these sentences, for
example,
Humphrey didn't smile because he's a dog and they don't
and so on. We may feel that any kind of prohibitive schema is
oppressive and a theory of semantic precedence would be more
helpful.
Some computer programs have been written to handle situations
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or temporal contexts. The idea of situations is inherent in
Isard's noughts and crosses program (Isard 1974). Utterance
situation is like the context index in Montague Grammar. The
described situation is a portion or chunk of the real world.
This notion is comparable to a possible world.
It is claimed (Cooper 1987) that situation semantics provides
an economic method of disambiguation namely by context, and
also tine representation of opaque contexts.
Situation semantics may be the obvious way to treat indexicals
too. Perry (Perry 1979) suggests that one can think of
sentences like 'I am making a mess' not as a true statement
with a missing reference but a proposition that is true or
false only 'at a person'.
One feels inclined to object that situation semantics pays
disproportionate regard to conversational utterances rather
than written text. If the theory claims that semantic
elucidation depends on the situation of utterance it is hard
to see how text is ever understood at all. Context is certainly
relevant and one can argue that a word never has exactly the
same meaning in any two contexts. However the efficiency of
any code rests on the obliteration of extraneous differences in
order to signal semantic contexts (Nida 1975). If text is
comprehensible, as it surely is, then perhaps contextual
theories have developed out of all proportion to the phenomena
that they intend to account for.
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2.10 Behaviourism.
A linguistic movement that anticipated performative semantics
was behaviourism. Behaviourism comes in various guises, all of
them treating meaning as implicit or explicit response.
Neither treatment is altogether convincing. If meaning were
explicit response, then this would entail that no response
meant no meaning. To say meaning is implicit response is to
claim something that is unverifiable. This theory clearly
belongs under the heading 'meaning in the world' but seems far
removed from lexical meaning or the idea of meaning as found in
a dictionary.
For Austin, the answer to the question 'why did X say what he
said?' is an indicator of meaning. For the 'forties
behaviourists, for example Bloomfield, a similar appeal is
made to context. The question is not 'what is referred to?',
'what ideal model could this sentence be mapped on to?', 'what
conceptual/mental model could this sentence be mapped to?',
'what are the truth conditions of this sentence?' or 'what is
a componential analysis of this sentence?' but 'in what
situations would this sentence be uttered?'. We can see that
Austin's performative semantics echoes this comraonsense
pragmatic attack on meaning. As Russell points out (Russell
1946) deductive thinking from self-evident (or not so
self-evident) truths had given way to scientific inductivism.
Thus, empiricists in linguistics triad to analyse language as
any other empirical phenomenen by an analysis of the situations
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in which it occurred.
The main difference between the behaviourists and the
performative semanticists is one of intention. While they both
reject the analysis of language as a logical calculus, for
Austin and his fellow thinkers the speaker's intention is part
of the characterisation of meaning while for the behaviourists
language is like any other empirical epiphenomenon such as
smoke and its meaning is the situation under which it occurs, a
situation being speaker's stimulus + utterance + hearer's
response. Thus, the meaning of the word would be that set of
features common to all the situations in which the word was
uttered.
This seems to us now a crude theory in that the speaker's
stimulus may be all kind of bodily functions that can not
properly be said to be part of the meaning of the words he
uses. Likewise, one of the most powerful properties of language
is that we can refer to objects that aren't around ('the cleats
are in Leighton Buzzard') but should not be excluded from an
account of meaning merely for that reason. Bloomfield,
begging the question, calls this 'displaced soeech'.
Behaviourism has links with logical positivism which Bloomfield
embraced in the journal Language 1933. This doctrine is
possibly the most chilling in its expression and consequences
of any in the field of language. It is the natural heir to
the empiricist philosophy of Hume, Mill and Russell. In logical
positivism there are only two kinds of legitimate and
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meaningful statements, namely:
the logically verifiable (e.g. P or not P);
the empirically verifiable (that is, reports of simple sense
data, verifiable by immediate experience).
Carnap, one of the early exponents in this field, in 'The
Logical Syntax of Language' of 1937, says
all empirical statements can be expressed in a single
language, which is the language of physics.
The idea was that ordinary language was confusing and one
should construct an ideal artificial language, and translate
into it. Everything, except analytic and mathematical truths
and empirical observations, would be demonstrably meaningless.
This, as Strawson pointed out, glosses over problems of
translation. How can you translate from natural language if
you do not know what it means? If you do, why is the
translation necessary (Strawson 1963)? Incidentally, ordinary
language philosophers, like Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin, also
believed that natural language was too unruly to be
systematised but Ryle and Austin pursued a reverent and
painstaking philological course of study that was the
antithesis of that of logical positivists like Ayer.
It is clear from the above examination of theories of meaning
'in the world' that we are no nearer a principled lexical
semantics, but rather that language has been stripped of its
lexical dimension by the different Procrustean formalisms into
which it has been squeezed.
-118-
2.11 Meanings in the head.
We now turn to those theories of meaning that place meaning 'in
the head'. This may seem rather confusing since under any
theory apprehension of meaning must be a mental process: we map
words onto physical objects using our mental faculties and we
construct in our heads abstract meanings for words recursively
out of other words. Surely all meaning is in the head.
However, for certain thinkers, it is the peculiar subjective
experience itself, associated with a particular word, that
constitutes the meaning of that word, as opposed to any
ratiocinative process that we engage in when construing a word.
2.12 Image theory.
Referential problems with behemoths led some philosophers, and
many other people in their wake, to the image theory of
meaning or 'the meaning of a word is explained in terms of an
image in the mind of the speaker'. The theory has its
groundings in Aristotle who claimed that
words are spoken symbols or signs of affections or
impressions of the soul, written words are signs
of words spoken. As writing, so also speech is not
the same for all races of men.
But the mental affections themselves, of which these
words are primarily signs, are the same for the whole
of mankind, as are also the objects of which those
affections are representations or likenesses, images,
copies.
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For Locke most ideas are not innate but acquired by
experience (Locke 1690):
the senses at first let in particular ideas,
and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by
degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged
in the memory and name got to them. Afterwards the
mind proceeding further abstracts them and by degrees
learns the use of general names. In this manner the
mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language,
the materials about which to exercise its discursive
faculty.
Of course the rationalist picture was quite different.
Descartes, (compare Kant above) extrapolating too much perhaps
from the epiphany with the bent stick in the puddle, says
(Ilaldane 1955 ) :
...any man who rightly observes the limitations
of the senses and what precisely it is that
can penetrate through this medium to our
faculty of thinking must needs admit that no
ideas of things in the shape in which we
envisage them by thought are presented to us by
the senses. So much so that in our ideas there is
nothing which was not innate in the mind
It is true that we may need some kind of innate capacity to
carve up the undifferentiated plenum of sensory experience into
discrete objects. Functionality is the same: the set of
railings beyond my window is, at one and the same time, a
fortification, an optical device for splitting up the buildings
beyond into visual strips of equal width and so on.
Plato of course also believed we did not learn concepts but
'remember', like clouds of glory, previously acquired forms.
Kant, in The Critique of Pure Reason, while he agreed with the
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empiricists that there cannot be innate ideas in the sense of
anything known prior to any sense experience, was not prepared
to say that all knowledge must be derived from experience. The
apparatus of, on the one hand, human sensibility (that is,
perception, or the senses) and, on the other hand, the
understanding (that is, abstract thought) might have a form or
structure that moulds our experience (Kant 1781):
through the former, objects are given to us;
through the latter they are thought...
the order and regularity in objects which we
entitle nature we ourselves introduce. The
understanding is itself the lawgiver of nature.
Sensory snapshots are not the primary data: to perceive them at
all requires prior knowledge of an objective world.
Mentalism is a natural home for those foxed by the
non-referential meaning of words like 'behemoth'. They are not
out there so they must be in the head. The trouble is, this
theory has its own problems. As Wittgenstein realised, a mental
snapshot of a man climbing uphill would look just like a man
sliding down; a fat man would resemble a pregnant one, and so
on.
Also, we might be able to manage one picture for an expression
like 'Richard Nixon' but it is not reasonable to expect this.
He does after all look different on every occasion and from
every angle and under every light. It is equally difficult to
imagine one picture of a chair or a triangle (right-angled?;
equilateral?). Locke (Locke 1690) says:
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the idea of a triangle must be neither equilateral,
equicrural, nor scalenon but all or none of these at
once.
The picture of an animal-in-general is unimaginable as well
(Berkeley 1710):
The constituent parts of the abstract idea
of animal are body, life, sense and spontaneous
motion, By body is meant body without any
particular shape or figure, there being no one
shape or figure common to all animals,
without covering whether of hair or feathers
or scales etc. nor yet naked; hair, feathers,
scales and nakedness being the distinguishing
properties of particular animals and for that
reason left out of the abstract idea. Upon the
same account the spontaneous motion must
be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping;
it is neverthless a motion, but what that
motion is, it is not easy to conceive.
It is not clear what picture words like 'virtue' inspire
either.
Two expressions may have the same picture as well ('the victor
at Jena' and 'the vanquished at Waterloo') without our wanting
to say they mean the same or are synonymous. Likewise one
expression may have two associated images without us wanting
to draw the conclusion that it is ambiguous. As with
extensionalism some words don't 3eem to have associated images
('and', 'almost') yet are not meaningless.
Disciples of this theory die hard though and it is not
surprising since we have expressions like 'I can see it in my
mind's eye', 'I see what you mean' and so on. Mill and
Berkeley tried to salvage the notion by suggesting that an
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image or idea could represent an abstract or complex idea if
attention was somehow attracted to the essential attributes
and withheld from those that are accidental. This might help
with 'triangle': perhaps we see a fleeting triangularish shape
with three angles. The traditional objection is that this is
an image not of a triangle but of a fleeting triangularish...
and so on. This seems a bit unfair. To concentrate on one
thing is not make any judgments about the presence or absence
of other things. To imagine a party where there happened to
be no women is not the same as to imagine a stag party.
Blackburn (Blackbiirn 1984) has a point though when he says that
the logical conclusion of this theory is that, if you cannot
imagine a bed without a member of the opposite sex in it, then
that is a concept the meaning of which you do not know.
Another objection by Wittgenstein is that we just do not
operate in this way. When we recognise a flower as being red,
this is not because we have compared it to a patch of red in
our minds; this would be to embark on a degringolade to a
reductio ad absurdum. It also seems to imply that any image-
making device, for instance a cheval glass standing in the Gobi
desert, would be a thinker.
An example of a thinker who has taken up the image theory to
extravagant lengths is Titchener (Titchener 1909):
meaning is the blue-grey tip of a kind of scoop...
cow is a longish rectangle with a certain
facial expression, a sort of exaggerated pout.
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Another problem Is that of self predication, one of the
premises of Plato's theory of forms, or roughly speaking, the
form F has the property f, thus the form of green would be
green. This however is implausible in conceptual terms. Is the
concept of green green? Is the set of green things green? As
Santayana said: 'loveliness is not lovely; it's even better!'.
Over and above these problems, the essentially subjective
nature of this as a theory (my pictures may be different from
yours) should undermine communication, yet there must be a
sufficient consensus about meaning to make communication
possible. To say images are not necessarily pictures leaves
us wondering what they are instead.
This theory gives us a simple mechanism compared to the
heterogeneous ones needed to underpin the pragmatic theories
but is not susceptible to symbolic representation and
inference which a semantic theory requires. Nor, despite
Titchener's valiant efforts, does it succeed in defining the
large army of non-pictorial abstract words, still less in
giving an account of general lexical relationships such as
synonymy, oppositeness, hyponymy and so forth that a semantic
theory seems to require.
As a philosophical position this semantic theory informed the
work of the early Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1921) although
his picture theory of meaning is more obscure, atomic
propositions being somehow pictures of atomic facts in a not
merely conventional way but one of real correspondence, as
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paintings correspond to reality or musical notation to music.
(Incidentally the latter notion is one to conjure with. The
'top' line of a stave is the one usually highest when a musical
score is held in the hand and thus could be said to correspond
to a 'high' note. But what is 'high' or 'low' about a note
exactly? It seems very little except perhaps the posture of
the singer who sings it but this has only a metaphorical
isomorphism with the 'altitude' of the note he sings.)
Wittgenstein later abandoned this position and indeed some
believe (Harris 1990) it to be spectacularly naive and a theory
linguists had long since abandoned.
It is understandable that the non-identity of sense and
reference should lead one to think of meanings as some kind of
concept. To think of them as mental entities however is a kind
of psychologism that Frege, for one, rejected. It seemed more
likely to him that meanings were public property, some kind of
abstract entity that can be 'grasped' by different people and
the same person at different times. Frege agreed that
someone's idea of a word is a mental image arising from
memories of sense impressions, being saturated with feeling
and private to an individual. However, he thought of a sign's
sense as being common property transmittable from one
generation to the next.
The notion that the extension of a term can be determined by a
concept in the head is rebutted by Putnam (Putnam 1973) since
extensions are partly determined socially by the linguistic
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community (the division of linguistic labour) and partly
indexically: as Kripke's notion of rigid designators suggests,
if we discover that water is H20 then nothing but H20 can
properly thereafter be called water. We might caution
mentalists as Burke cautioned revolutionaries: 'the nature of
things is a sturdy adversary'.
There is incidentally a veritable choir of literary voices who
can only be heard faintly in this thesis, who reject the
characterisation of word meaning in terms of mental images or
at any rate lament the impossibility of matching any words and
thoughts exactly. For Shelley, words are only an approximation
of a poet's thoughts (Defense of Poetry) although he says of
the Creator ('Prometheus Unbound'): 'He gave man speech and
speech created thought which is the measure of the universe'.
Incidentally, the linguistic determinists in anthropology
believe the semantic character of the form classes ( that is,
the parts of speech in English) fixes the conception of reality
in a language community, and that differences on this level
correspond to different Weltanschauungen. This doesn't tell us
which came first of course: is 'justice' a noun because it is
perceived to have thing-like qualities or vice versa?
The priority of thought over speech does seem to lend some
support to the image theory of meaning. Nelson and others
have evidence that children can sort cars and planes into
different groups before they have acquired the
corresponding words. Fodor believed that since children and
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animals appeared to be able to think before they could speak
that there must be a primary language of thought (Fodor et al
1975) and that the word 'boy' was a convenient one-word
abbreviation for 'young' + 'male' + 'human' and so on,
primitives which we afterwards 'forget'. Sampson (Sampson
1930) objects that, on the contrary, there are no Wordsworthian
clouds of glory: we know the word 'boy' before the words
'male' and so on. 'Sibling' is arguably more primitive than
'brother' or 'sister' but much lass familiar. Here is a fairly
awful poem by the nineteenth century poet Frederick Locker that
expresses the Fodorian sentiment.
A Terrible Infant
I recollect a nurse call'd Ann,
Who carried me about the grass
And one fine day a fine young man
Came up and kiss'd the pretty lass.
She did not make the least objection!
Thinks I, "Aha!
When I can talk I'll tell Mamma"
-And that's my earliest recollection.
Edmund Gosse had a similar recollection, reputedly of a time
before he could speak, of a dog stealing a piece of meat from
the table.
However, a large number of men of letters seem to believe in
some kind of unbridgeable chasm between thoughts and words.
Trollope in his Barchester Towers regretfully acknowledged that
there was no daguerrotyper for the writer: word paintings are
at best an interpretation, at worst a travesty of the mental-
image. In a lovely passage of Jean Paul Sartre's, the writer
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describes the attempted recall of a day at the seaside. With
every recollection, one more sensation was replaced by a word.
'Beach' rather than 'shore' or 'sand' or no word at all fixed
the reality in a certain way. After many years of recollection
of this particular day every sensation had been replaced by a
word and the original experience was lost to him for ever.
It is also sometimes true that ideas can be expressed more
pungently by implicit references than blatant ones. Lawrence's
largely autobiographical work Sons and Lovers culminates with
an act of euthanasia. Such a word or concept is never however
expressed; it is probably true that Lawrence would not have
advocated it explicitly. What then is being described? It
seems that rather than the meaning of words being 'in the
head', on the contrary there is a discrepancy between what we
can think and do and what we can express in words.
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Chapter 3. Semantics and inference II.
3.1 Meanings in the abstract.
Since accounts of meaning in the world and meaning in the head
have largely failed to address the question of lexical
semantics we turn now to a consideration of meaning 'in the
abstract' .
3.2 Structuralism.
Structuralism provides a natural home for those retreating from
the problems of a mentalism that involves one-to-one mapping
with words and images. Extensionalism can account for
concrete words ('bucket') but is not so good for words with
mythical referents ('behemoth'). A mentalist image-theory can
handle some abstract words quite well but is not so good at
others like 'question'. What is a question if it is not an
object or an image? We all know what a question is and
answer the question by providing a definition in terms of other
simpler words, or a 'meaning in the abstract'.
This is an over-simplification of structuralism of course, but
suffice it to say that from invoking the external world to
explain meaning many scholars in both linguistics and literary
theory have withdrawn into the symbolic world to provide an
essentially recursive explanation of language in terms of
itself. Saussure (Saussure 1916) says
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Language is a system of interdependent terms in which
the value of each term results solely from the
simultaneous presence of others.
While we may question the total context-dependence of word
meaning (whether the context is a sentence or the language
itself), nevertheless such an approach seems to hold more
promise for lexical semantics than the theories of meaning in
the world and meaning in the head described earlier do on their
own.
Structuralism has groundings in lexicography, that is in
dictionaries that attempt to identify features and legitimate
noun-adjective combinations and also dictionaries of synonyms,
antonyms and so on. One can compare Lyons' and Cruse's work
in this area and the lexicographical tradition of onomastics or
arranging vocabulary according to meaning groups.
One of the origins of structuralism is field theory as
developed by Trier in the 'thirties after Humboldt and
Saussure.
Saussure adopted the 'semiological' approach to communication
which generalised from the code model of language to all other
forms of communication (Saussure 1916):
Language is a system of signs that express ideas
and is therefore comparable to a system of writing,
the alphabet of deaf-mutes, symbolic rites,
polite formulas, military signals etc....
A science that studies the life of signs within
society is conceivable...
Todorov suggests this has its origins in Augustine who
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approached the study of grammar, logic, rhetoric and
hermeneutics within the unifying framework of a theory of
signs. Systems of signs governed tropes, gestures, religious
rites and sacred texts. Modern day semiotics has not fulfilled
expectations. Trier, however, applied Saussure's notion of
language as a system to the study of vocabulary, and thought of
synchronic vocabulary ranged according to content in fields
placed hierarchically or adjacently. Each unit is delimited
with respect to its neighbours.
Structuralism is properly a linguistic movement rather than a
philosophical one, being concerned not so much with the
metaphysical nature of meaning itself as with the analysis of
the meaning of particular words, among other things.
Structural semantics has been one of the main trends of
European linguistics since the nineteen thirties, although
unpopular in the 'sixties and 'seventies along with lexical
semantics.
One can distinguish two line3 of thought in linguistic
semantics, namely, North American structuralism in the wake of
31oomfield and also a line from Sapir and Whorf to the
ethnolinguists. Bloomfield and his followers were hostile
towards the study of meaning which was an obstacle to the
scientific approach of a mechanistic behaviourist because it
seemed to require having a scientifically accurate knowledge of
everything in the speaker's world (Bloomfield 1946).
Bloch and Trager likewise eliminated lexical meaning from
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linguistic analysis and Harris (Harris 1963) substituted for
semantics the description of language according to
distribution: the difference between 'life' and 'rife' lay
solely in distribution.
So, lexical meaning was sacrificed to a scientific ideal. (A
similar fate befell the mind amongst members of the
philosophical mind-brain identity school: the chosen
methodology could not handle the concept of mind except by
reducing it to a different and tractable substance, namely
brain.)
Bloomfieldians tended to equate meaning with the thing-meant
or with a situation and the responses to it (Bloomfield 1946).
A more accommodating approach to the idea of semantics was born
with Nida's article (Nida 1951) 'A system for the description
of semantic elements' which introduced a proper terminology for
semantics. Words like 'meaning' and 'mentalist' were restored
to North American respectability and Bloomfieldianism was
undermined by generative linguistics.
Descriptive semantics' other line of descent is anthropology or
ethnolinguistics and its concern for the vocabulary of kinship
relations, disease names and so on (Wallace and Atkins 1960).
It is striking how similar ethno-linguistic componential
analysis is to modern European structural semantics. Lounsbury
(Lounsbury 1964), for example, regards the system of kinship
terms as a semantic field or paradigm or set of forms which all
have a common or 'root' feature but all differ in respect of
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other features or 'semantic dimensions'. Each term can be
defined componentially as a bundle of features; this
definition is the expression of a term's significatum.
The most recent developments in semantics have been termed
structural. We should distinguish at this point between two
kinds of structuralism: field theory and componential
analysis. Coseriu distinguishes three sorts of structural
semantics (Coseriu and Geckeler 1981):
1 the configuration of associations of one sign with other
signs in the vocabulary (semantic fields);
2 disambiguation or the assigning of forms to meanings;
transformational grammar as first conceived by Katz and
Fodor (Katz and Fodor 1963; Katz 1966) has this approach
(semantics of logical form);
3 the analysis of functional lexical oppositions; decomposition
into smaller elements or features (componential analysis).
Weisgerber, in the nineteen sixties, distinguished between
differently configured lexical fields, for example, the series
(for example, fail-pass-credit-distinction), hierarchies (for
instance, kinship terms) and multistratified fields (for
example, the linguistic articulation of dying in German for
people, animals, plants, objective and subjective attitudes
and so on). He distinguished between fields in natural
phenomena, material culture and intellectual life.
Lyons (Lyons 1968) also sought to identify lexical systems (or
lexical fields) according to paradigmatic and syntagmatic
sense-relations. By sense relations Lyons means synonymy,
hyponymy (unilateral implication, say, 'scarlet-red'),
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incompatibility (for example, 'red' and 'blue'), complementary
oppposites or tertium non datur (say, 'singlemarried'),
antonymous opposites (say, 'big'-'small'), converse oppositas
(say, 'husbandwife'). (Note, this is not the same as
compositional analysis of the insides of words themselves.
Lyons rejects this (Lyons 1963).)
Incidentally, one must distinguish between this type of field
and the concept of a semantic field as used to describe all the
uses of one word and the relationship between all the
dictionary entries for that word.
In psychology, Osgood (Osgood et al 1957) tried to measure
meanings by semantic differentiation or the 'successive
allocation of a concept to a point in the multidimensional
semantic space by selection from among a set of given scaled
semantic alternatives'. Coseriu dismisses this as connotative
and based on hearer reaction. This seems a little harsh: if
one is to take psychology seriously at all one must
acknowledge the value of empirical evidence as well as the
results of disciplines with different methodologies. The
distinction between connotative and denotative meaning is not
so sharp anyway that one can afford to dismiss such methods of
elicitation.
Coseriu objects that connotative meaning is extralinguistic but
does not offer a method of distinguishing where connotation
ends and inherent meaning begins. One might more truthfully
say that connotative meaning is very hard to formalise or
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elucidate. One might turn to another discipline like
philosophy or poetry for some elaboration of this and other
vague kinds of meaning although not all linguists would accept
the 'explanations' volunteered by the Romantics and Coleridge
(who coined the term 'esemplasy* for the unifying power of the
imagination). Sperber (Sperber 1986) objects that they
deal with vagueness in vague terms, with metaphors
in metaphorical terms, and use the term 'meaning' so
broadly that it becomes quite meaningless.
It is interesting to note in passing that non-scientific
explanations are often in this day and age deemed by
(quasi-)scientists to have no explanatory power at all.
Coseriu's objection is less devastating. He merely claims
connotative meaning is extra-linguistic. He also suggests that
Pottier's componential analysis of types of seat in terms of
features like 'having a back', 'having four legs' and so on is
extra-linguistic too and not an analysis of linguistic
content.
I think this is probably evidence that, in the analysis of
physical objects particularly, meaning is very close to
denotation, despite Coseriu's distaste for this conclusion.
Complex concepts such as 'probation officer' or 'rancour' may
be more susceptible to linguistic analysis but chairs and
tables are typically things identified deictically not
analytically. Coseriu dodges concepts like 'chairs', however,
and makes much of essentially subjective concepts like 'warm'.
However, he rejects the labelling of them as subjective and
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imprecise because, as a structuralist, the word-object mapping
and its relative precision is not his concern: linguistic
content is defined in terms of linguistic opposition and not in
terms of real objects and the relations between them.
Coseriu argues that if you can't tell whether something is a
goat or a sheep this does not show the concept is nebulous; on
the contrary it shows that you have a clear grasp of the
concepts but reality is vague. Buying shoes is always much
harder when you know exactly what you want.
The denotative/connotative distinction is a well-known one,
denotative semantics concerning referential meaning or the
relation between words in the language and objects in the
world. The connotative aspect of words on the other hand
concerns structural meaning or the relations between words and
other words. Denotative semantics is not vague enough;
connotative semantics is not formal enough, but to arbitrarily
discount the latter would be unthinkable in other branches of
intellectual thought. Here in passing is Burke's opinion in
The Sublime and the Beautiful (Pittock 1980):
Words, especially abstract words, have no direct,
denotative meaning: ...the power and prestige they
acquire in society comes largely as a result of their
uncertain connotative meaning. It is precisely
because we have no clear image of the heroic that we
admire heroes. What we can define is diminished thereby,
in semantics as in politics. In both, Burke believed,
connotative context lent authority, just as the Sublime
operated in the connotative context of human awe and
terror.
Lexical field theory developed into componential analysis
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which is an approach to semantics that has been heavily
exploited by linguists and computational linguists. It
represents a systematic attempt to analyse lexical meaning as
opposed to logical meaning and to give an account of words
other than logical operators.
However, before we embark on lexical decomposition there are
problems characterising lexical fields. It is clear that the
members of a lexical field are somehow related ('auntie',
'brother', 'cousin'; 'angry', 'calm', 'pleased') but the
grouping of words into fields is too vague as a formal
characterisation of meaning.
Again, there are so-called function words that do not generate
a field or trigger conceptual networks ('and', 'before', 'or').
Xempson (Kempson 1977) attempts a definition, suggesting that a
lexical field is a network of items related by hyponymy and
incompatibility.
Coseriu (Coseriu and Geckeler 1981) argues that field theory is
descriptive but lacks a method. The oppositional principle
isn't explicitly defined; the distinction between linguistic
delimitation and extra-linguistic delimitation is muddied and
undue use is made of technical terminology (say, military
ranks) and not enough of non-technical language.
Coseriu thinks the distinction between objects and language is
crucial and that technical vocabulary is deceptive because it
is structured according to objects and not on the basis of
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language. It seems true that in the creation of technical
terminology we have more regard for precise, clearly demarcated
concepts that can be subjected to logical, mathematical or
set-theoretic analysis and which have a regular in-built
structure.
It is also true that we beg the question about the inherent
structures of language if we are only prepared to adduce those
word-fields we have self-consciously constructed according to
a plan. (This is why translation of technical language i3
artificially easy compared to ordinary language.) It seems
appropriate to eliminate such terminology and nomenclature from
this research since one of the main assumptions of the work is
that linguistic analysis is most productively carried out on
non-technical terms.
What can we make of these wide and varied contributions to
lexical semantics? One thing is clear: while there is
evidence of a more systematic approach than is apparent in
descriptive linguistics, nevertheless no general transcendent
semantic principles seem to emerge, nor are there any formal
methods for dealing with unruly lexical data.
It should be pointed out that post-structuralist thought,
perhaps pusillanimously, deems significations or meanings to
be essentially unstable anyway and not to have the discrete
nature of sheep that enables them to be herded into a lexical
field (Selden 1985):
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The sign is not so much a unit with two sides as a
momentary fix between two moving layers. The dictionary
confirms only the relentless deferment of meaning: not
only do we find for every signifier several signifieds (a
'crib' signifies a manger, a child's bed...) but each of
the signifieds becomes yet another signifier which can be
traced in the dictionary with its own array of signifieds
('bed' signifies a place for sleeping, a garden plot...).
The process continues interminably, as the signifiers
lead a chameleon-like existence, changing their colours
with each new context.
3.3 Componential analysis.
It is tempting to think that closer inspection of lexical
fields would reveal some structure or schema that we could
apply to all words as a framework for lexical semantics.
It is clear that one avenue to take at this point is to say
that there must be common denominators that are shared by words
in a lexical field and that a definition of each of the words
in the field in terms of simpler words would reveal the
building blocks of meaning.
The notion of viewing complex concepts as generated by simple
ones has a long history (Mill 1843):
The laws of the phenomena of the mind are
sometimes analogous to mechanical, but sometimes
also to chemical laws. When many impressions
or ideas are operating in the mind together, there
sometimes takes place a process of a kind similar
to chemical combination. When impressions have been
so often experienced in conjunction, that each of
them calls up readily and instantaneously the ideas
of the whole group, those ideas sometimes melt and
coalesce into one another, and appear not several
ideas but one...These are cases of mental chemistry;
in which it is possible to say that the simple ideas
-139-
generate, rather than that they compose, the complex
ones.
This seems to suggest that (at least some) words might undergo
a similar analysis.
While Mill distinguishes between generation of words from atoms
and the composition of words, nevertheless, the guiding force
behind methods such as this is an atomic reading of the
universe, favoured by various people from Democritus to Newton
and Leibniz, and culminating in a pervasive atomism in modern
thinking since Frege. It is apparent in artificial
intelligence, formal semantics, critical theory (structuralism
and post-structuralism) and arguably in politics, Thatcherite
conservatism being essentially scientific rather than humane,
levying taxes per capita and treating the individual as atomic
whether he be the survivor in an enterprise culture or the
victim of social Darwinism.
Leibniz, and other seventeenth century philosophers, laid the
foundations for an atomistic semantics. Leibniz sought a
world of uniquely independent language constants. As Russell
(Russell 1946) puts it,
[he] cherished the hope of discovering a kind of
generalised mathematics which he called
Characteristica Universalis, by means of which thinking
could be replaced by calculation. 'If we had it' he
says 'we should be able to reason in metaphysics and
morals in much the same way as geometry and analysis.'
An atomistic approach to language gave rise to componential
analysis. One exponent was Hjelmslev (1963) who thought that
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the content level of language could be analysed, for example,
ram = he-sheep and so on. The idea is the familiar one that an
unlimited number of words can be made up of a limited number
of primitive irreducible elements. You swap a primitive
element and you get a new word. This exchange test is similar
to the commutation test of Ileyse in the 1950's who measured
differences in content in terms of features.
European componential analysis also has its American
counterpart in Weinrich (IJeinrich 1966) and Bendix (Bendix
1969):
a minimal definition of meaning is that sat of
semantic components that are sufficient to distinguish the
meaning paradigraatically from the meanings of all other
forms in the language.
Nida (Nida 1975) believed a componential analysis of words was
possible. To analyse a concrete term (say, 'hoe'),
- find a superordinate (say, agricultural implemement);
- find the hyponyms (say, 'Dutch hoe');
- compare with co-hyponyrns (say, 'fork');
- list the componential features (say, 'tool', 'hand-held');
- form the definition.
To analyse an abstract term (say, 'beautiful'),
- find words that overlap in meaning (say, 'lovely');
- determine the range of things that can and can't be qualified
by the related meanings (for instance, 'pretty man' and
'handsome lake' are unorthodox);
- spot contrasts between the related meanings (say, 'lovely
lady', 'beautiful lady');
- list the significant features of 'beautiful'.
Componential analysis is not of course as simple as this. Any
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definition of language in terms of simpler language must
eventually hit bottom: the level of semantic primitives,
atoms, features, sememes: call them what you will. The
ontological status of these elements is fair game for sceptics.
Either they are words of the same status as those words they
are used to define or they are another sort of beast. In
either case they themselves are susceptible to semantic
investigation. A componential semanticist may be forced to
accept that they are irreducible atomic conceptual matter we
all possess (Katz 1975).
This must also be true of words that will not decompose in the
first place, the Lockean simple ideas such as 'yellow', 'hot'
and 'sweet', which he describes as having no other ideas
contained within them and as ideas that can neither be created
nor destroyed by us. These are in contradistinction to complex
ideas that are compounded out of simple ideas, allowing
compounds that do not exist in the world like 'centaur'.
'Yellow' can only be reduced to the atomic primitives 'colour'
and 'yellow'. Some words, like 'move', can perhaps only be
defined by truth conditions. If something is at A at tl and at
B at t2 then it moved.
Componential analysis has a close connexion with the lexical
relations of hyponymy and incompatibility. Both lexical fields
and also semantic features are useful in identifying hyponymous
relations. Cruse (Cruse 1986) calls the atomic building blocks
of meaning semantic traits. The meaning of a word: 'is viewed
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as being made up, at least in part, of the meanings of other
words 1 .
Such participants are known as semantic traits. Cruse stresses
that no claim is made that they are primitive, functionally
discrete, universal, drawn from a finite inventory or capable
of giving an exhaustive definition of the meaning of any word.
Cruse realises that his theory is descriptive and that
we have no grounds for believing that the meaning
of a word, when viewed in this fashion, is finitely
describable - without circumscription it is an
unpromising candidate for formalisation.
Traits can be criterial, expected, possible, canonical,
non-canonical, unexpected or excluded. For example,
- 'animal' is a criterial trait of 'dog';
- 'fish' is an excluded trait of 'dog';
- 'can bark' is an expected trait of 'dog' (the 'but' test:
'it's a dog but it can't bark);
- 'can sing' is an unexpected trait of 'dog' ('it's a dog but
it can sing');
- 'brown' is a possible trait of 'dog' (it's a dog and it's
brown);
- 'has four legs' is a canonical trait of 'dog';
- 'can fly' is a non-canonical trait of 'bird'.
Criterial traits have their origin in Aristotle, who attempted,
not very successfully, to distinguish between essential and
accidental attributes of things. This is easier for natural
kind terms than for other words. Is a book always hardbacked?
Cruse's traits are akin to Coleman and Kays's (Coleman and Kay
1981) distinction between protypical and typical features.
Compare also Rosch's (Rosch 1978) idea of a prototype or those
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members of a taxonomic category that are more central than
others. (See also Pulman 1983.)
We can generalise and simplify by saying that criterial traits
suggest hyponymy, excluded ones suggest contradiction,
expected traits suggest prototypicality and unexpected traits
atypicality.
Componential analysis is attended with problems as we might
expect. Language is never purely synchronic; besides idioms
there are a lot of constructions one might call repeated
discourse or fixed phrases, quotations and so on, that are not
susceptible to commutation; there are also topographical,
intentional and cultural differences in the meaning of words.
A very common example of a 'fixed phrase' is the metaphor 'the
foot of the mountain' which blazed briefly for the person who
created it but for most of us it is dead.
One could restrict structural semantics to functional lexical
oppositions. We must bear in mind however that the norm abounds
with idioms, quasi-quotations, buzz-words, expletives ('yet',
'already', 'still') and so on.
The arbitrary choice of primitive semantic features is also a
serious criticism of componential analysis. It is sometimes
held (pace Cruse) that a semantic component is part of a
universal language-neutral stock of features from which each
language chooses its subset. This is yet to be proved.
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Katz (Katz and Postal 1964) believes that the semantics of
English can be exhaustively represented by a lexicon and
meaning composition rules or 'projection rules'. Bar-Hillel
(Bar-Hillel 1970), however, objects that Katz's semantic
markers or conceptual elements (supposedly derived from the
senses) of the word 'bachelor' are ludicrous, including as they
do, not only 'physical object', 'living', 'human' and 'male'
but also 'serving under the standard of another', 'without a
mate at breeding time' and the parochial 'having the academic
degree for the completion of the first four years at college'!
Sampson (Sampson 1980) objects too that Katz and Bierwisch
believe these markers to be derived from the senses or part of
the human capacity respectively. But where does the feature
'male' come from?
Alternative componential analyses are also a problem: is an
uncle a father's brother or a mother's sister's husband, and so
on? Perhaps, given the paucity of real synonyms or synonymous
paraphrases, it is neither. This is not a trivial point.
Chomsky admitted (Chomsky 1972) that semantic representations
of this kind are not real identities because 'kill' does not
mean the same as 'cause to die', 'raise' as 'cause to rise' or
'burn' as 'cause to burn'.
Curiously, the most ardent exponents of componential analysis
see such problems as somehow inherent in language rather than
their chosen methodology. Nida (Nida 1975) enumerates the
'difficulties' (but compare Austin (Austin 1940), who is
-145-
sceptical of the whole endeavour):
- lack of a metalanguage to describe the diversities of
language (for instance, 'stink', 'stench', 'smell');
- difficulty of finding meanings that constitute a contiguous
set; how is the spectrum to be represented;
- representing terms that differ, not componentially but in
degree or intensity (for instance, 'toss', 'hurl');
- representing lexical relations (for instance, 'behind', 'in
front of');
- representing relational features (for instance, 'colleague',
'friend').
- representing syntagmatic influences (for instance, 'good
pianist', 'good dinner'; 'cricket ball', 'cricket
averages'); some non-intersective adjectives are used
paronymously, their senses here are not similar;
- the same words apply to a family of objects; if A resembles B
and B resembles C but A does not resemble C, we may still
call them by the same name (for instance, 'pleasure') but
this name may not be susceptible to componential
representation;
- one word (for instance, 'fascist') has many properties; on
one occasion it may be used to denote one sub-set of these
properties and on another occasion another subset; how can
this be represented componentially;
- how do you know whether X is a component of Y or Y of X?; is
'extended' part of the meaning of 'shaped' or 'shaped' part
of the meaning of 'extended' (Berkeley 1710)?
Even modest claims concerning semantic traits are attended by
problems. It is not enough to say that if an attribute is
used to infer category membership then it is criterial (Brown
1958). For zoologists, prawns and moths are both arthropods:
an odd way of chopping up the world to some empiricists who
would be more likely to use habitat as a criterion. The
cerebral index is not a common way of distinguishing men and
chimps. One man's criterion may be another man's noisy
epiphenomenon depending on the way he divides up the world.
A case in point is the conceptual puzzle from Leviticus which
divides animals into the categories 'clean' and 'unclean' for
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dietary purposes. Camels, ostriches, crocodiles, mice, sharks
and eels are unclean; gazelles, frogs, fish, most grasshoppers
and some locusts are clean.
The philosopher Quine (Quine 1977) argues for a psychological
and societal progression from an innate, similarity-based
conception of kinds to a theoretically-oriented, more
objective basis. Chemical, physical and genetic analytical
techniques of classification have replaced perceptual ones.
Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny: children's conceptual
techniques undergo this metamorphosis as they grow up.
It does seem to be true that concepts are intimately bound up
with theories, Kuhn and Feyerabend arguing that scientists with
different theories must have different concepts though possibly
sharing the same nomenclature (for example, 'light' can refer
to a concept in wave theory or in particle theory). Schank
(Schank and Colby 1973) supports this.
A concept corresponds vaguely to what we
might call a single meaning of a word, but the
connection is more complex. Underlying the
organisation is a belief that meanings cannot be
reduced to any set of pure 'elements' or components
from which everything else is built. Rather, a person
categorises his experience along lines which are
relevant to the thought processes he will use, and
his categorisation is generally neither consistent nor
parsimonious, nor complete. A person may categorise
a set of objects in his experience into, for example
'chair', 'stool', 'bench' etc. If pushed, he cannot give
an exact definition for any of these, and in naming some
objects he will not be certain how to make the choice
between them. This is even clearer if we consider words
like 'truth', 'virtue' and 'democracy'. The meaning
of any concept depends on its interconnection with all
of the other concepts in the model.
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Thus, it seems very difficult to say categorically what traits
are essential to the definition of a concept (except for
truisms: a dog has trait +canine). The only thing one can say
for sure is that if two objects share a property then that
property on its own cannot be criterial in assigning them to
different categories. Of course, even to claim that category
membership is determined by similarity to a set of properties
is to make a curiously vacuous and circular claim. As Quine
pointed out (Quine 1977), perhaps things only appear to be
similar because they are members of the same category.
Of course, there are advantages in componential analysis. We
can see that there are various lexical relations (hyponymy,
taxonyiny and so on) that are closely connected and might all
be representable by componential analysis, as are other
relations such as meronymy. This, however, makes the
characterisation of semantic primitives even more rebarbative.
It may be that they should be highly domain specific if they
are to be of any validity at all.
Since it is not clear what the principled relationship is
between a semantic feature and the word of which it is a
component, there seems to be no reason why any lexical
relation, for instance, meronymy, should not be implicitly
represented by semantic features. Indeed, it would be very
difficult to define, for example, a 'wrist', except in terms of
other things to which it stood in a meronymous relation, such
as the arm.
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Ace there any other lexical relations that could be represented
by semantic features? Cruse defines the following. Rank
terms are ungradable lexical units that operate on a
discontinous scale, for example, the military hierarchy,
first-second-third, twins-triplets-quads,
triangle-square-pentagon. Grade-terms are lexical units that
operate over a continuous scale and are gradable, for
instance, freezing-cold-cool-warm-hot-scorching,
tiny-small-big-huge. Degree-terms are lexical units that
operate over a continuous scale but are non-gradable for
example fail-pass-credit-distinction, child-adolescent-adult.
Proportional series are indicated by the linguistic frame: 'A
is to B as X is to Y', for instance, 'duck is to duckling' as
'swan is to cygnet'.
It seems that all these relations could be represented in a
lattice structure in which the more semantically primitive
elements were higher in the structure. Thus 'swan' and
'duckling' would both inherit 'animate' but only 'swan' would
inherit 'adult'. The comprehensive nature of such a lattice,
which could loosely be called a hyponymy lattice, is enjoyed at
the cost of representing a great many lexical relations only
implicitly. For instance, the sequential nature of 'first'
and 'second' would be lost and only their common ancestry
explicit (common ancestors being 'adjectival', 'ordinal' and so
on).
It is also true that componential analysis is not an ideal
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method of representing semantic relations such as symmetric,
transitive and associative relations (for instance, X is parent
of Y; X is taller than Y, and so on). Nor does it handle
indexicals, performative utterances or paraphrases (A precedes
B; B follows A). No meaning is represented apart from a
contrastive lexical kind (denotative meaning: father = male;
connotative meaning: father = caring), thus encyclopaedic
knowledge, however relevant (a father is probably over twelve),
is excluded. It is also the case that some words would require
complex componential analysis in that they do not necessarily
point to any concept but merely delimit an area negatively as
being not like some other.
The idea of lexical decomposition has great descriptive mileage
but is, unfortunately, formally intractable. Some features
like 'plural', 'mass' and 'masculine' have been adopted in
feature-based grammar formalisms being a bridge between syntax
and semantics. Beyond these obvious features is a
proliferation of possible features of differing granularity
and intrinsicality. There is no principled way to circumscribe
them. Fillmore believed the definition of semantic components
must be arbitrary.
Thus, despite the specious attractiveness of componential
analysis, at the end of the day we cannot abandon model-theory
entirely in favour of such a system. Of course, model theory
has its limitations too: linguistic differentiation does not
correspond to reality, being sometimes more granular (colour
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terms for the continuous spectrum) and sometimes less
('bric-a-brac' for numerous distinguishable items) (Cruse
1986).
Also, some words do not have observable denotata in themselves
('listless', 'irony'). It seems, however, possible that one
could do a compositional job on such words reducing them to
primitive elements and that those elements might turn out to
be, not semantic features, but observable denotata. However,
the conceptual bricks favoured by Katz (Katz 1972) are of
different kinds, for instance, 'bachelor' and 'widower'
would share positive features 'animate', 'male' and 'adult'
but would have positive feature 'never married' and negative
feature 'never married' respectively. Whatever the minimum
primitive set is, it is, unfortunately, not the same as that
set of concepts that has demonstrable denotata and thus cannot
be accommodated easily into a model-theoretic semantics.
We may feel at this point that we have travelled an
uncomfortable distance from the external world which, to be
fair, came in very useful in providing meaning for a lot of
serviceable words like 'cup' and 'green'. As Aitchison
(Aitchison 1978) points out, some words which appear to be
amenable to compositional analysis are tricky: is not a
non-stripy or non-carniverous tiger still a tiger? A lot of
people would think that this inherent immutability was true of
all natural kind terms or rigid designators. Surely some
primitive concepts are best explained referentially?
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Of course, wa are not forced onto the horns of this dilemma
between structural and non-structural theories of meaning.
Aitchison (Aitchison 1978) abandons the idea of a unary
semantic principle:
meaning is double-faced. The meaning of a lexical
item such as 'tree' must be considered in two ways: first
of all as one element in a language system whose
meaning is dependent on relationships with the other
words in the system. Second its meaning is linked up with
a certain class of recognisable objects in the external
world.
To review for a moment, we can see that the present discussion
of linguistics, from field theory to semantic traits, is a
long way from where we began: namely what might be called the
black box approach to words. To a philosophical logician, each
word ha3 a discrete external function and what is inside it is
not his concern. Predicate calculus was not designed to
express lexical relationships. The uncomfortable accretion of
meaning postulates to Montague semantics shows us that logical
form went a long way down the road of truth-conditional
semantics and model theory before lexical relationships were
incorporated.
This doesn't mean that lexical semantics is a fruitless
endeavour but merely that it was not the concern of logicians
like Russell and Frege to root out lexical dependencies but to
formalise truth conditional semantics. To the lexicalist a word
is more a box of delights than a black box.
Of course, to give a full account of language we need a
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marriage of formal and lexical semantics. Is such a synthesis
possible?
3.4 Thematic roles.
Transformational grammar made an attempt at synthesising formal
and lexical semantics by incorporating thematic roles (theta
roles; participant roles) into a fairly formal system. A
number of linguists have addressed themselves to a study of
thematic roles under various guises of nomenclature.
The characterisation of thematic roles, apparently a real
attempt at uncovering general semantic principles concerning
the functional semantics as opposed to the logical semantics of
words, attempts to characterise the semantic function of
syntactic structures.
In frame analysis (Fillmore 1975), a case framework for a verb
is a specification of the syntax and/or semantics of the
concepts that can be associated with that verb and the cases
are, for example, agent, beneficiary, recipient and so on.
The point of the structure is to provide slots into which later
comprehension processes can look without having to contend with
the complexities of the original sentence which may include
passives, tenses, prepositional phrases and so on.
In functional grammar (Matthews 1981), 'predicate frames' are
listed in the lexicon. These specify a number of arguments
(for instance, agent, goal and so on) and from these frames
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predictions can be made about the contents of the arguments.
Other grammars with similar aims are the lexical functional
grammar of Bresnan and Kaplan and the functional unification
grammar of Kay.
Relational grammar (Postal 1976) was developed in reaction to
transformational grammar, elevating the notions of subject and
object to positions of importance. This can be unproductive in
some sentences where subject/object distinctions aren't
obvious, for example:
Father Blaney weighs seventeen stone
The theta theory (theta for 'thematic') in Government and
Binding Theory also attempts to account for the relationship
between verbs and their arguments, the theta role, or thematic
relation, being the argument. The theory determines under
what circumstances an NP can be the argument of a verb, the
different kinds being, for instance, agent, patient (or theme)
or goal, and attempts to make syntactic generalisations to this
end.
X Bar Theory is a variation of the phrase structure component
of transformational grammar. To say that a phrase structure
rule is A -> B where B is any set of non-terminal or terminal
symbols, is too powerful. Heads are linguistic universals and
phrase structure rules should capture them. The theory also
incorporates theta roles or the thematic or participant roles
of Fillmore.
-154-
The function of thematic roles is to enable us to generalise
about similar constructions that have different meanings.
Lachlan had a skean-dhu
Lachlan had a holiday with the Salvation Army
They also explain restrictions on co-ordination and sentence
order and expose similarities in meaning where different
constructions are used.
McBride burned the incense on Sunday
the incense burned on Sunday
Sir Bigshot Bagott opened the pilchards with his Osmiroid
the Osmiroid opened the pilchards
Typology of participant roles is debated. In the previous
example McBride is deemed to be the agent. It is not agreed
whether this would still be so if the subject had been 'fire'
or 'the robot'. Other classes have been suggested such as
'force' or 'machine'. The finer the distinctions made between
different semantic categories, the closer the study of thematic
roles comes to lexical semantics rather than functional
semantics. Amongst about thirty roles suggested for X in the
phrase 'with X' have been:
the thurible is with the candlesticks (location);
he weighted the sack with the candlesticks (instrument);
he fell into the moat with the candlesticks (comitative);
make the molten metal with the candlesticks (ingredient).
Such an explosion of classes could be reduced by extirpating
contingent and situational attributes from the analysis and
concentrating on grammatical and lexical attributes. There
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could also be a restriction of one participant role per clause
although this creates problems distinguishing between
complement (goal) and adjunct (goal).
he sent a bridie to the oubliette for Fons
Other roles are benefactive, recipient, patient, source and
goal.
the priest slipped from the vestry (source)
the priest slipped into the barouche-landau (goal)






The analysis of participant roles is vague and inconclusive.
More importantly, participant roles are context dependent.
There is no reason to suppose that 'into the barouche landau'
has the thematic role 'goal' in some kind of intrinsic way.
Compare
the field mouse slipped opportunistically into the barouche
landau
the highwayman fell clumsily into the barouche landau
The vehicle is not a goal in any real sense in the latter
example, and to deem it so is merely conventional and lacking
in explanatory power. The most we can say is that the phrase is
adverbial and spatial.
The following adverbials are difficult.
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tha vicar cleaned the pond with the boy scouts
the vicar crossed the moor with his compass
the vicar printed the parish magazine with a computer
when I ate the india rubber I cut it into eight pieces
when I ate the india rubber I forfeited my exeat
A solution to the first three examples is to say that there is
only one 'with' role (comitative) but that each object changes
the meaning subtly. The latter two examples demonstrate that
an adverbial introduced by 'when' can have temporal or
teleological force.
To many people, syntax is grammar and semantics is grammatical
functions. This is very crude but it is nevertheless true that
grammatical functions provide a useful starting point for a
study of semantics. The definition of even grammatical
functions is, however, rather woolly. For example, indirect
objects are often only defined by means of a list of verbs
deemed to take them. Certain transformation rules do not work
for all indirect objects either, making the class difficult to
define.
he gave the thurible to O'Connell
he gave O'Connell the thurible
Sparrow attributed the work to Housman
*Sparrow attributed Housman the work
It cannot be said that complements are always indirect objects
for sometimes they are directional adverbs:
he gave the burse to Father Shaugnessy
but
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he put the holy water into the piscina
Defining the notion of subject is also difficult and it cannot
be recognised in some languages. One can only establish a
list of subject-like characteristics (Matthews 1981). The
subject cannot usually be eliminated. Subjects normally
express the agent of an action and the addressee of
imperatives.
Given all these problems, it is not clear whether, even if a
set of thematic roles could be characterised at a necessarily
fine level of syntactic granularity, that it would be of any
significance.
3.5 Computation and unification formalisms.
Before leaving this survey of interdisciplinary semantics a few
words should be said about a mechanism used widely in
computing which realises some of the theoretic notions outlined
above.
Computational power has been harnessed in the service of
several areas of linguistic research including the
construction of concordances, word-frequency analyses,
speech-analysis, parsing and language-generation and also
semantics.
While it would be superfluous to enumerate all the computer
systems in computational linguistics and artificial
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intelligence according to their semantic components, one
mechanism stands out as significant in the context of
componential analysis.
Unification has its origins in mathematics but has especial
value in any application where a large amount of potentially
disparate information has to be synthesised. This is obviously
the case in natural language parsing and it has seemed a good
idea to some to include semantic, pragmatic and indeed any
other constraints when sorting out the possible interpretation
of a string of words. Thus semantic pruning does not come in
at the end of the computational process but concurrently with
syntactical analysis. (The pros and cons of these alternative
methods must be weighed carefully: it is not obviously more
efficient to do the job either way.)
Another advantage of unification is that the mechanism provides
an economical way of representing the common heritage of many
lexical items. For instance, the lexical information
pertaining to a transitive verb can be represented once and
thereafter inherited by all transitive verbs.
Kartunnen (Kartunnen 1986) claims that many grammars such as
LFG, HPSG, CG, CCG, relational grammar and some versions of GB
can be represented by the graph-unification formalism D-Patr
from Xerox Pare and it is easy to see how. Other grammars
written in Prolog, which is a term-unification language,
exploit unification as do grammars like UCG written on D-Patr.
Advantages are order-independence of rules and the handling of
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partial information. Semantic constraints are handled by
means of features for polarity (+ve/-ve), tense, tense aspect
(simple/perfect), mood (indicative/conditional/potential),
type (declarative/imperative/interrogative). For example
'loved* would have features positive, past, simple, indicative,
declarative. Another advantage of the unification formalism is
that it is surface-based.
It must be said that insofar as the above grammars and others
not detailed (for example, LFG, FUG, GPSG, HPSG and DCGs) are
concerned, the semantic component is either very rudimentary
and restricted to what might be called logical semantics and
the entailments of function words, or else offers a simple
type hierarchy of concepts and the semantic features attached
to them, thus, for example, 'flow', 'drip' and 'trickle'
might all be assigned to the same class and impose a
restriction on any subject noun that combines with them, namely
that it be some kind of liquid (contrast, 'the information
flowed').
Unification formalisms like PATR offer scope for over-riding
although this introduces non-monotonicity and sacrifices the
potential for order independence of rules. The system also
allows lexical redundancy rules to express relations like
active and passive although this is outside the methodology of
PATR, transformations again jeopardising order independence.
LFG allows aggregation of incompatible information using some
suitable criterion for deciding what over-writes what.
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As Shieber (Shieber 1986) says, the structures offered by a
grammar formalism should be appropriate for expressing
linguistic information. It is a fair question to ask whether
the structures offered by unification grammar formalisms are
appropriate. There are various caveats: templates are not a
class of objects defined by linguistic criteria; subsumption
lattices are not organised according to linguistic strata but
computationally motivated; D-PATR rules are complicated;
unification is not a procedural process; inheritance (without
over-riding mechanisms) is possibly not a property that is
sufficiently general in linguistic structures for one to build
a grammar around the notion. Having said that, the
computational elegance of unification is so seductive that it
has been exploited in all sorts of artificial intelligence
contexts. Computational elegance however should not be used to
justify incongruous applications.
Some linguistic phenomena seem however to be particularly
suited to unification treatment. Homonymy is multiple
ambiguity of phonologically similar words (for example, the
two meanings of 'bible' (a holy book; a cow's stomach)). This
is a problem which can sometimes be solved in computation by
unification of feature sets or in linguistics by the
imposition of selectional restrictions. For instance
Vernon was reading a bible
may carry selectional restrictions on the verb 'to read' such
as 'takes an inanimate object'. If only one of the two lexical
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entries for 'bible' has the feature 'inanimate' the problem on
this occasion is solved. It is not as straightforward as this
of course. Even excluding metaphor and poetic style, Vernon
could be reading the entrails of a cow as one reads
tea-leaves!
Polysemy refers to the related but differing senses that one
word may have or the vacillation of meaning or sense of a
word from context to context, for example, 'man' in 'man has a
vectorial spirit' and 'a man sat on a drawing pin'. This class
of words facilitates puns. An example is 'met':
I met my wife in Paris which was embarrassing as I had told
her I was going on a business trip to Widnes.
This is a problem: should one have separate lexical entries
for such a word or is there a minimal feature set that is
common to all uses of the word and a number of variable
features on each that take the colour of the local context? A
natural inclination for parsimony makes us move to the second
solution.
Another way to classify these kinds of lexical items is as
ambiguous and vague. One could say that 'bible' is ambiguous
and that 'man' and 'good' are vague. The common solution to
both is a kind of negotiation procedure where each word
contributes its heap of semantic elements and the vague words
contribute also indeterminate features with a range of
possible values. The syntactic rules that build constructions
would also unify feature sets discarding incompatible values.
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Unification seems to be a powerful mechanism both for parsing
and also for lexical semantics that enables one to test the
operational feasibility of notions such as componential
analysis that were hitherto merely theoretical.
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Chapter 4. A semantics of prediction and coercion:
background.
The following four chapters deal with the special semantic
problems of, on the one hand, predicting the meaning of unknown
words from their neighbours, and, on the other, resolving
semantic anomalies. These two aims are not unrelated since
coming across an unknown word in a text is rather like
discovering an anomaly. At any rate we are brought up sharply
by a piece of text that cannot be understood literally or
cannot be understood at all.
Chapter 4 discusses the background to the semantics, the
grammar and the classification of words into basic ontological
types.
Chapter 5 deals with the need for a semantics of prediction and
coercion and discusses alternative approaches to the problem.
Chapter 6 deals with the principle for predicting the meaning
of unknown words.
Chapter 7 handles semantic coercion and the principle of
anomaly resolution.
4.1 Fashion.
From previous chapters, despite a lengthy assessment of current
lexical semantics, we can see that the study of word meaning
(what is inside the black box) along with philology and
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etymology, first pursued by the Stoics, has been, to some
degree, marginalised since it has not proved amenable to the
twentieth century post-Fregean paradigm of the scientific or
formal treatment of language. Aesthetics has enjoyed the same
isolation in philosophical circles since it does not reward
formal analysis in the way that other philosophical topics do.
Ethics yields to a utilitarian treatment for instance.
Thrax's Greek grammar from the first century BC identifies
(though he did not get round to them all) six different
elements of grammar including explanation of principal poetic
tropes and mythological examples, etymological derivations,
identification of proportional series and poetic criticism.
Boils can mean a particular configuration of spots or they can
mean bubonic plague or they can mean imminent demise.
Scientific description may be more precise than any other
explanation but not necessarily of greater epistemological
significance.
It is a mistake to demean all aspects of the world and language
in particular that will not yield to reductionist treatment.
As Wittgenstein, swimming against the tide, in the
Philosophical Investigations, put it (Wittgenstein 1953):
we are not striving after an ideal as if our
ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a
quite unexceptionable sense and a perfect
language awaited construction by us...
Thus, anomalously, even as the linguists were breaking away
from the treadmill of descriptive linguistics and beginning to
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formalise generative grammar, the philosopher Wittgenstein was
forswearing all formal methods and advocating descriptive
semantics alone (ibid.):
we may not advance any kind of theory. There
must not be anything hypothetical in our
considerations. We must do away with all explanations
and description alone must take its place.
Thrax's description of grammar is translated as technical
knowledge, one of the four Aristotelian divisions of
knowledge, namely, one that uncovers underlying principles
but, notably, not 'episteme' or that branch of knowledge that
reveals all the causes of something, revealing it as being
necessarily the way it is. This suggests that we should
recognise grammars as provisional, not a distillation of
language but a normative description of it. In Varro's De
Lingua Latina, written in the first century BC, he concludes
that, contrary to the polarised views of the day, language is
the product of both regular laws and also non-deterministic
human choice.
It is important to realise that twentieth century formalism is
largely a matter of intellectual fashion and not necessarily
an inherently superior methodological approach. The question
of whether the universe and language are subject to laws (the
analogy / anomaly controversy) taxed the ancient Greeks.
Formal methods are fraught with problems. It is often
mistakenly believed that a particular formalism is a
distillation of everything that there is in the field in
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question when it would be more reasonable of its creator and
disciples to admit, as Montague did, that only a fragment of
the field is accounted for. This problem also arises in
artificial intelligence where there is often a qualitative, and
not merely quantitative, difference between some micro-world
under investigation and reality.
Another example of the inadequacy of formal methods when
dealing with organic subject matter is Roger Williams'
extrapolated tenth symphony of Beethoven. The critics
suggested that Beethoven's egregiousness lay in part in being
able to write music he hadn't written before rather than music
he had. Sampson, after Popper, believes one can not have a
science of thought, since thought involves ex-nihilo
hypothesis plus sensory evidence while science involves
prediction. Semantics is creative, because it is built
on the speaker's beliefs which are creative, therefore it
is not scientifically describable and no general theory of
language is possible. We should, as Wittgenstein recommends,
go back to descriptive linguistics and lexicography (Sampson
1980).
Of course, formal semantics may not be attended with problems
in the future, but we should remind ourselves that there is no
reason, except scientistic fervour, why we should necessarily
assume this.
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4.2 Aims of the theory.
It seems to me that neither the formalist nor the descriptive
linguist is entirely right. Those who fear that formal
semantics is some kind of vivisection of what is an organic
human creation, or, alternatively, blasphemy against something
3acred should be aware that there are still insuperable hurdles
to be overcome concerning the representation of meaning.
For one thing, only a handful of words function purely as
logical operators. The rest of language is laden with
contextual nuances, contingent factual information and distant
metaphorical senses. Our understanding of nouns draws on a
vast network of world knowledge ('hotel', 'breakfast'); no
adjectives or adverbs are entirely intersective but are to some
degree context-dependent ('red hair', 'red roses'); verbs are
extremely susceptible to metaphorical shift ('break the
moustache-cup'; 'break the tradition'). Some kind of
exhaustive syntax-based context-free set-theoretic account of
semantics seems out of the question.
This, however, seems very dissatisfying. Surely we can strip
words of their connotative and context-dependent meaning and
give a principled account of the semantics of what is left.
After all, a great many words merely refer to everyday objects,
events and properties out there in the world. It is hard to
believe that they combine together in sentences in an entirely
unprincipled and whimsical way.
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This seems to me to be a clue to a principled approach to
semantics. Establishing reference for the words we use is,
first and foremost, an ontological question. What sort of a
thing is a foot-warmer? How does it differ from the sort of
thing a faux-pas or a fortnight is? What are the basic
ontological types? How do they inter-relate? To what extent
are they fixed or do they exercise selective and coercive
powers over each other?
Before a detailed discussion of these questions I will describe
the basic building blocks of the semantics to be used, namely,
the hierarchy of semantic categories, the classification
procedure that assigns words to these categories, the lexicon
of basic English words that is incorporated into the semantics,
the grammar and the fragment of language with which the
semantics deals.
The research has three overall aims, namely, to use the
semantics
a) to predict the semantic class of an unknown word from a
known word in text adjacent to it;
b) to predict the semantic class of a linguistic structure from
its components;
c) to make domain-independent inferences from well-known




It is assumed that there is a semantic hierarchy of basic
ontological types and that all words can be classified into
one of four ontological classes (for instance, 'dog'
belongs to the class animate) according to the ontological
types of their referents.
Something should be said about hierarchies.
Cruse (Cruse 1986) says that hierarchies can be branching or
non-branching. They must be directional, that is asymmetric.
They must be catenary, that is, they can, in principle, form a
chain of elements not just two (this excludes relations like
'is husband of'). They may be transitive or intransitive. They
must have only one root. The branches must not converge (this
excludes lattices and relations like 'is larger than').
Examples of hierarchies are taxonomies and parts explosions.
To some extent it seems stipulative to say that a
lattice structure cannot represent a hierarchy. Chambers
Twentieth Century Dictionary gives the following definitions of
hierarchy (Chambers 1983):
classification in graded subdivisions;
a body or organisation classified in successively subordinate
grades.
Neither of these definitions is incompatible with a lattice
structure (remember a lattice may have only one root).
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One may feel intuitively that it is part of the definition of a
hierarchy that, for any two members of that hierarchy, it is
possible to say which is the more senior. This test however is
equally inapplicable to trees and lattices. Cruse's
stipulation that a lattice cannot be a hierarchy may come from
the paradigm of human organisations. Office-boys, corporals,
programmers and farm-hands usually report to only one boss; it
is confusing if they don't. This may suggest that hierarchies
cannot be lattice structures but are tree structures or linear.
Hyponymous relations can be represented by a hierarchy. Not
all hyponymous terms however can be represented by a tree
structure, unless we restrict ourselves to natural kind term3.
Consider the following. The lines can be read (from bottom to
top) as 'is a kind of'.




It seems to be a mistake also to think that there is
necessarily a hierarchical structure independently of the
relation used. To show this we can construct hierarchies where
hyponyms and superordinates swap places:
pet dog wolfhound
/II /||
wolfhound pug dandiedinmont guarddog petdog workingdog
This is not supposed to represent natural kind terms and so
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there is no preferable orientation of these hierarchies. It
all depends on one's point of view. In a book or a semantic
feature database about pets, 'wolf hound' would, by default,
contain the semantic primitive 'pet'. In a book or database
concerning wolf hounds, pet dogs would, by default, contain the
primitive 'wolf hound'. Data is only recognised as data in a
specific domain. For instance, paper money is flammable but
such a property would be irrelevant in nearly every context
(Medin and Shoben 1988).
Non-branching hierarchies can be derived from branching ones or
just be linear relations of dominance. If you label the levels
of a branching hierarchy (with abstract entity labels not
classes) you get a non-branching one. Here is one of Cruse's





/ I / I I
tufted bush hop lesser species
vetch vetch trefoil trefoil
Another way to reduce a branching hierarchy to a non-branching
one is to provide a single superordinate for all items at each
level. You can't do this with a taxonomy however because
taxonomies are transitive and any superordinate for a level
would also be an appropriate superordinate for all levels
below it.
Cruse claims that sometimes a branching hierarchy exists but
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there are no words for it, for instance, unit-of-measure
hierarchies and military hierarchies. These can be represented
linguistically as non-branching hierarchies with labels like
'centimetre' and 'colonel'. It is difficult to see how one
could represent these as branching hierarchies though. A ruler
may comprise twelve inches, each of which comprises ten tenths
of an inch but it is difficult to represent this as a
hierarchy. For one thing, every tenth (unless uniquely named)
stands in the same mathematical relation to every inch, which
would generate some kind of lattice structure that Cruse, as we
have seen, claims cannot be a hierarchy.
Other non-branching hierarchies are what Cruse dubs linear
relations of dominance. They are asymmetric and catenary with
relations like 'is bigger than'. In some hierarchies the
relation is a salient property or criterial trait of the
elements, for instance
mound-hillock-hi11-mountain.
In others it is just an expected trait, as in
dog-horse-elephant.
Cruse distinguishes hierarchies from chains, the latter having
no inherent traits that provide the relations but forming a




Cyclical chains are called helices. Examples are
Monday-Tuesday-Wednesday
the spectrum, the seasons and times of day.
The hierarchy adopted by this thesis comprises four fundamental
classes standing in a linear relation of dominance, from lowest
to highest, viz
concrete animate mental abstract
A definition of each of these classes is given in Section 4.4.
This relation of dominance will become crucial later on in the
characterisation of the principles of prediction and
coercion.
The relation of dominance between these classes should be











It will be observed that such a structure is not, in Cru3ean
terms, a hierarchy since it is, in fact, a sort of lattice.
However, just as a frog is both terrestrial and aquatic, (most)
animate objects are both concrete and mental. We cannot
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pretend that this paradoxical state of affairs does not exist,
or that if it does, it is not inherently hierarchical.
Wherein lies the hierarchy?
To follow in Cruse's footsteps we need a useful schema. I
suggest
nothing can be X if it isn't Y
where Y is the superordinate and X the subordinate in a
hierarchical relation. Thus, nothing can be animate (for
example, a man) if it is not both concrete and mental and
nothing is mental (for instance, a thought) that is not
abstract. Likewise, nothing is concrete that is not abstract in
the sense that it has some abstract dimension of functionality
(for example, sand is unsuitable for building on, a protractor
is a device for drawing angles, and so on). On the other
hand there are abstract objects that are not mental (for
example, a possibility) and concrete ones (for instance, a
scythe) that are not animate so there is no other appropriate
configuration for the lattice: it could not whimsically have
been the other way up, for instance.
The ascendancy of abstract over concrete in these hierarchies
is neither arbitrary nor insignificant. Abstract terms denote
all that is most significant to the intellectual life and finer
sensibilities of civilised man. Locke believed that what
distinguished man from beast and civilised man from primitive
man were his powers of abstraction. This is taken up by
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Bloomfield (Brown 1958).
The surface study of semantic change indicates
that refined and abstract meanings largely grow
out of more concrete meanings.
There is also evidence (see below) that ostensive meanings have
chronological precedence over abstract meanings in language
acquisition (although this in itself is not a sufficient reason
for abstract readings to be preferred to concrete ones in a
case of ambiguity).
The first of the above hierarchies is a coarse-grained
representation for simplicity. The large grain size means
that, when we discuss anomalous linguistic structures, some
anomalies are not identified (for example, 'the dog winked')
as the components of such anomalies fall under the same class.
One further semantic class, the class figurative has not been
mentioned before. The class is unusual in that it applies only
to combinations of words and not to individual ones.
Figurative usage occurs when abstract adjectives, adverbs and
verbs concerning the psyche (that is, the cognitive, emotional
and intentional life of man) occur in conjunction with
concrete (that is, appertaining to inanimate matter) nouns,
verbs and subject nouns respectively. This marriage usually
begets androids or android-like events, for example
the peevish bicycle
output the document eagerly
the scythe repented
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We may think that this is merely a case of coercion that can be
incorporated into our general theory somehow, but examination
of the first example shows that there is no coercion. The
bicycle is still, in essence, a bicycle and the peevishness
still, in essence, a state of mind. Comparison with the phrase
'a hot temper' demonstrates the difference. A hot temper is
still, is essence, a temper but is not in any literal sense
hot. We may argue that a hot temper does not literally exist
and therefore the phrase should perhaps be classified as
figurative but this is to reject the conventional
interpretation of the phrase which is that it refers to a kind
of temper that does really exist but is not really hot. The
phrase has yielded to coercion in a way that figurative phrases
do not: they resist ontological classification into one of the
four primary classes.
Single words do not seem to be inherently figurative, since,
despite problems of existence, they are always ontologically









All these words refer to objects or properties about which
there is some uncertainty, for instance, one is unclear about
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the colour of sky-blue-pink but assumes it would refer to a
concrete quality. Likewise one is sceptical about the
existence of Bulldog Drummond but one assumes the name would
refer to an animate object. 'Fictitious', while it is a
property of non-existent objects is not a non-existent property
but has the ontological class abstract. We have a good
concrete definition of phlogiston (an element separated from
every combustible body in burning): there just happens, along
with Biggies, moly, worricows and other denizens of possible
worlds, not to be any around the place.
The fact that the above list of words refers to things that do
not exist in the real world need not make any difference to our
semantics. After all, we can talk about, say, a pink hat,
quite intelligibly, with a respectful avoidance of anomaly and
contradiction, without caring about whether it exists or not.
This is true. However, if we had no idea to which ontological
class hats in general belonged then we would not need to guard
against anomalous or contradictory discourse about them since
there could be no such discourse. One does not economise in
daydreams: they cannot be too baroque or vainglorious.
Likewise, discourse about non-existent ontological types like
peevish bicycles cannot be anomalous. In these circumstances
we can say what we like and a semantics of prediction and
coercion is redundant.
The semantic class figurative is included here for completeness
since some combinations of words are figurative. However, it
-178-
is excluded from the .semantic hierarchy since it has
application only to linguistic phrases and not to individual
words.
4.4 Classification of known words.
Known words must obviously be classified if we are to use them
for predicting the classes of unknown words.
The following criteria are used to determine which of the five
semantic classes should be assigned to a word.
Animate. The class animate is assigned to words that denote
any object, action, state, event, process or property that is
apprehensible by the senses and can only be, be executed by, be
enjoyed by or be inherent in, an animal. For example, the
following words are classed as animate: boy, to hide, to be
lame, to be sick, to write, flatulent.
Concrete. Any object, action, state, event, process or property
that is apprehensible by the senses and can exist, be executed
or obtain in the absence of an animate object (for example:
dust, to fall, to decay, a volcano, erosion, black).
Mental. Any object, action, state, event, process or property
that is not apprehensible by the senses and is, is executed by,
is enjoyed by or is inherent in, the human mind (for example, a
dream, to decide, anxiety, a thought, ratiocination, contrite).
Abstract. Any object, action, state, event, process or
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property that is not apprehensible by the senses and does not
come under the previous classification, and is not figurative
(see below) (for example: a lemma, to vitiate, impossibility,
yesterday, to elapse, old).
Figurative. Any object, action, state, event, process or
property that is the result of combining an abstract adjective,
adverb or verb concerning the psyche with a concrete noun, verb
or subject noun respectively (for example, a cheery tank-
engine, fell apart with relief, the fountain mourned, a
churlish thunderstorm, the oaktree pondered).
If a word genuinely falls between two classes (for example,
'man', 'brainchild', 'song') or if a word has more than one
use (for example, 'break' in 'break the plate'; 'break the
tradition') then the word is classified in the lower class of
the two. One can think of this as a default class. If a word
has two meanings (homonymy) then it has two entries in the
lexicon and two classifications.
I accept the traditional distinction that concrete nouns are
those that represent things or properties that could be
apprehended by the senses if they existed. This includes
'redness', 'bucket', 'rustlings', 'cold', 'bitterness',
'smells', 'ambrosia', 'unicorn' and 'Sherlock Holmes'.
The traditional distinction between concrete and abstract when
applied to attributes can be re-worded as a distinction between
formal and functional attributes, for example, the attributes
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of colour, shape, weight and so on are formal, while those of
purpose, for instance, 'having the function of slicing bacon'
and 'being a chiropodist by profession' are functional.
(There is possibly potential also in distinguishing between
Cartesian primary and secondary qualities, that is, on the one
hand, qualities to be found in all bodies like solidity ,
extension, figure and mobility, and, on the other hand, powers
in the object to produce ideas in us that do not resemble their
cause, for instance colour, taste and smell.)
The classes mental and animate, although, according to the
above ontological hierarchy, they derive from the basic
classes of abstract and concrete, are, nevertheless, primary
classes in an anthropocentric world. By 'primary' I mean that
there are single words that should be classified as animate or
mental, for example 'horse' and 'reproachful'. 'Mental'
includes the cognitive, emotional and psychological faculties
of man. Anthropocentricity is not usually a consideration in
lexical semantics, the motivation usually being to organise
words according to the hierarchy of natural kind terms or
lexical fields or some other schema. This is curious when one
thinks about it since language is a human creation with human
concerns in mind. If language is preoccxipied with the mental
and physical life of man we should not be surprised.
Here is a sample lexicon of the primary semantic classes, built
according to the above classification method.
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As we have seen, the two basic classes are concrete and
abstract, concrete being all those things that are
apprehensible by the senses and abstract being everything else.
Thus, the elements in the column headed 'concrete' are all
apprehensible by the senses. (This is pace Putnam's
reservations about the common man's ability to identify a
concrete substance like, say, gold. We are talking here about
what is apprehensible not what is identifiable.)
We can see and touch metal buckets, hear a bell ringing loudly
and see a printing machine outputting paper. On the other
hand, abstract things are not apprehensible in this way. We
cannot touch or smell a theory, (literally) see that something
is French or glimpse an argument being vitiated. Nor can we see
that someone is executing their duty controversially.
The two remaining classes are secondary classes, thrust into
prominence by the anthropocentric nature of language and the
world of discourse, namely 'animate' and 'mental'. The class
animate is the progeny of the ontological classes concrete and
abstract in the ontologoical hierarchy. Animate subsumes so
many words that it deserves to be identified as a class in its
own right. 'Mental' deserves to be identified as a class in
its own right for a different reason, namely that, although
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mental objects are abstract, nevertheless they have the unique
distinction of being, in some sense, situated in (or
epiphenomena of) animate objects.
Thus 'man' is an animate noun. 'Forlorn' is also animate
because it cannot properly be said to subsist in the absence of
any animal. 'Avoid' is animate because it requires an animal to
realise it, and 'loquaciously' is animate because it is a
property that cannot subsist in the absence of an animate
action, state, event or process.
The noun 'mind' is a mental noun. 'Contrite' is classified as a
mental property because it cannot exist in the absence of a
mind. 'Despise' is a mental verb because it presupposes a
cognitive agent. Likewise, 'angrily' presupposes a mental
state, action, process or event.
One or two of these examples may seem whimsical. For instance,
a French man is surely apprehensible by the senses. Why then
should the adjective French be deemed abstract? Or, if it is,
then surely so is the property of being a man and indeed any
property.
This is not so. For one thing, it is perfectly possible for
something to be French and yet this Frenchness to be quite
undetectable by the senses. However, it is difficult to
imagine that something could be a man and yet his 'manness' be
undetectable by any sense whatsoever (given, of course, an
observer and reasonable conditions).
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But, it may be argued, suppose the man is wearing a bustle,
rouge, Rive Gauche and singing Voi Che Sapete? Detection might
be impossible. This is even truer of, say, a traffic-warden in
his pyjamas. The senses would not apprehend his day-job.
The answer is that, granted, a traffic warden, or even a man,
might escape detection by the senses but not qua animate
object. Thus they would both be classified as animate for the
purposes of our system.
It is tempting to think that all properties are functional
('old','French', the property of being a secretary and so on)
and thus not apprehensible by the senses, but this does not
seem to be correct. Granted you can see a French waiter but
not see his Frenchness. However, you can see a pink geranium
and also see its pinkness. Of course, you cannot smell its
pinkness but this is not required. Detection by one of the
senses is enough.
Another troublesome example is the concrete verb 'output'. Why,
it might be asked, should we use such an awkward neologism when
plenty of other words will do? The answer is that the only
transitive verbs that are exclusively used with concrete
subject nouns are neologisms such as 'autoprint', 'output' and
so on. Verbs like 'hit* and 'cut', although classified as
concrete, often have an animate agent behind them and thus are
not ideal prototypical examples. Of course, there are
intransitive verbs that can take concrete subject nouns, but
few of them exclusively so. Buckets can, indeed, fall, rattle
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and shake but then so can animate objects. 'Fall apart' is
perhaps a better example of something only concrete objects can
literally do without losing caste!
It is a mistake to think for a moment that every word fits
neatly into one of these four discrete groups. The reality is
a continuum and this in itself can affect the semantic result
of combining two words. The continuum is built up by beginning
with the lowest class, concrete, in its most brutish
instantiation (for instance, sand, iron) and, by minute
accretions of animacy, mentality and abstraction to move up to
the highest class, abstract, in its most rarefied
instantiations (for instance, impossibility, proof).
The nature of the hierarchy as a continuum or, in actual fact,
a circle, can be demonstrated by the following nicely







The classification of words into the four primary classes (and
one secondary class) can be extended to cover complex phrases
that can nevertheless be reduced to simple parts of speech.
Thus, in 'the prisoner in the oubliette', 'in the oubliette'
would be classified as a concrete adjectival phrase (or noun
modifier) which can loosely be called a concrete adjective.
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Likewise in 'tortured with the bastinado', 'with the
bastinado' would be classified as a concrete adverbial phrase,
or verb modifier, which can loosely be called a concrete
adverb.
Of course, this initial four-way classification is rudimentary.
There are much finer-grained classifications available, for
example concrete-mass, concrete-liquid and so on. Violation of
expected classes of this sort causes prototypicality mistakes,
such as
Beasley drank the school assembly hall.
The idea of classes of meaning is derived from Aristotle
(Ackrill 1987). In the Categories he suggests the











Kant also assembled a table of categories of the human
understanding, including quantity (unity, plurality, totality),
quality (reality, negation, limitation), relation (substance
and accident, cause and effect, reciprocity) and modality
(possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence,
necessity and contingency). Russell finds Aristotle's
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categories confusing. The category of substance is supposed to
exclude properties that cannot exist on their own (that is,
independently of a substance, for example 'white'). However,
he allows a particular horse and also horse-in-general to be
substances, and Russell cannot make any sense of the notion of
a substance without properties (Russell 1946):
substance ... is a metaphysical mistake,
due to transference to the world-structure
of the structure of sentences composed of a subject
and predicate
Brown (Brown 1958) distinguishes between single, conjunctive,
relational and disjunctive categories. In single categories,
the members all have an attribute never found outside the
category. An example is 'goat'. In conjunctive categories a
joint presence of attributes is required (for example, a
right-angled triangle). In disjunctive categories one of a set
of alternative attributes is required, for instance, a lord
can be a peer of the realm or a life-peer. In relational
categories a specific relation is required between the
attributes of that category (an isosceles triangle has two
sides the same length).
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4.5 Corpus origins.
As we have seen above, the semantic theory is designed to
underpin a knowledge elicitation program.
The program, as it runs, builds a database of facts supplied by
the expert user. However, the program is also knowledge-based
in that it is supplied with a lexicon of common words. A small
demonstration version of the program containing a subset of
this lexicon can be found in Appendix 2.
Implicit in the lexicon is the semantic hierarchy. It is
important to note that the lexicon structure is, first of all,
a processing or programming aid (a bit like a road-map) and no
claims are made that it (in its entirety) is isomorphic with
any ontological reality out in the world.
Indeed, it can be seen that the hierarchy incorporates two
distinct sub-structures, the one being composed of syntactic
elements or parts of speech, and the other of semantic elements
or ontological classes. This apparently unsystematic thicket
is in fact merely a representation of the dual parentage
(syntactic and semantic) of every word.
It will also be apparent that the higher echelons of the
lattice are meta-level elements like 'adjective' and 'abstract'
while their descendants are object language elements like
'ache' and 'accident'. Here are some lines from the beginning
of the lexicon lattice. The code is Prolog. The ninth line,
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for example, can be translated roughly as 'there is a node
labelled 'one_place_predicate ' and a subordinate node labelled




















































subsumes (mental__in transit ive_verb,ache).
subsumes(concrete_adjective,acid).
subsumes(concrete_noun,acid).
The meta-level lines of this lexicon have bean built
systematically without regard for known linguistic referents.
Thus, it is extremely unlikely, for example, that the node
'concrete_modal_verb' should have any descendants. This is
because the lexicon is dynamic and intended for constant use
and modification. Thus, new words are added during the
execution of the program and branches can be pruned if they are
found to be dead wood.
The object language levels of the lexicon are taken from the
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (Longman 1987). The
definitions in this dictionary are built from a restricted
lexicon of common or 'basic' words which, the editors claim,
are derived from all the well-known frequency lists of English
words.
A word should be said about Basic English. The slightly
jingoistic flavour and sporadic parenthetical exhortations to
buy the audio version (£6 p&p) of the work of Ogden (Ogden
1930) and his fellows, should not lead us to deride its
endeavour. While tracing its utilitarian ancestry to Bentham,
the search for basic English has other forebears in the
philosophy of language like Leibniz and the attempt to find a
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universal language. Ogden's collection, as that of Longman, is
not a frequency list but a list of 850 simple words that one
can, in theory, express everything with. Longman's collection
is more contemporary and serves to prune out oddities (I don't
find the words 'porter' and 'whip' quite so basic as Ogden)
and gives us a corpus to begin with.
Incidentally, words can be more or less basic. There are many
levels of vocabulary, not just the basic and the
domain-specific. If we were having a conversation about a
chapter of 'The Trumpet Major' we might use specialised
world-knowledge of novels to talk about it, as well as
knowledge of the novel in question, Hardy, nineteenth century
England and so on. There are other levels between basic
English and a particular event or process or instance being
described, namely sub-domains. However, for our purposes here,
there is deemed to be a lexicon of basic words, common to all
domains, and all other words are deemed to have specialised or
technical meanings.
4.6 The grammar.
The semantics is compositional and isomorphic with the syntax.
This is a simplification of the real state of affairs where
words are subject to an ambient cloud of influence from the
immediate and even remoter context. This does not mean such
influence is not in principle measurable but that it may not be
compatible with rules of syntactical composition.
-191-
A slightly less tortuous algorithm might be: the semantic class
of a predicate P is a set of semantic features, being the union
(this set may be without a label in the object language) of the
set of semantic features of P and the 3et of semantic features
specified for P by each other predicate N that shares an
argument X with P, subject to certain conflict resolution
rules.
For example, suppose the expert user typed in the sentence
buddleia_davidii outgrows weeping buddleia_alternifolia





Thus, the semantic class of the predicate P would be the union
of its own set of semantic features with the sets predicted for
it by both N1 and N2 since they both share an argument X with
P, and also that set predicted for it by Q since Q shares an
argument Y with P.
However, for the purposes of this semantic theory, words
influence only those with which they syntactically combine.
This is according to most phrase structure and categorial
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grammars, namely, an adjective combines with a noun to form a
noun phrase, a verb combines with a noun phrase to the right
to form a verb phrase, a verb phrase combines with a noun
phrase to the left to form a sentence, a verb combines with a
(non-sentential) adverb to form a verb phrase and a sentential
adverb combines with a sentence to form a sentence.
We can see that, in the above sentence, P does not
syntactically combine with N2, although they share an argument,
and thus, for our purposes, they are deemed to exert no
semantic influence over each other.
The phrase structure rules are as follows:
SENTENCE —> SENTENCE SENTENTIAL_ADVERB
SENTENCE —> NOUN_PHRASE VERBJPHRASE
NOUN PHRASE —> NOUN
NOUN_PHRASE —> ADJECTIVE NOUN
VERB_PHRASE --> TRANSITIVE_VERB NOUNJPHRASE
VERB_PIIRASE --> TRANSITIVE_VERB VERBAL_ADVERB NOUN_PHRASE
VERB_PHRASE —> INTRANSITIVE_VERB VERBAL_ADVERB
VERB_PHRASE —> INTRANSITIVE__VERB
This restricted grammar has been chosen on the assumption that
most linguistic constructions have one of the following
syntactic functions: adverbial, adjectival, nominal or verbal.
This is similar to Rieger's case frameworks for an
'unintelligent case-frame-like parser' (Dingwall 1978).
For example, phrases such as 'yesterday morning' reduce to
sentential adverbs while 'old and derelict' reduces to an
adjective. Subordinate clauses such as 'after the rain had
fallen' reduce to sentential adverbs and verbless clauses
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('when ripe') or non-finite clauses ('being alone') reduce to
adjectives.
Complements like 'in the garden' ('the Colonel was in the
garden') reduce to adjectives while others ( 'the General's
batman') reduce to noun phrases. Catenative verbs in
conjunction with infinitives ('Aiglitts hates to exercise
Duchess') or auxiliary verbs in conjunction with participles
('Aiglitts was thrown') reduce to verb phrases.
Disjunctive phrases ('either the General or Mrs Weobley')
reduce to noun phrases and so on. Gerundives are treated as
adjectives and gerunds nouns. Complex prepositional phrases can
be reduced to adverbials or adjectivals (as in 'I saw the
adjutant with my silver lorgnettes').
4.7 Parts of speech accepted.
All parts of speech in simple (that is unconjoined) indicative,
non-anaphoric and positive sentences are accommodated by the
theory, all linguistic structures being deemed to be one of
the following in force: nominal, adjectival, adverbial or











in the green strip
behind the referee













at this stage in the game
While the semantic principles below apply to all linguistic
constructions, the parser currently rejects the following:
verbs taking a complement or more than two arguments; composite
or complex noun phrases; infinitives; post-nominal adjectives
('church militant') and tensed verbs.
The analysis of adverbials is fraught. Sometimes a parser is
incapable of determining scope in a sentence without having
recourse to semantic information. There is a well known
ambiguity in 'Blaney ate the crubeens slowly' between eating
each individual crubeen slowly and eating all four slowly. In
the former 'slowly' is a predicate of 'eating a crubeen'; in
the latter of 'eating all four crubeens'.
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Consider also 'Palgrave hired a car hurriedly' and 'Palgrave
hired a car for a week'. In the former the predicate is
predicated of the hiring event, while in the latter it is
predicated of the result of the event. Thus account should
be taken of the internal structure of the events that verbs
refer to, not just of the event itself (SERC 1987).
Thus a deeper analysis of verbs should be made than one that
merely distinguishes them as states, activities,
accomplishments or achievements.
There are methods of telling whether an adverbial is a
sentential operator or a predicate operator. Fronting the
adverbial can disambiguate. The opacity test states that where
an adverb is a sentential modifier then it need not allow
replacement of co-referring descriptions. The synonymy test




synonymy is preserved by a sentential modifier but not by a
predicate modifier. It i3 clear that, while adverbials may be
recognised by the parser and given a coarse-grained semantic
classification, their semantics may be extremely complex.
Tensed verbs are also complicated: the usage of the present
tense form alone is too diverse to allow anything but a
trivial analysis. Here are some examples to demonstrate some of






























Pons is undergoing the bastinado
yesterday whom do I see but Fons
tomorrow Pons is in Tlemel Hempstead
2 and 2 are 4
sauria are reptiles
this is Fons
discretion is the better part of
valour
Fons goes to the Veterinary School
butcher eats trafficwarden
Bert sees Fons enter the laundrette
this Mazda MX-5 goes 120 mph
The analysis of (what used to be called) the future tense in
terms of modality rather than time, is also non-trivial.
While the semantics of tense is an interesting question in
itself, it is beyond the scope of this thesis which merely
addresses itself to the question of the common semantics that
the base form of a verb shares with its derivatives.
The theory applies to adjectives and adjectival phrases,
although, as is well known, they can be indistinguishable from
adverbial phrases, requiring a semantic disambiguation. It is
claimed adjectives can be intersective or non-intersective.
This may be a convenience. The intersection of 'red' and 'hair'
might yield 'red hair' but the intersection of that same set
'red' and 'rose' wouid yield not only red roses but also ones
which were that pale apricot colour that red hair so often is.
These are not usually called red roses. Black tulips might
also slip the net as being exemplars of blackness. Thus,
'red' may be almost as non-intersective as 'former', 'fake',
'good' and 'big'.
Even apparently troublefree adjectives like 'male' have
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multiple entries in the dictionary, between which there is only
an obscure metaphorical connection (Chambers 1983):
appertaining to the sex that begets not bears young;
having botanical stamens;
having mechanical projecting parts;
male orchis: the early purple orchis;
male order: the Doric order in architecture;
male rhymes: those in which only the final syllables
correspond;
It is not clear whether there are any genuine intersective
adjectives. The procedure of intersection seems odd anyhow.
We do not assess how good an example of a red object an apple
is before we pronounce on its redness. This is, of course,
merely a psycho-linguistic observation but it seems no
coincidence that we do not, as Wittgenstein realised, compare
yellow objects to a patch of yellow in our heads to see if
they match. We rather recognise an object, say, an apple, and
recall that this is the sort of apple we call yellow.
Adjectives can also be sortal or substantive, for example:
African elephant (the species African elephant)
African elephant (an elephant bought or reared in Africa)
Idioms are a problem. They are characteristically
non-compositional. This is exhibited in the anomalous
it's raining cats and dogs: no, sorry, it's only raining cats.
They must be distinguished as lexically irreducible or
inference will be mistaken. We can distinguish between idioms




and partial idioms, where the whole equals part of the sum of





A large number of phrasal verbs fall into one or other of these
categories. They are best held as entities in a lexicon for
this reason. Nearly all the following adverbs can be used in
conjunction with the first thirty or so verbs on a frequency
list, some yielding non-compositional (idiomatic) meanings:
about, back, inside, outside, beside, until, after, before,
upon, aside, at, of, off, up, down, through, around, round,
between, behind, on, in, under, with, by, from, out, to,
throughout, over, near, away, within, for.
Some examples, illustrating the non-compositional nature of
phrasal verbs, are:
I'm going to look round the necropolis
I'm going to see Dibber about the onion sets
I'm going to look up Bunty
The first example could be deemed compositional since 'round'
can mean 'all over' as well as 'beyond' (for example, 'I'm
going to look round the corner') (Chambers 1933).
The second and third are less straightforward: for one thing,
they could be spoken meaningfully by a blind man. This, in
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itsalf, however, does not render them non-compositional. The
injunction
see Birkin about sending more ericacious potting compost
could probably be executed by a telephone call. However, the
reason for this need not be that the phrasal verb is more than
the sum of its parts. It may just be that both 'see' and
'about' have secondary meanings, say, 'make contact with' and
'concerning'. Of course, this explanation falls down if these
two senses of 'see' and 'about' fail to crop up anywhere except
in this particular phrasal verb.
Prepositions, while not themselves possessing any of the four
main grammatical functions, nominal, verbal, adverbial or
adjectival, nevertheless occur with high frequency, and must be
accommodated by any semantic theory.
The current thesis is only concerned with words of high
frequency according to the above named frequency lists. While
verbs are cited in the infinitive in these lists (all forms
being conflated into one entry) other parts of speech have a
separate citation for each form. Thus, in this work, shared
inferences from paronymous terms will be restricted to verbs.
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Chapter 5.
A semantics of prediction and coercion: Grounds for a
semantic principle.
5.1 The disambiguation of senses.
As was stated above, the current research has three aims:
- to make inferences from computer input information to acquire
more information,
- to predict the meaning of unknown words from known ones in
adjacent text, and
- to predict the semantic category of linguistic constructions
from their components.
A semantic principle is required for the latter two of these
aims because of the widespread use of metaphor, category
mistake, 'sense-shifting', call it what you will. Natural
languages are hugely ambiguous, unlike computer languages whose
ambiguities are solvable locally. A principle is required for
the disambiguation of senses.
The best known example of a word whose sense shifts in context
is 'good', one of the least intersective of all adjectives.
Roughly speaking, good adults are moral, good babies quiet,
good doctors and engines are efficient, good parties are
pleasant, good flour is pure and so on.
There may be many reasons why a word varies in context. It may
be a non-intersactive adjective as we have seen with an
elliptical meaning (compare, healthy body, healthy exercise,
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healthy complexion). A word may be used metaphorically: the
foot of a mountain only shares part of its sense with the foot
of a man. A word may be part of a complex noun phrase with a
highly context dependent meaning (for instance, air raid
shelter, bus shelter).
It is worth mentioning the syntagmatic/paradigmatic distinction
(one of the Saussurean dualisms) as a sub-division of
linguistic semantics because this ha3 a bearing on entailment.
One can think of a word when it is in context as having (at
least) two dimensions, the linear one, namely its sentential
position, but also its position in some kind of conceptual
structure. Cruse (Cruse 1986) suggests the significance of
these two dimensions:
Paradigmatic relations... reflect the way infinitely and
continuously varied and experienced reality is apprehended
and controlled through being categorised, subcategorised
and graded along specific dimensions of variation. They
represent systems of choices a speaker faces when
encoding his message. Syntagmatic aspects of lexical
meaning on the other hand serve discourse cohesion,
adding necessary informational redundancy to the
message, at the same time controlling the semantic
contribution of individual utterance elements through
disambiguation, for instance, or by signalling
alternative e.g. figurative strategies of interpretation.
Some have touched on the importance of the disambiguation of
senses in other contexts. Hall-Partee (Dingwall 1973) says:
The different sub-senses of 'remind' are clearly
closely related and only one of them is equivalent
to 'strike as similar'. It remains to find
a way to reconcile the two kinds of generalisations,
one among distinct lexical items that share distributional
and semantic properties and the other among semantically
and/or syntactically differing uses of what seems
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nevertheless to be a single lexical item or a
family of morphologically closely related items.
Rieger (Dingwall 1978) says:
we will argue that, if a model has the ability
to organise word-senses, then use this organisation
to discriminate and identify uses of a particular sense
of each word of each sentence in some context ...
then that model has the primary mechanism of language
..most of the complexity in natural langauge, in fact most
of its information content, lies in the individual word
sense rather than in any central or uniform system of rules.
Rieger thinks that all the questions we may ask in order to
discriminate senses fall into one of the following classes:
1) questions about adjacent words;
2) questions about the syntax or semantics of adjacent word
senses;
3) questions about invariant general knowledge;
4) questions about dynamic expectancies in the model.
Rieger's system is concerned with words with many senses but
does not address itself to conflict resolution or what should
be done when two words are in a close syntactic relation such
as a predicate and its argument ('Grogan shifted') or a head
and its adjunct ('feckless Grogan') but appear to conflict
semantically (for instance, 'thirsty bucket').
It seems that some or all (severally) components of a word are
cancellable in context, and that some kind of semantic
principle is required to characterise this.
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5.2 Lack of a systematic lexical semantics.
The second reason why a semantic principle is needed is that
principles and theories of word meaning are rare. In a
post-Fregean scientific age linguistics and semantics are
increasingly theoretical. That part of semantics that concerns
logical or structural meaning and resides in function words
and logical operators is amenable to this approach but general
word meaning or lexical word meaning is more elusive and thus
has been, to some extent, neglected except by lexical
scholars like Cruse and also knowledge representation
practitioners in artificial intelligence. Thus a lexical
semantic principle is required.
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5.3 Inadequacy of selectional restrictions.
Another of the grounds for a semantic principle is the
inadequacy of selectional restrictions. We have seen that,
roughly, formal semanticists have undertaken the task of
characterising logical entailments while descriptive linguists
have characterised lexical ones. However, we might ask
whether entailment is the most fundamental linguistic
mechanism at all? Perhaps linguists have fallen into a
formalist trap to suppose this to be so? Another way of
exposing lexical entailments, if they are there to be exposed,
is by considering the violation of selectional restrictions or
'what we cannot say'. This phenomenon is also variously named
type-crossing, category mistake (Russell 1946) and violation of
integrity constraint (Gray 1986). It was first alluded to by
Aristotle, when devising his categories (Aclcrill 1987).
A predicate in one category might, in certain
conditions, and on account of its category
membership, be thought inappropriate to apply
to a subject in another.
For Ryle, when an expression cannot be substituted for another
without turning meaning into absurdity there is a category
mistake. His definition of absurdity is generous, believing
that good syntax plus category mistakes can lead us to believe
in entities that do not exist. Presumably this would include
I saw Eternity the other night:
Like a great Ring of pure and endless Light,
All Calm as it was Bright...
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Still round and round the Ghosts of Beauty glide,
And haunt the Places where their Honour dy'd...
For Cruse, semantic traits are presupposed by selectors which
occur in constructions in which co-occurrence restrictions are
operating. In a head-modifier construction it is the modifier
that is the selector. In a head-complement construction it is
the head which is the selector. For example,
'a pregnant X' entails X is female,
'X drank Y' entails, among other things, that Y is liquid,
'X died' entails X was alive.
Cruse defines selectional restrictions as 'those
presuppositions of a selector whose non-satisfaction leads to
paradox or incongruity'. He suggests that we can distinguish
between
- selectional restrictions, that is, logically necessary
semantic co-occurrence restrictions, for example, 'die'
presupposes features 'organic', 'mortal', 'alive' and so on,
and
- collocational restrictions, that is, arbitrary co-occurrence
restrictions for example, 'kick the bucket' presupposes a
human organism; 'toasting' can be done to bread, 'grilling'
cannot; they are irrelevant to truth conditions but odd;
their presence alone does not undermine cognitive synonymy.
This i3 controversial. 'Die'
quite versatile ('the engine
'is this glass dead, pal?'),
on the other hand, seem to me
principle concerning any kind
it is less amenable to metaph
nd its derivatives are, in fact,
died'; 'the day the music died';
Idioms like 'kick the bucket',
to correspond more to a general
of linguistic phrase, namely that
rical usage than an individual
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word would be.
Thus, we might say that a theory was rebarbative but probably
not that it has spiny filaments growing out of it. Likewise we
might say 'Hippolyte is a pig' but probably not say 'Hippolyte
is an omnivorous ungulate with a thick bristly skin'. This is
not merely because we cannot summon up some lengthier
paraphrase of 'pig' or 'rebarbative' but because phrases tend
to be more specific and less amenable to metaphorical usage.
It is a curious fact about linguistics as with other
quasi-3cientific subjects that formalists and libertarians
jostle under the same banner while their intellectual
positions are incompatible. On the one hand, it is often
claimed that linguistics is not prescriptive but descriptive,
that a linguist cannot assume the pedagogic mantle of a
nineteenth century grammarian. On the other hand formalists
seek a calculus or a formal method which characterises
language and prescribes and proscribes its use. Aitchison
(Aitchison 1978) says
it is a common fallacy that there is some
absolute standard of correctness which it is
the duty of linguists to maintain.
This 'fallacy' must however be implicit in the work of both
syntacticians defining, for example, a comprehensive set of
phrase structure rules and linguists like Chomsky defining
universal linguistic constraints.
It may be argued that this endeavour is not so much
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prescription as an attempt to characterise what is
conventionally or humanly possible. Thus, linguists seek to
outline not what we ought to say but what we do say, the de
facto not the de jure.
This does not seem to me to be true. There is nothing to stop
me uttering syntactic gibberish. In this way, language is
quite unlike any other natural phenomenon: there is plenty to
stop me falling uphill for instance and I haven't a choice in
the matter. What then is being claimed? It is wrong to say
linguists characterise what is humanly possible. At most they
characterise what is customary and conventional. However this
is the same as prescription. Prescriptive laws prescribe
behaviour appropriate to a moral or social system.
What has this got to do with selectional restrictions?
It may be argued that it is possible to formalise and prescribe
in the field of syntax but, as far as semantics goes,
Aitchison is right and we cannot dictate. What then of
selectional restrictions? Does 'pregnant' entail 'female'?
A pregnant moon is only female in a metaphorical sense. It is
certainly true that entailments are often preserved at a
metaphorical level, although both antecedent and consequent
are construed metaphorically, but it is not always the case.
The point about metaphorical usage is that it is selective.
Some features are chosen: some are not. In
as Vernon sank he breathed in pond water;
eventually he fought his way up and drank the pure air
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'drank' obviously does not entail that 'air' is liquid. The
relevant features of 'drank' in this context concern eager
gulping and savouring of something or other but it does not
seem right to say that the pure air is even metaphorically
liquid. On the contrary, the entailment seems to work in the
other direction: the direct object 'air' circumscribes the
meaning of the verb 'drink' in the way just mentioned.
Some people are very anxious to adduce examples of selectional
restrictions for completeness sake but fail to provide
convincing ones. Katz (Katz 1971b) cites
waterproof shadows empty foolishly
as an example of 'meaninglessness' and 'open/close' and
'whisper/shout' as incompatible pairs. This is extraordinary,
fie says we have a
linguistic intuition that... the sentence
"the shadow...fell from the 53rd floor and broke
both itself and the pavement when it landed" is
semantically deviant...
Katz is indeed correct when he says the following.
If we count the number of senses that the lexical
items of an ordinary 15 or 20 word sentence has and
compute the number of possible combinations that can
be formed from them when they are paired up, in
accordance with the grammatical relations of the
sentence, the number of possible senses of the
sentence runs into the hundreds. Since no sentence
of a natural language has anywhere near this number of
senses and some have none at all there must be a rather
severe form of selection going on...
Katz, following the long tradition springing from Aristotle,
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claims that words are categories and that
the category of a concept specifies the other
concepts with which it can combine to assert something
of some object in its range of predication.
Is this the only solution to the apparent paucity of sentence
meanings given the combinatorial possibilities? It seems
rather the case that words coerce and filter one another. The
semantic features or components are filtered if necessary and
if there is still a conflict one feature must over-ride the
other. Katz claims shadows cannot be waterproof because
waterproofedness involves the inside of an object and shadows
haven't got insides. This is tendentious. Shadows have got
area and thus insides: moreover waterproofedness can be
applied to ink which may have even less of an inside than a
shadow.
One source of category mistakes is what Cruse calls
incompatibles. Mutually exclusive classes are indicated by
incompatibles, that is, there are two terms X and Y where 'A is
an X' entails 'A is not a Y', for example
'Sceolan is a man' entails
'Sceolan is not a woman',
'Great-bladdered Emer is walking' entails
'Great-bladdered Emer is not running',
'Cuchulain is near the building' entails
'Cuchulain is not in the building'.
Entailment is of course unidirectional.
'I met Bran today' does not entail
'I did not meet Bran yesterday',
'Oisin bought some apples' does not entail
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'Oisin did not buy some pears',
'Niamh's eyes are blue' does not entail
'Niamh's eyes are not red'.
Cruse points out that co-ordination can suggest incorapatibles,
but is not reliable, for example, 'I met students and
bank managers and election candidates'. Here however I would
suggest that the co-ordinate coerces incompatibility. It is
true that being a bank manager is not mutually exclusive with
being a student but I think what is intended by the speaker is
a classification of people according to their primary
occupation. It seems to me that the context has restricted the
terms used (student becomes full-time student) not that the
co-ordinate has lost its exclusive power.
If one can claim that Mary's eyes can be blue and red, then
perhaps one can also claim that one can be running and walking
or that one can be in and near a building. Part of Mary's eye
is blue and another part is red. Likewise I could be running
for a moment and then walking, or be near the house with my
head through the window. Cruse is certainly right to claim one
cannot be walking and running simultaneously or wholly in and
out at the same time but a Gricean audience would provide some
elliptical gloss to nullify the violation and redeem the sense:
I was inside and near the house all day in case Trimble rang
Trimble was walking and running alternately to rest his toe.
Thus it may be that while we can talk of selectional
preferences, selectional restrictions at best only operate in
some contexts and in others they are violated by metaphor,
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irrelevant or false. The way words circumscribe each other
is more complicated than this, as is suggested later.
The desire to uncover a general semantic principle of
selectional restrictions is so strong that we may be tempted
to proscribe usages that are perfectly acceptable to everyone.
The search for a theory is, as Wall (Wall 1978) says in
another context, like the man who searched for a penny under a
streetlamp. He had dropped it down the road but was looking
for it there because the light was better.
It has been suggested that the study of selectional
restrictions will uncover some
empirical basis for the distinction between arguments
and non-arguments, the idea being that a verb will have
selectional restrictions on its arguments and not on
anything else (Riemsdijk 1986).
Thus "seems" would not take the subject of the sentence as one
of its arguments though a verb embedded under it would. As we
will see later, the special relationship between a verb and its
arguments is reflected in the semantics although in a more
complex way than the mere imposition of selectional
res trictions.
A general point should be made. It is not enough to say
something is a 'category mistake' or 'breaches a selectional
restriction'. If someone said to Grice, 'Is that your elbow
in the butter?' he would not say under his breath 'Fool!:
whose elbow would you expect to find attached to my hand?' but
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would construe the 'question' accordingly. This is true of
solecisms in every area. If Matisse paints a picture which
appears to be an unruly daub and we know he is capable of
photographic execution we will ask ourselves why he has
deliberately painted this way. (This is true independently of
the worth of the picture.)
To claim that exceptions to the rule are always errors is as
foolish as trying to generalise from them. It would be rather
like saying that because you had to eat the pilot in the Amazon
to keep yourself alive then cannibalism is alright in Bishops
Stortford. Irregular behaviour in all walks of life is neither
normative nor always pathological but just irregular.
Likewise, although one might correct a child who said 'I have
eated the ice cream' or 'the tree smiled', we would have a
different attitude if a poet or any adult said such things.
A deliberate category mistake is not meaningless any more than
some speech acts are, but is a purposeful violation. One
might dub this phenomenon, after Putnam's division of
linguistic labour, as the division of linguistic
responsibility. Pope was aware that some men of letters are
'above the law' in this way (Pope 1709).
Great minds do sometimes gloriously offend
And rise to faults true critics dare not mend
Interestingly, although little minds are presumably not above
the law, nevertheless, the most infelicitous solecisms are
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rarely meaningless, such as the advertisment for hormone
face-cream, toothsomely called Plenitude Action Liposomes,
which claims 'they make your face feel visibly younger'. This
is, in fact, merely one of the most commmon kinds of ellipsis,
being ellipsis of 'as if it were'. Compare 'my face feels red'.
It should also be said that metaphor violates selectional
restrictions and the ubiquity of metaphor precludes us from
relegating it to the study of pragmatics, a tempting home for
everything meaningful that will not fit into our favourite
semantic theory. Sentences such as
he read widely on the issue
are metaphorical in a purely lexical sense not a pragmatic one.
I believe that the best candidates for genuine category
mistakes involve modality and tense. These are often believed
to be very closely related as is demonstrated by the curious
ambiguity of
I will see Venice and die
and the schoolmaster's pedantic joke
I shall die and no-one will save me.
The ambiguity of the former possibly depends on the choice of
a mere future tense reading or one involving psychological
intention. The latter example is an attempt to disambiguate
just this problem for schoolboys and it is not insignificant
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that, nowadays at any rate, its import can be missed. Compare
the very rough synonymy of
this bed is collapsible
this bed will collapse
Tense is also closely bound up with philosophical notions of
freewill and determinism. Dahl (Dahl 1985) says
Normally, when we talk about the future, we are
either talking about someone's plans, intentions
or obligations, or we are making a prediction or
extrapolation from the present state of the world.
As a direct consequence, a sentence which refers to
the future will almost always differ also modally from
a sentence with non-future time reference.
It is an intuitively appealing idea, not just to the curiously
paradoxical Calvinists, that, in some sense, the past could not
have been other than it was. Sometimes this belief is extended
to include the assumption that the future cannot be other than
it has always been predestined to be. At the same time men
feel themselves to be autonomous and responsible for their
actions. However, there is a class of mental processes that
seems curiously out of tune with this belief. This can best be
demonstrated by some examples that seem to embody some kind of
category mistake:
this catastrophe motivates a need for better community policing
Father Blaney decided to want a doughnut
Gloria decided to know that she had chicken pox
Father Blaney chose to need a new soutane
Father Blaney decided to understand the abbot
Wingco Gosh Fairbanks decided to forget the incident
Father Blaney made up his mind to believe in transubstantiation
Sir Bigshot Bagott decided to think that the boy was lying
I decided to ponder on the matter
Hippolyte decided to regret the deed
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Wingco Gosh Fairbanks decided to remember his mother
Father Blaney determined to lack longjohns
Hippolyte decided to long for rissoles
I decided that the thought would occur to me
Sir Bagshot Bigott resolved to feel pain
The last example is realised even more preposterously in
Dickens' Hard Times where the ailing and chronically
self-effacing Mrs Gradgrind remarks that she is sure there is
pain in the room somewhere but she doesn't know whether she
has got it.
Some of the above examples are acceptable or elliptically
acceptable. We can decide to ponder on and think of tnings.
Likewise, we can decide to forget something in the sense that
we can order our actions in such a way that we are prevented
from dwelling on something. This is not the same however as
being able to marshall our thoughts instantly or at a
preappointed time.
We can also decide to decide provided that this means we are
deciding that we will decide at some future time rather than
that we are deciding that we are deciding. We can also decid
that we must be deciding but this reflexive stance places us a
a remove (to all intents and purposes a temporal remove) from
our decision. Thus, it is broadly synonymous with 'I decided
that I had decided' or 'I realised that it (the decision) had
happened to me'.
These examples apart, it appears that our minds are rather lik
children. We can train them up in the way they should go and
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after that they are free to believe, regret, covet and so on
without waiting for our permission.
It seems that we can reflect on the past or the future but not
the present. Thus, I would claim that sentences such as
Father Blaney decided to know he was bald
are category mistakes in the same way that
I will see the chiropodist yesterday
is. Compare also the last line of this poem by Norman MacCaig
(MacCaig 1985).
Ask me, go on, ask me
to do something impossible,
something freakishly useless,
something unimaginable and inimitable
like making a finger break into blossom
or walking for half an hour in twenty minutes
or remembering tomorrow.
Category mistakes, so-called, dislocate our thought processes
disturbingly, like spelling mistakes, or exhilaratingly, like
Escher's impossible pictures, depending on our attitude. They
are not the only kind of anomaly however that can trip us up.
It is clear that, since selectional restrictions appear to be
so much less restrictive than we thought, that we need a
principled way of interpreting the 'anomalies' selectional
violations produce. However, a semantic principle of
disambiguation, as well as addressing category mistakes,
should address what one might call prototypicality mistakes.
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For example,
I live in a jamjar
if asserted truthfully by a healthy man is anomalous. There is
no category mistake. The verb 'live in' denotes a physical
state which can compatibly obtain inside a physical object.
Of course the problem is that the typical jam jar is too small
for a person to live in. Either the sentence means that I
spend a lot of my time with at least part of myself or maybe
my spoon in a jamjar, or that I live in a dwelling that has
some of the properties of a jam jar (lots of windows, for
instance) or something highly metaphorical, perhaps that the
people I live among have some resemblance to fruit preserve.
Such a sentence could be called a prototypicality mistake in
that, while no categories conflict, nevertheless, the
prototypical realisation of a word in the sentence is absent.
Prototypicality mistakes shade into category mistakes at one
point. We may even feel that the idea of categories is
unhelpful. This was Russell's view in The History of Western
Philosophy (Russell 1946).
What exactly is meant by the word 'category'
whether in Aristotle or in Kant and Hegel, I must
confess that I have never been able to understand.
I do not myself believe that the term 'category' is in
any way useful in philosophy, as representing any
clear idea.
It is indeed hard to be precise about the pathological
differences between
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that woman is a bachelor
and
I ate the Sydney Opera House.
Here are some other examples that obfuscate the distinction
between category mistake and prototypicality mistake further
and demonstrate the varied causes of anomaly.
yuoi sdgf fholu h sedrg i gfhlk orthographical
Vera love I syntax
soldiers is handsome syntax
Arthur and Alf and Stan are both masons plural/dual
the windowcleaner is former attributive/predicative
the gardens are hanging attributive/predicative
this elephant is African sortal/substantive
that was the worst success negative/positive
all men are mortal but that man isn't propositional calculus
Sopwit'n and Venables are rusticated and Sopwith isn't
propositional calculus
Venables is happy and unhappy logical
Logan knows an untruth logical
Venables is neither married nor unmarried logical
Sopwith is doing it again for the first time logical
Arthur regrets doing something he knows he didn't do
presupposition
the dog is in the larder and I don't believe it epistemic
this sentence is falsa reflexive
the nude in puris naturalibus lit a Rothman's tautology
I came there to see Jennings deixis
Botolph paused widely spatio/temporal
I will do it yesterday temporal
I decided to understand him modal
I will have a gin count/mass
my scottie doesn't bark prototype
Meaulnes poured the butter out prototype
I live under that pebble prototype
there's a human goat nyponyiny
Ambrose is a man and a woman incompatibles
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that genius has mastered long division irony-
it's unfortunate that Fons died from the pilliwinks litotes
he took offence and his gamp and left zeugma
I drank a cup for breakfast metonymy
I am a greater thinker than Wittgenstein hyperbole
the damsons have a bitter sweet taste oxymoron
he is reading the whole of Clarissa perfective/imperfective
he climbed to the top but didn't get there
perfective/imperfective
Arthur flinched slowly progressive/achievement
Reg hardly died progressive/achievement
Fred suddenly lived in Morpeth stative/active
he is very deceased
he is rather alive
Alf tiptoed noisily into the vault
he painted the walls with silent paint
the shadow broke across the lawn
Arthur smells itchy
I feel visibly younger
Biddulp'n thought noisily
she is an iron lady











It should be clear from these examples that there are many
reasons for semantic anomaly. However, it seems that, apart
from morphological eccentricity, all other kinds of semantic
anomaly can be classified as some kind of category mistake.
Even logical anomalies of the P and notP kind could be regarded
as a co-occurrence of the categories positive and negative.
Broadly speaking, the dearth of genuine selectional
restrictions is slightly intoxicating. We can say anything
provided it is not too ungrammatical. This may not be a
surprise to anti-formalists but to architects of semantic
theory it is disturbing. In what sense can one have a theory
of lexical composition if words are so promiscuous?
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I propose that what we should be seeking is not an account of
selectional restrictions or category mistakes but an account of
selectional preferences and a principle of disambiguation or
arbitration amongst the possible meanings a linguistic
construction can appear to have.
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5.4 Inadequacy of meaning postulates.
We have seen that there are a number of reasons why we need a
principle of semantic disambiguation. One is the high
incidence of words with multiple senses; another is the virtual
absence of systematic lexical semantics; a third is the
resilience of meaning in propositions that embody category
mistakes or selectional restriction violations.
A further and related reason is the inadequacy of meaning
postulates to predict the meaning of unknown words or the
senses of ambiguous ones.
Carnap devised meaning postulates to state relationships
between certain meanings or intensions (Carnap 1937) or, more
precisely, to represent analytic sentences in a formal
language. Here are some examples.
if x is crimson then x is red
if x buys y then x pays money in order to own y
if x kills y then x causes y to become not alive
These are examples of analytic truths but there is no reason
why meaning postulates should not represent synthetic truths if
they are useful for a particular purpose. Indeed Quine (Quine
1960) could not really see the difference. It is certainly true
that in an artificial domain like a database we could dictate
that, for instance, all employees have a serial number by
definition. Thus so-called synthetic meaning postulates like
the following may be useful too.
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if x is an endowment policy then x has a date of maturity
if x is green then x is extended
if x is buxom then x is female
It can be seen that these meaning postulates have a measure of
analyticity that is absent in truly synthetic propositions like
the following.
if x is endowment policy EW18493875 then x has a date of
maturity of 30.09.2010
The flexibility of meaning postulates may suggest that they are
useful devices, if not for expressing constraints on models,
nevertheless for expressing default relationships between
words. However, meaning postulates are not adequate to express




The problem with these two meaning postulates is that (unless
they are considered merely as default statements) they
proscribe valid usage like the following.
Vernon swallowed the lie
Vernon drank the pure air
Such usages are not, contrary to popular linguistic belief,
florid, poetical, rhetorical or in any way self consciously
precious. He probably would not even notice anything
semantically anomalous about them. If one is still in doubt
there are even more prosaic examples.
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Walters is deeply worried about the fingerprint
Souness ruled out chemical weapons
McCoist pointed out the structure of human existence as the
framework within which questions have to be posed
Butcher showed that this is the dimension that has to be faced
Drinkell had narrow interests, a cold manner and a dry wit
McStay sang a high note
Stevens went to the foot of the building
there is ample evidence that great empires rose and fell in
India
The following example comes from Whorf (Whorf 1956) as an
illustration of how spatial terminology is frequently used to
refer to psychological matters.
I grasp the thread of another's arguments but if
its level is over my head, my attention may wander
and lose touch with the drift of it so that when he
comes to the point we differ widely, our views being
indeed so far apart that the things that he says appear
much too arbitrary or even a lot of nonsense.
Context dependence is not restricted to indexicals or non-
intersective adjectives. Other words (for instance, drive the
car, drive the cattle) depend on context of use. Some people
have gone so far as to suggest that the pragmatic/semantic
distinction should be abandoned (Eikmeyer 1981).
Sometimes a whole lexical field is shifted into metaphorical
usage. In European languages it is customary to discuss time
and also intensity and tendency in spatial terms, for example,
long day, high intensity, tendency to rise and so on. (This,
interestingly, is different from Hopi where time has a
vocabulary of its own that is not used in spatial description
(Whorf 1956).) This creates problems for a systematic





ical usage, a secondary meaning or neither,
is, our semantics must accommodate it. A meaning
the following kind
if x is long then x is physically extended
would be no good.
The longstanding awareness of the existence of metaphor makes
it surprising that some linguists still support the idea that
meaning and entailment are just a matter of semantic components
and selectional restrictions (Locke 1690):
....to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, adhere,
conceive, instil; disgust, disturbance, tranquillity etc.
are all words taken from the operation of sensible things
and applied to certain modes of thinking.
As Sampson (Sampson 1980) says, metaphor is far more common
than we think but is left out of compositional semantics.
Others believe semantics to be too vague to establish immutable
semantic rules (Eikmeyer 1981):
meanings are not fixed objects of any sort,
they are fuzzy, flexible and open to adjustment.
Secondly, the use of meanings is closely linked
up with the fact that contexts may be continuously
changed.
Thus language is vague essentially not marginally.
What does it mean to say that a term is vague?
Ksmpson (Kempson 1977) distinguishes four different types of
vagueness:
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- referential vagueness: the meaning is clear but it is unclear
whether it can be applied to certain objects, e.g., town and
city;
- the meaning of the word itself is indeterminate, e.g. 'Bim's'
in 'Bim's book' can mean one Bim wrote or owns etc.;
- clear meaning but lack of specification, e.g 'neighbour';
'went' as in 'Vernon went to the station' covers many
different modes of travel;
- disjunction in meaning caused by 'or' or negation, e.g.
'Vernon can mend sinks or washbasins', is unspecified on two
levels; for one thing 'or' is used to cover the logical
exclusive-or and the logical inclusive-or, but even if there
were only one kind of 'or', say exclusive-or, the sentence
would still be vague as we still don't know whether it is
sinks Vernon can mend or washbasins; similarly with
negation, because of de Morgan's law (not(X and Y)) -> (notX
or notY); this is not ambiguity but under-specification.
Thus metaphor, contextual coercion and inherent vagueness all
militate against the characterisation of a body of reliable
meaning postulates.
Determining meaning postulates is in any case an arbitrary
endeavour. The meaning of words is not an exact science and
thus defining words in terms of others, whether for
paraphrasing, synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy, entailment
relations or any type of meaning postulates must be an
imprecise activity. Indeed some think it a misplaced endeavour
and only provisional. For the philosopher Ouine, the
empiricist point of view could not make sense of the notion of
equivalence of meaning which is required by reductionist
semantic programmes like that of Carnap (Quine 1953).
Pinning down the relations between words seems much easier in
theory, perhaps because of the widespread existence of
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dictionaries, than it is in practice. The circularity and
vagueness of lexical definitions is hidden under the specious
orderliness of dictionaries. Winograd (Winograd 1976) has some
nice examples of men that might or might not qualify for the
status of bachelor depending on one's point of view (the Pope
for instance), despite the received wisdom that 'bachelor' is
one of the most precisely defined words in the language. It
appears it is a family-resemblance type concept rather than a
set-intersection type.
Fillmore (Fillmore 1982) argues that lexical concepts are
represented in terms of idealised cognitive models. For
example, 'bachelor' can be defined as an unmarried adult male,
in the context of a society in which certain idealised
expectations of marriage obtain. The existence of Catholic
priests, male homosexuals and co-habitees does not mean that
the concept is ill-defined but that it doesn't fit the world
precisely. Mohr (Mohr 1977) suggests we view Platonic
universals in this way. Compare Lakoff (Lakoff 1972).
According to Fillmore's view the connection between concepts
and exemplars is comparable to the connection between theories
and data. Theories are simplifications: data is unruly. As
Kuhn (Kuhn 1962) argues, theories depend on a background of
assumptions; thus concepts also depend on background
assumptions about the world (Fillmore 1982). We do not always
recognise these assumptions, and are blithe about
generalisations like 'a cheetah can run faster than a man',
disregarding arthritic cheetahs and baby cheetahs (Ziff 1960).
The unspecified set of conditions under which this claim about
cheetahs is true, Ziff calls a conceptual schema, and people
understand one another to the extent that their conceptual
schemata are shared. We can see that this problem is closely
akin to the frame problem or the qualification problem, namely,
to what extent must a concept and its context be exhaustively
defined. Concepts can end up like God, in the atheistic
philosopher Wisdom's phrase, 'dying the death of a thousand
qualifications'.
Concepts are fuzzy, instantiated by exemplars, that is abstract
entities 'representing a conflation of typical properties'
(see Fillmore 1975, Rosch 1975 and Wittgenstein 1953). The
exemplar chosen in a discourse will, if possible, be one that
satisfies all the current goals set up. This means that
meaning postulates can only be formulated if one identifies
which exemplar of the antecedent is the relevant one.
Meaning postulates may also fail in the context of 'hedges'
(Lakoff 1972) or linguistic disclaimers, for example
Arthur's wife is such a socialite that he is a regular
bachelor.
Others find meaning postulates, or any kind of formal
representation technique, inappropriate. Dictionaries can only
give approximate non-definitive accounts of word meaning
(Sampson 1930); it is a dogma of linguistic semantics that
words have essences or criterial features; they only have
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'increments of probability' (Labov 1973) or entailments with
weightings (Labov 1972).
Grice (Grice 1978) distinguishes between the derivative and
non-derivative senses of words. For instance the words 'loose'
and 'unfettered' may appear to be synonyms but in the
expressions 'a loose life' and 'an unfettered life' the former
takes on a derivative sense (that is, implying dissipation)
while the latter seems quite general in meaning.
5.5 Inadequacy of feature unification.
Another reason why semantic principles of prediction and
resolution are needed is the inadequacy of feature unification.
An important mechanism used for the representation of meanings
is the feature-based formalism, We have already seen that
there is a long tradition of analysing meaning in terms of
components, features, sememes, atoms, whatever one likes to
call them. Just as a word has definitive features that
circumscribe its meaning ('spinster' has 'single') so they also
place strictures on the meanings of that word's neighbours in
the sentence.
Thus, unification of features purportedly enables one to
disambiguate polysemy, for example,
Father Blaney read the bible
Here 'bible' would be resolved as a religious book, not a cow's
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stomach, because of the selectional restrictions 'read' would
impose.
However, while this technique is successful in some cases it is
not always so. Unification of features cannot account for the
resolution of all semantic anomalies since it cannot determine
whether the verb phrase
swallow the lie
denotes a physical action or a non-physical one, and it must
logically be one or the other, and, moreover, we know which.
'Lie' (as in 'deliberate untruth') has some sort of feature
like +abstract. 'Swallow' would be +physical. There is no
principled way of achieving feature unification here. Thus a
principle is required to resolve this.
5.6 Inadequacy of semantics of syntactic government.
A further reason why semantic principles are needed is that
theories of syntactic government cannot account for the
resolution of semantic anomalies, since they cannot account for
the fact that both of the following examples denote
non-physical situations, while one has a physical verb and a
non-physical object noun and the other vice versa.
Father Blaney put his finger on the problem
Father Blaney's condition justified the bucket
An important claim made by the theory is that anomaly
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resolution cannot be derived from syntactical structure,
head-modifier structure or government and binding structure.
Various grammars have differed in their analysis of heads and
modifiers but have agreed on the basic principle that they are
derived chiefly from syntactic structure not word meaning
(with some exceptions, for example, an adverb can only be
disambiguated as sentential or verbal by virtue of word
meaning).
A purely syntactic notion of what a head and a modifier are
seems to have been extended to a semantic one. In syntactic
research it is believed that, using tests of transposition,
substitution and so on, phrases can be identified. Within each
of these phrases a central constituent can be found called the
head (for instance, the head of a noun phrase is a noun). The
following criteria to be used for recognising heads have been
suggested:
- they are characteristic;
- they are obligatory^
- they control the agreement and number and type of
constituents within the phrase;
- they control constituents outside the phrase.
Modifiers are defined as 'everything in a constituent that is
not the head', for instance, the parenthesised words
the book (that fall into the cuspidor)
Modifiers are distinguished as peripheral or nuclear, dependent
on the strength and closeness of the link between them and the
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head (for instance, the complement of a verb is very strongly
and closely related to it). Thus, Reed and Kellog's nineteenth
century sentence diagrams and Tesniere's dependency grammar
of the 1950's would both agree that adjectives modify nouns.
There are, it is said, heads, adjuncts and arguments. In the
phrase 'sleepy Alf', 'Alf' is the head and 'sleepy' is an
adjunct, while, in the sentence 'Alf sliimbers', 'slumbers' is
the head and 'Alf' is the argument.
Another way of expressing it is as follows. If X is the head
then if
X + Y = X, then Y is an adjunct;
X + Y = Z, then Y is an argument.
Do adjectives always modify nouns? It seems that this is a
doubtful claim in the following examples,
the iron lady
the good president
where the adjective and noun both modify, or affect the
interpretation of, each other and, in the first example, the
adjective is coerced by the noun. The truth of Winograd's
(Winograd 1983) claim that
the concept of modification corresponds well to our
intuitive notions of description. A noun tells
what an object basically is, while adjectives provide
further description
seems to depend on the noun and adjective in question too
(think of 'tin soldier'). The following set of examples
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illustrates how our basic inclination to recognise nouns as









Buckets can be wet; they can even jog under external influence.
Their appearance can be forlorn and their capacity suggest
thirst. However, it is difficult to construe the next two
examples in any other way than as metaphorical. A contrite
bucket must be some kind of figurative bucket. A human bucket
is probably a person, not even akin to a bucket in appearance
but merely enjoying some property of buckets like being a
capacious receptacle for liquid.
Such examples demonstrate how minute semantic accretions of
animacy in an adjective can eventually, when it is juxtaposed
with a concrete noun, set up a semantic conflict and disrupt
expectations of government.
It is not clear that verbs should invariably be recognised as
heads either. Dependency grammar would designate the verb
'shine' as the head in the following example,
girls shine in single-sex education
as if its meaning were ontologically fixed and the other
components merely provided a further description of the
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process of shining.
This view of modification was a commonplace. We can compare
Jesperson's categorial interpretation of the parts of speech
where nouns were categories of the first degree, verbs and
adjectives of the second and adverbs the third. Each
category is modified by a category of higher degree, for
example, nouns by verbs and so on (Lyons 1968).
This does not appear to be invariably true. Semantic coercion
or modification is not merely a function of syntactic
category. Thus some other principle of disambiguation of
semantic anomalies is required.
5.7 Inadequacy of a quasi-physical model.
It has been suggested that postulating a quasi-physical realm
can account for the resolution of semantic anomalies. This,
however, would be to claim that in,
Father Blaney's thoughts flowed to Knock
the thoughts had some physical properties. This does not seem
to be true. There is no literal liquefaction of the thoughts.
You can't dip your toe in them and draw it out wet or pour the
thoughts over a dry-clean only suit and ruin it. Nor can
thoughts move since they have no location. One can imagine
them flowing but that's not the same thing.
It is certainly true that the choice of a particular kind of
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metaphorical realm, in this case a watery one, imposes some
stylistic constraints upon the subseqent choice of metaphors
but the point is that they will still be metaphors: they are
not intended to have a literal application to the subject or
change it ontologically in any way. This fact is obvious to
human beings but we need a principled method of determining,
first of all, when a metaphor is present, and, secondly, how
its semantics is to be resolved.
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Chapter 6.
A semantics of prediction and coercion: prediction.
One of the aims of this research is to devise a method of
predicting the semantic class of an unknown word in a sentence
from the class of a known word or linguistic structure of "that
sentence. We have seen how various mechanisms open to us, such
as selectional restrictions, meaning postulates, feature
unification and syntactic government fail to provide a means of
predicting or resolving meaning.
We assume that there exists a large corpus of non-specific
linguistic material that one would find in any subject. In
other words, not all words are technical. It is suggested that
the domain-specific words are usually nouns, but also a
percentage of the verbs. There are, however, a great many other
words, including some generic nouns and verbs but also most
adjectives, prepositions, adverbs and so on, that turn up in
all subjects but which convey information and from which
inferences can be drawn.
As an exercise the reader might try replacing all the uncommon
nouns in a passage of text with nonce words or variables. The
resulting text is surprisingly informative. This is why one is
able to have the semblance of a conversation with someone even
though most of the technical terms he uses are unknown. Here is
an example.
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*s can be used for cutting or trimming *s as well as for other
duties although a pair of * *s are often handy. Both must have
* *s. A large ordinary * and a small *'s * with an * * are
also necessary. A * * such as a * * is useful for paring off *
* from *s but on smaller * this can be done with a pair of *s.
Winograd (Schank and Colby 1973) points out that elucidation of
unknown words is partly achieved by syntax:
people are able to interpret sentences syntactically
even when they do not know the 'meaning' of the
individual words. Most of our vocabulary beyond
a certain age is learned by hearing sentences in which
unfamiliar words appear in syntactically well-defined
positions.
Thus, in the above example, the first two unknowns occur in the
syntactic position of noun phrases and the presence of an 's'
suffix and the absence of any determiner in either case
suggests a plural. In line 2 the phrase 'a pair of * *s'
likewise suggests a complex noun phrase or a noun preceded by
an adjective. In line 3 'a small *'s *' suggests a possessive
noun phrase. In line 5 the phrase 'smaller *' suggests a mass
noun because of the absence of a plural ending.
This is not all we can infer, however. As well as a knowledge
of syntax we bring to bear semantics in elucidating word
meaning.
Thus, in line 1, we assume that the first unknown refers to
some variant of scissors and the second some physical count
noun. In line 2 we are told that 'a pair of * *s' are a common
alternative to the scissory things in line 1. Both must have
'* *s'. From this we may infer that this is some necessary
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component of the scissors, the most obvious being some kind of
blade. In the next sentence two more unknowns are required to
continue with the same cutting and trimming operation or one
associated with it. Thus they are probably some kind of tool,
the latter being preceded by a possessive adjective suggesting
the typical user of the tool. In line 4 'a * * is useful for
paring off *' suggests some kind of knife and some kind of
integument. Thus elucidation depends on syntactic,
morphological, lexical (things that are cut are usually
physical objects) and world (scissors have blades) knowledge.
Here is the complete text, taken from an electricians' manual.
PLIERs can be used for cutting or trimming WIREs as well as for
other duties, although a pair of SIDE-CUTTERs are often handy.
Both must have INSULATED HANDLES. A large ordinary SCREWDRIVER
and a small ELECTRICIAN'S SCREWDRIVER with an INSULATED SHAFT
are also necessary. A CRAFT KNIFE such as a STANLEY KNIFE is
useful for paring off PVC SLEEVING from CABLEs but on smaller
WIRE this can be done with a pair of WIRE-STRIPPERs.
It is suggested that a computer program that could make this
kind of inference would be able not only to function as a
knowledge elicitation device but would also have theoretical
linguistic value especially if it could be shown that a
dialogue can be coherent, though possibly misleading, even
though a large part of the nouns and verbs are not understood.
The sort of information that can be derived from these everyday
words can be causal, hierarchical, equivalent, meronymous,
functional, set-theoretical, logically-sequential, temporal,
spatial, thesaural, inferential and quantificational.
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This function of the program has been partially addressed by
others, for instance, in Wilks' (Wilks 1972) computable
semantic derivations system, the sense of 'sport' can be
disambiguated in
Grogan is a good sport
shinty is a good sport
Thus, information about unknown words, or about ambiguous
senses of known words, can be inferred from the linguistic
context.
A word of a known class can be used to predict the class of the
unknown word with which it combines syntactically. In actual
fact, the semantic class of each predicate P in a logical form,
may constrain or be constrained by the semantic class of any
predicate Q that shares an argument X with P. However, for the
purposes of predicting the class of an unknown word, we
consider only the semantic class of the word with which it
syntactically combines. For example, in the sentence
gentlemen prefer blondes
represented by the Prolog clause
prefer(X,Y) gentlemen(X), blondes(Y)
the predicate 'prefer' shares an argument with the predicate
'gentlemen' and the predicate 'blondes' and thus its meaning
can be semantically constrained by them and vice versa. The
only two predicates that do not share an argument are
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'gentlemen' and 'blondes'. However, for the purposes of
predicting the semantic class of the word 'prefer' we use only
the word with which it syntactically combines in our phrase
structure rules (verb-phrase --> verb noun-phrase) namely
'blondes'.
The following table gives, for each semantic class of each
syntactic structure, the predicted semantic class for the word
it syntactically combines with.
C stands for concrete, M for mental, A for animate, B for
aBstract and F for figurative, according to the classification
system described above for the classification of known words.
The arrow stands for 'predicts', thus, in the adj-noun column,
C —> C or A means 'where a concrete adjective combines with an
unknown noun to give a noun phrase, that noun is predicted to
be of the class concrete or animate'. The predicted classes are
as follows.
adj noun verb noun2 vp nounl s s-advei
A — >A A — > A or C A — > A A — > 7
C —>C or A G --> C or A C — > C or A C — > C or B
M —>M or A M — > ? M — > M or A M — > M or B
B -->? B — > ? B — > ? B — > B
C or B <—• C ? <— C B or C <— C F --> 7
M or B <—■ M M or B <— M B or M <— M A or C <— C
B <-- B M or B <— B B <— B A or M <-- M
? <-- F ? <— F 7 <— F 7 <— B
? <— A 7 <— A 7 <— A A <— A
It may be observed that these predictions follow a general











It should be pointed out that 'can be class X' here should be
read as 'some dimension of it is class X without coercion into
a different sense'. The difference between a new dimension
and a new sense can best be illustrated by examples. For
instance, in the following sentences
the watchdog gave a yip
the watchdog dreamed of liver and lights
the word 'watchdog' has the same sense and may well refer to
the same animate object which is nevertheless engaging in a
physical activity in its physical dimension and a mental
activity in its mental one. On the other hand, in
the National Front is the watchdog of Britain's liberties
the word 'watchdog' is used in a quite different (albeit
related) abstract sense, in an identity statement with another
abstract object, the National Front. In the following
prediction principles we are concerned only with the most basic
sense of a word not any secondary or metaphorical one. 'Below'
and 'above' refer to the hierarchy represented by the above
diagram.
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The Principles of Prediction.
The prediction principles are as follows. (Examples are given
below.)
A noun's class can be any class below or including the class of
the adjective with which it syntactically combines.
A subject noun's class can be any class below or including the
class of the verb phrase with which it combines.
A sentence's class can be any class below or including the
class of the sentential adverb with which it combines.
An object noun's class can be any class below or including the
class of the verb phrase with which it combines (where the
hierarchy is conflated into two classes, the superordinate
abstract + mental and the subordinate animate + concrete).
A verb's class can be any class below or including the class of
the verbal adverb with which it combines (where the hierarchy
is conflated into two classes, the superordinate 'abstract +
mental' and the subordinate 'animate + concrete').
An adjective's class can be any class above or including the
class of the noun with which it combines.
A verb phrase's class can be any class above or including the
class of the subject noun phrase with which it combines.
A sentential adverb can be any class above or including the
class of the sentence with which it combines.
A verb phrase's class can be any class above or including the
class of the object noun phrase with which it combines (where
the hierarchy is conflated into two classes, the superordinate
'abstract + mental* and the subordinate 'animate + concrete').
A verbal adverb's class can be any class above or including the
class of the verb with which it combines (where the hierarchy
is conflated into two classes, the superordinate 'abstract +
mental' and the subordinate 'animate + concrete').
The above prediction principles merely lay down descriptive
rules for the way the four primary semantic classes behave with
respect to one another. They merely claim that, say, class X
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and class Y are potentially compatible in, say, an adjective
noun combination. No claim is being made that adherence to
these rules would eliminate every anomalous word-marriage.
For one thing, fine-grained anomalies can occur within the
boundaries of one semantic class ('buxom policeman', 'grill the
toast'). For another, two words taken from two semantic
classes that the rules predict to be compatible may
nevertheless not be so. For instance, we predict that an
adjective can come from any class above or including the class
of the noun with which it combines. For instance, it seems
sensible to predict that concrete adjectives can be applied to
animate nouns with impunity. However, 'wet Betty' is fine while
'cast-iron Betty' is probably anomalous. This does not
provide sufficient grounds for abandoning the prediction
principle but suggests that an enhancement of the theory might
sub-divide the class concrete in a useful way.
We can test the predictions made by this table against the


























We can expand the first entry in the prediction table as
follows. Given an animate adjective, such as 'forlorn' or
'cross-eyed', we can predict that the noun that it combines
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with to make a noun phrase, if unknown, will probably be from
the class animate, for instance 'man', 'gypsy' or 'ocelot'.
We can make some generalisations. An abstract adjective is
promiscuous, as one would expect from its non-intersective
nature, and will combine with any category of noun and thus










An abstract adverb is promiscuous for the same reason. It will
combine with any sentence or verb and thus cannot predict any
one class of sentence or verb.
the woman avoided the man yesterday
the machine output the bucket yesterday
the mind despised the memory yesterday
the argument vitiated the theory yesterday
A mental verb is also promiscuous: thus it does not predict any
particular class of object noun. This is because one can
address one's mind to anything whether concrete or abstract.
Mental verbs are compatible with all object nouns including
those higher in the hierarchy.
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Father Blaney liked chocolate
Father Blaney liked his mum
Father Blaney liked daydreaming
Father Blaney liked lycanthropy
What is being claimed here is that a verb phrase created by
combining a mental verb and any class of object noun will be
classified as mental. It may seem tendentious to suggest that,
in these examples, the verb 'like' is not semantically coerced
by the noun that follows it, but what is important is that
there is not sufficient coercion, even from the abstract noun
'lycanthropy' to change the ontology of the verb 'like' which
still refers to a mental state. Even if we paraphrase 'liked
chocolate' as 'liked eating chocolate' the phrase still refers
to mental activity: not just eating but liking to eat! Contrast
these examples with the following ones.
Father Blaney exposed the camera film
Father Blaney exposed his person
Father Blaney exposed his innermost thoughts
Father Blaney exposed lycanthropy
It is clear here that the ontological status of the verb
'exposed' is undergoing coercion from a trivial physical action
to a complex abstract one.
Incidentally, the coercion in the above sets of examples is in
accordance with what would be predicted by the selectional
restrictions or selectional preferences imposed by the
respective verbs.
The verb 'like' prefers an animate subject but does not
prescribe an object. Thus any object is absorbed into the
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mental verb phrase established by the verb 'like'.
The verb 'expose', on the other hand, prefers a concrete
subject and a concrete object. Thus any sentence that violates
this selectional preference needs a semantic principle to
resolve it. It is just such a principle that we seek to
identify here.
An animate sentence will combine with any class of adverb. As
we have seen, this is because it is compatible with both the
class concrete and the class mental and also the class abstract
since everything has an abstract dimension of functionality or





An animate noun will combine with any class of adjective for
the same reason, that is, it is compatible with concrete, and





Since figurative is a combination of the concrete and either
mental or animate, a figurative sentence, like an animate one,
will also combine with any class of adverb.
the dustbin coughed noisily
the dustbin coughed hoarsely
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the dustbin coughed apologetically
the dustbin coughed yesterday
Concrete subject nouns, verbs and verb phrases predict
concrete verb phrases, object nouns and subject nouns
respectively.
the bucket rattled
... output the paper
the machine output the paper




Mental subject nouns predict mental verb phrases,
his mind despised the self-deception
Abstract subject nouns, nouns, verbs, verb phrases and
sentences predict abstract verb phrases, adjectives, object
nouns, subject nouns and adverbs respectively.
the evidence proved the theory
the French theory
vitiated the argument
the error vitiated the argument
the error vitiated the argument completely
Figurative subject nouns and object nouns, since figurative is
a combination of concrete and animate or mental, predict
concrete, animate or mental verb phrases and verbs
respectively.
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the happy dustbin rattled
the happy dustbin laughed
the happy dustbin repented
electrocuted the happy dustbin
kicked the happy dustbin
liked the happy dustbin
Concrete object nouns predict concrete or animate verbs. They
also predict mental verbs since a mental verb can address
itself to any object.
...output the paper
... tore the paper
...approved of the paper
Animate nouns can combine with concrete, animate or mental







Mental adjectives, verb phrases and adverbs predict mental or
animate nouns, subject nouns and sentences respectively.
happy thought
happy man
Modeste recalled the mental-image
his memory recalled the mental-image
his memory recalled the mental-image angrily
Modeste kicked the puffball angrily
Animate adjectives predict animate and mental
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Concrete nouns and sentences predict concrete adjectives and
adverbs respectively. They also predict abstract ones since
abstract adjectives and adverbs are promiscuous.
metal bucket
controversial bucket
the bucket fell noisily
the bucket fell inevitably
Mental nouns and sentences predict mental or abstract
adjectives and adverbs respectively.
happy thought
controversial thought
his mind pondered the idea relentlessly
hi3 mind pondered the idea yesterday
Abstract object nouns predict mental or abstract verbs.
liked the hypothesis
justified the hypothesis
Concrete adjectives and adverbs predict concrete or animate
nouns and sentences respectively.
wet bucket
wet man
the bucket fell noisily
the man sang noisily




Two points should be made in conclusion. One is that fine
grained anomalies are not accounted for here. Thus a concrete
adjective predicts a concrete or animate noun. This is
obviously true for 'wet' but not true for 'metallic' since
'metallic man' although not meaningless is hardly a phrase that
one would predict.
The second point is that, by restricting ourselves to making
predictions from words that syntactically combine with each
other, some inferring power is lost. For example, in the
sentence
the theory contains X
the semantic class of the unknown word X is predicted from the
verb 'contains'. This is a concrete verb and will predict a
concrete or animate object noun. It is far more likely that X




A semantics of prediction and coercion: coercion.
7.1 Coercion.
Another aim of this research is to determine the semantic class
of a linguistic structure from the semantic classes of its
constituent words. This aim is non-trivial in that there are
presumed to be no selectional restrictions on the classes of
words that can combine in a structure, owing to esemplasy or
the unifying power of the imagination to combine virtually any
concepts. Selectional preferences may help us predict the
meaning of unknown words but violation of selectional
preferences does not result in nonsense.
It can be seen that this aim (determining the semantic class
of a linguistic structure from the semantic classes of its
constituent words) is intimately bound up with our previous
task of discovering a principled method of predicting the
meaning of unknown words, since prediction is dependent on the
semantic class of adjacent words or structures and thus all
structures must be classified semanticallv.
Our rejection of selectional restrictions does not mean that
we cannot predict the probable class of an unknown word from
its neighbours but merely that the resulting linguistic
structure will not be meaningless just because the class of the
unknown word turns out to be different from what we have
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predicted. Selectional restrictions have been replaced by
selectional preferences.
It is claimed that there is a hierarchy of classes such that
where two words combine in a structure and those words have
incompatible semantic classifications then the class of the
resulting structure will be the class of the two that is higher
in the semantic hierarchy or will be a special class outside
the hierarchy, namely figurative.
Two words are deemed to be semantically incompatible if they
violate the prediction principles outlined above.
When two words combine that are semantically compatible, that
is, in accordance with the prediction principles, the semantic
class of the resulting structure will be that of the syntactic
head of that structure.
Syntax cannot always provide the
structure however. As we have s
demonstrate how minute semantic a
adjective can eventually, when it
noun, set up a semantic conflict







There is a strong tradition in
semantic class of a linguistic
een, the following examples
ccretions of animacy in an
is juxtaposed with a concrete
that compromises the semantic
linguistics to treat nouns and
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adjectives as heads and adjuncts respectively, for all
purposes. This would predict that, regardless of semantic
class, the noun would determine the ontology of the noun
phrase. There seems little doubt that this is untrue in the
last example ('talkative bucket'). There is obviously some kind
of metaphor involved, (even if only an evanescent one) or even
a full-scale figurative scena yet to be unravelled. The
argument is less conclusive in the case of 'jogging bucket'
where the jogging may be the jogging of an autonomous agent
(the android bucket) or alternatively the result of an external
force like the man carrying it.
So, resolution of anomalies (that is, structures that violate
the prediction principle) is achieved by reference to a
semantic hierarchy. It should be noted that this is not the
ontological hierarchy that is discussed above but a hierarchy
of coercion.
The hierarchy is, from lowest to highest
concrete < animate < mental < abstract
The ontological hierarchy that was discussed earlier can be







Thus, an animate thing is a kind of concrete thing. Mental
objects are a kind of abstract object and so on. All concrete
things have an abstract dimension (their functionality) but
not vice versa so the lattice could not have been the other way
up.
Now, this hierarchy, although it represents an ontological
hyponymy relation cannot be used to resolve semantic anomalies
for the simple reason that it does not constitute a linear
relation of dominance. In other words, it is not possible to
say of every pair of elements which of the two is subordinate
to the other.
What we want to know is which of two semantically conflicting
elements in a linguistic structure should take precedence and
coerce the other.
For this purpose we need what Cruse calls a linear relation
of dominance or a semantic coercion hierarchy. The one we will
use is as above:
concrete < animate < mental < abstract
If one looks carefullv at the phrase
thoughts flowed to Knock
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(for instance, in the sentence 'Father Blaney's thoughts flowed
to Knock'), one sees that the two words 'thoughts' and
'flowed' are semantically incompatible according to our
prediction principle. However, there does not seem to be an
equal coercion or negotiation between the two words 'thoughts'
and 'flowed'. They do not both mutate. There is no liquid
trajectory across the Irish Sea. The meaning of the word
'thoughts' remains constant; 'flowed', on the other hand, is
coerced such that the resulting phrase has an abstract and
metaphorical reading.
It may be argued however that a concrete dimension has been
imposed by the word 'flowed' and that this can be demonstrated
by the stylistic constraints placed on subsequent text. For
example, it has been pointed out to me by Ronnie Cann, that a
pleasing conclusion to the sentence might be
Father Blaney's thoughts flowed to Knock and eddied around the
shrine
while the following
Father Blaney's thoughts flowed to Knock and exploded over the
shrine
would be infelicitous. It does not seem to me however that the
presence of an extended metaphor of this kind, felicitous or
otherwise, in any way compromises the ontological nature of a
thought in this sentence. This is why we would describe the
above sentences as 'metaphorical' rather than as sentences
conveying a literal truth.
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Of coucse no account has been offered of why so-called mixed
metaphors are stylistically unsatisfactory but this is beyond
the scope of this thesis which does not seek to be prescriptive
but rather to disambiguate. Thus, 'thoughts flowed and
exploded' would be classified as an abstract construction.
There is a fine-grained anomaly in the phrase 'flowed and
exploded' which we would need an enhanced semantic principle to
resolve.
Suppose, first of all, for simplicity, that we roughly classify
all words into two classes, viz, abstract and concrete. If the
two component words or phrases of a larger semantic structure
conflict because one is abstract in meaning and the other
concrete, the resulting syntactic structure will be abstract,
for example, a concrete verb and abstract object noun
(Father Blaney) swallowed the lie
yield an abstract verb phrase. Thus, Father Blaney does not
engage in a physical act of swallowing but merely a
metaphorical one.
Likewise an abstract verb and concrete object noun, for
instance,
(Father Blaney's condition) justified the bucket
yield an abstract verb phrase, the appropriate sense of the
verb phrase being something like 'justified the presence of the
bucket' rather than some concrete reading like 'aligned the
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bucket' .
A concrete verb phrase and abstract subject noun, for example,
the thought struck Vernon
yield an abstract sentence, since the sentence, although
apparently about striking, does not describe a state of affairs
apprehensible by the senses and thus does not have a concrete
sense. Likewise, an abstract verb phrase and concrete subject
noun, for instance,
the bicycle-lamp pleased Vera
also yield an abstract sentence rather than a concrete one
since the situation described is not apprehensible by the
senses.
A concrete adjective (or adjectival phrase) and abstract noun,
such as
watertight argument
green thoughts in a green shade
heavy criticism
yield an abstract noun phrase. Thus, arguments have no literal
seaworthiness, nor do thoughts have colour (at least no colour
that is apprehensible by the senses), nor criticism avoir du
poids.
A concrete adverb and abstract verb phrase
(Father Blaney) thought warmly of (the Taylor's 55)
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yieLd an abstract verb phrase since thoughts are not literally
warm but only metaphorically so.
The coercive trend can be seen developing in the following
sequence.
Jim tore the paper apart
Jim tore the newspaper apart
Jim tore the book apart
Jim tore the thesis apart
Jim tore the theory apart
Jim tore the ideology apart
The watershed in these context-independent sentences seems to
be whan 'thesis' is reached since it is a word that is used
chiefly in its abstract sense although it has a technical
concrete usage, especially in universities, that allows a
concrete reading for the whole sentence. It is hard to
interpret the final example in any other way than a
metaphorical one. Of course, given appropriate contexts,
either reading would be applicable to all these examples.
As we saw above, there can be semantic anomalies at all levels
of language. Not all anomalies are at the coarse-grained level
of basic ontological types (consider 'Leroy grilled the toast')
and a more detailed analysis of these than the one offered here
is needed.
A finer grained classification of words than the classical
abstract/concrete dichotomy can be given however. This has been
achieved by the creation of two further basic classes, namely
animate and mental, and a derivative one, namely figurative.
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The principle of hierarchical coercion also applies to these
two basic classes.
A full table of semantic predictions and coercions can be found
in Appendix 1. There follow a verbal description and examples
of the basic principle of coercion.
The Principle of Coercion.
In cases of anomaly, that is where the above prediction
principles are flouted, semantic coercion is exerted by
of a higher semantic category over words of a lower one,
the hierarchy of categories, from lowest to highest, is,
have seen,
concrete animate mental abstract
It should be remembered that, although the semantics of every
word in a sentence is potentially influenced by the semantics
of every other, we restrict ourselves here to influences
between words that combine syntactically, according to our
phrase structure rules, to form a larger linguistic unit. For
instance, an adjective combines with a noun to make a noun
phrase.
A concrete adjective is compatible with concrete and animate
nouns but is coerced by all higher categories of the noun with
which it combines to form a noun phrase. Thus a concrete





the semantic head, namely animate, for instance,
black man
wooden traffic warden
metal merchant (e.g. scrap metal merchant)
(For exceptions to this rule pertaining to models, see Section
7.4.)
A concrete adjective and a mental noun however, for instance,
a black humour
(e.g. Hippolyte has been in a black humour all day)
green thoughts
yield a mental noun phrase, and a concrete adjective and an
abstract noun, for instance,
black humour (i.e. black comedy)
cast-iron theory
the empire, in its pinafore
a rotten theory
yield an abstract noun phrase in accordance with the semantic
hierarchy.
A mental adjective coerces concrete nouns, is coerced by
abstract nouns and is compatible with animate nouns. For
instance, a mental adjective and an animate noun yield an
animate noun phrase:
contrite man




the spiritual exercises (of St. Ignatius Loyola)
or a figurative noun phrase:
contrite bucket
(e.g. the contrite bucket mumbled its apologies)
A mental adjective and an abstract noun yield an abstract noun
phrase, for instance,
contrite theory
suggests a theory espoused by the contrite. It does not suggest
that the theory has been ontologically coerced into some kind
of intentional being.
The coercion principle is semantic not syntactic thus, in a
semantically anomalous noun phrase, nouns coerce adjectives in
the same way as adjectives coerce nouns, that is, in accordance
with the semantic hierarchy, and we can deduce that headedness
is not significant.
An animate noun is compatible with concrete, abstract, animate









x^hich even though it exhibits a high degree of semantic
negotiation between the words does not compromise the
classification of 'giant' as animate.
A concrete noun combines successfully with concrete and
abstract adjectives. A concrete noun is coerced by animate and
mental adjectives into yielding a figurative noun phrase. Thus
wet bucket
traditional bucket
yield concrete noun phrases, but
furtive bucket
contrite bucket
yield figurative noun phrases.
A mental noun coerces all adjectives in the categories below it
but is compatible with mental and abstract adjectives, for





An abstract noun coerces all the adjectives in the categories





A truly concrete transitive verb is a rare category comprising
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just a few neologisms like 'output' and 'autoprint', although
intransitive concrete verbs are, for obvious reasons, far more
common, for example 'fall' and 'smell'. The latter do not
concern us here as we are considering the relation between
verbs and object nouns.
It may be argued that, of course, there are many concrete
transitive verbs such as 'hit', 'strike', 'touch', 'cut' and so
on. These actions are clearly apprehensible by the senses and
physical objects can engage in them ('the lightning struck the
fowling-piece and the bullet hit the shooting-brake').
However, these verbs usually involve an animate agent and more
often than not the instrument of the action is left out all
together ('Hippolyte cut the cake'). Thus, such verbs are not
good prototypical examples of the class concrete.
A concrete transitive verb is compatible with concrete and
animate object nouns but is coerced by mental and abstract
object nouns. The following yield concrete verb phrases:
output a bottle
output a man
However a concrete verb and a mental object noun yield a mental
verb phrase:
output hostility (e.g. generated an aura of being hostile)
while a concrete verb and an abstract object noun yield an
abstract verb phrase:
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output controversy (e.g. was the cause of controversy)
An animate verb is compatible with concrete or animate object
nouns; any object noun in a higher category (including
figurative because that contains one mental element) coerce
it. For example, the following yield animate verb phrases:
avoided the bucket
avoided the horse
However, an animate verb and a figurative object noun yield a
figurative verb phrase, for instance:
avoided the apologetic bucket
An animate verb and a mental object noun yield a mental verb
phrase:
rummage through the mind
while an animate verb and an abstract object noun yield an
abstract verb phrase:
smash the theory
A mental verb is compatible with any object noun since the
mind can address itself to anything: nothing except the
logically impossible is tmthinkable (pace Blackburn's claim
that the prurient mind finds it impossible to think of an







An abstract verb is compatible with every class of object noun,
because it appertains to some abstract dimension of that object
noun, for example:
vitiated the bucket (e.g. its existence)
vitiated the consultant (e.g. his diagnosis)
vitiated the thought (e.g. its truth)
vitiated the theory (e.g. its robustness)
A concrete verb phrase containing a transitive verb is, as we
have seen, a rare category exemplified only in, for example,
'output the document' and 'autoloaded the disc'. It is
compatible with concrete and animate subject noun phrases:
the machine output the document
the man output the document
(e.g. caused the machine to output the document)
yield concrete sentences.
The paucity of concrete transitive verbs make a proper analysis
difficult. The concrete transitive verb phrase 'output the
document' in conjunction with a mental subject noun should,
according to our theory, produce a mental sentence. However,
verbs like 'autoload' and 'output' are neologisms that have not
yet acquired a metaphorical currency. Their meaning is fixed
and they resist any coercion at all. The sentence
dogged determination output that document
(e.g. made the man make the machine output that document)
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should yiald a mental sentence. However, the reader will notice
that in such anomalous sentences as this the only sane reading
is a highly elliptical one and it is odd to classify the whole
sentence as mental.
If it seems far-fetched to classify this sentence at all (and
it does since elliptical sentences can be as disjointed in
meaning as conjoined sentences) some examples using
intransitive verbs (for example, 'stink', 'fall') may be more
compelling. In the following, the concrete verb is compatible
h , h
with the concrete and animate subject nouns but .coerced.theA A.









An animate verb phrase in combination with a concrete subject
noun yields a figurative sentence, for example
the rain avoided the Long Mynd
while an animate verb phrase and an animate noun, for instance
the janitor accosted the man
are compatible and yield an animate sentence. However, higher
category subject noun phrases coerce an animate verb phrase,
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for example:
Hippolyte's conscience pricked him
yields a mental sentence (since Ilippolyte is not physically
pricked in a way apprehensible by the senses), and
the evidence undermined Hippolyte
yields an abstract sentence (since Hippolyte is not literally
standing on top of, say, a coal field).
A mental verb phrase coerces a concrete subject noun phrase
into its figurative dimension but is comnatible with animate
and mental subject noun phrases. It is coerced by an abstract
noun phrase, for example:
the bucket knew the ...yields a figurative sentence
the man knew the ... yields a mental sentence
his conscience regretted the ... yields a mental sentence
the verdict acknowledged that yields an abstract
sentence
An abstract verb phrase is compatible with every category of
subject noun with which it combines, for example:
the bucket vitiated ... (e.g. its existence vitiated...)
the man vitiated ... (e.g. his presence vitiated...)
the memory justified ... (e.g. its occurrence justified...)
the ubiquity of the bastinado justified ...
A concrete adverb is compatible with concrete and animate
sentences, for example:
the machine throbbed mechanically
the man jogged mechanically
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but is coerced by sentences of a higher category, for example:
Tlippolyte thought mechanically
yields a mental sentence'
the conclusion proceeds from the premises mechanically
yields an abstract sentence.
An animate adverb coerces a concrete sentence into the
figurative dimension, for instance
the bucket overflowed dejectedly
but is coerced by higher categories; for example:
Didier thought sweatily
yields a mental sentence
Hercule vitiated the argument sweatily
yields an abstract sentence.
Incidentally, having established the semantic principle, it is
possible to apply it to linguistic structures in order to
determine the classification of their components. For example,
suppose we were uncertain as to the semantic classification of
the two words 'crowd* and 'community'. In the following
phrases, the adjective 'wet' appears to be coerced in the




This suggests that 'crowd' must be animate or concrete since it
is compatible with the concrete adjective 'wet'. However
'wet' is coerced by 'community' into a non-apprehensible sense
which suggests that 'community' is either mental or abstract.
The same technique could be used to establish the class of
other words.
A few words should be said in conclusion about verbal adverbs.
We have considered so far only sentential adverbs or adverbial
phrases like 'yesterday', 'hastily' and 'without his
umbrella'. However, there are of course verbal ones like 'up'
and 'about'. The reason they are dealt with only briefly here
is that they appear to be almost entirely restricted to the
semantic class concrete, for example, 'up', 'in', 'through' and
so on. There seems a strong case as well for classifying
apparently temporal adverbs, such as 'before' and 'after' as
concrete since we apply them so readily to concrete situations
without any of the ratiocination typical of abstract thoiight.
We can analyse the following examples along the usual lines.
In the phrase 'in a quandary' the preposition 'in' is spatial
and therefore concrete, while 'quandary' is abstract. The
principle predicts that the whole phrase is therefore abstract.
In the following sentence,
see Birkin about sending more ericacious potting compost
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'see' and 'about' would be classified as animate and concrete
respectively, and thus we would expect that the phrasal verb
'to see about' would be animate since its components are
compatible.
The phrasal verb 'to see about' has various meanings: 'to do
whatever is to be dona about', 'to attend to' and 'to consider'
(Chambers 1983). The first two of these definitions would be
assigned the semantic class animate and the third mental.
Thus, the lower (in the semantic hierarchy) semantic
classification of the phrase, which is the one we always
default to, is the same as that predicted by the semantic
principle, namely animate.
It may be argued that we are making very heavy weather here of
the simple fact that verbs like 'see' and 'look' are ambiguous.
On the contrary, it seems rather that they are polysemousj
(Crystal (Crystal 1985) says 'a large proportion of a
language's vocabulary is polysemic') and moreover that so many
words are polysemous (for example, 'expose the film', 'expose
the fraud') that we need a principled way of establishing which
of a word's many senses is being used on a particular occasion
and what aspects of its linguistic context are determining its
sense.
Some phrasal verbs cannot be dismantled in this way but are
incontrovertibly non-compositional, for instance, in
ring up Birkin!
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there is no upwards motion in the matter, although one can
imagine the evolution of this phrasal verb from other more
compositional ones such as
rouse up Birkin from his pallet!
The idiom can nevertheless be analysed in the same way that
'see X about' was analysed above. It may be that, while




Although the Principles of Prediction and the Principle of
Coercion (stated in Chapters 6 and 7.1 respectively) are
broadly true, it must be said that computed categories can be
overridden by an accumulation of later evidence.
Underspecification of phrases is not uncommon (I once saw a
box with the words 'The Improver' written on it). Sometimes
even whole sentences are ambiguous. This view has the support
of the modern day empiricist Quine who, in 'Word and Object
(Quine 1960), put forward the thesis of the 'indeterminacy of
radical translation' or the view that a sentence can always
properly be regarded as meaning a multitude of different
things.
Of course all pragmatic theories of meaning that regard
context of utterance as an indispensable component of meaning
would support this view. Such a position seems to me to be
dodging the question of the ineradicable quiddity of each word
and its influence on others regardless of context.
Anyway, indeterminacy of translation apart, in this work the
semantics is deemed to be compositional and monotonic despite
the possibility of later semantic counter-evidence. Thus, 'the
thirsty bucket' is deemed to be figurative. However, one needs
to look at the rest of the sentence to determine whether this
is merely metaphorical usage or part of a full scale
figurative scenario, for example, respectively:
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the thirsty bucket overflowed with water
the thirsty bucket winked at the dour pump.
For the same reason, it is slightly tendentious to claim, as we
do above, that a sentential adverb can coerce the semantics of
a whole sentence. Thus,
the floor creaked accusingly
while open to figurative interpretation, contains enough
accumulated concrete evidence to render the adverb merely an
evanescent metaphor.
7.3 Negotiation.
As mentioned above, feature unification semantics cannot
resolve conflicts such as
Father Blaney swallowed the lie
since the verb and object noun being concrete and abstract (or
+physical and -physical) would not unify. Some people may
object that the meaning of 'swallow' here is clearly a
secondary meaning and moreover the noun 'lie' would
disambiguate the verb 'swallow' and feature unification could
go ahead. This seems untrue. 'Swallow' here, although
apparently only remotely connected with the ingestion of food,
is nevertheless etymologically the same. Physical terms are
often used in connection with mental attitudes, for instance,
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Grundy accepted the spoonful/ the idea
Grundy rejected the mouthful/ the offer
Grundy took in the news/ the water
Grundy took on board the porridge/ the truth
Grundy swallowed the jelly/ the lie
Grundy regurgitated the story/ the junket
Of course it is possible for one's lexicon to enumerate all the
different senses of these words separately but this would be to
deny that there is such a device as metaphor but merely many
unrelated senses for one orthographical form. One need only
open a dictionary to see how many senses words have.
It could be argued that every concrete term had these two
dimensions, namely, physicality and some kind of
functionality. This would be in accordance with the views of
Descartes and the rationalists who thought we must project
constructions onto reality in order to make sense of chaos.
Thus, we can see the physical continuum of reality and also
possibly chairs qua physical objects but must project onto
reality its functional or abstract properties.
We may fear that the existence of multiple senses of words
prevents semantics being compositional. However, because the
orientation of a jigsaw piece is not determined when you put
it down on the table that does not mean that the jigsaw is not
compositional. Some pieces (say, pieces of sky), like some
words, have many different orientations (for example, a
rebarbative hedge/ traffic-warden/ statute). Others, like a
jigsaw piece with a face on, are less troublesome. The face
will almost certainly go chin downwards in the picture.
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Likewise 'molewrench' is unlikely to be promiscuous in its
usage.
It has to be said however that, while a general principle of
semantic coercion can be sustained, there appears to be some
mutual negotiation of meaning between words that combine in a
sentence even where one is clearly of a higher category than
the other.
This, of course, is not always true: a 'watertight argument'
is not compromised by 'watertight' in its abstract ontological
status at all. It is 'watertight' that undergoes a dramatic
metamorphosis. It does seem however that some words change
their senses subtly whilst behaving in accordance with the
semantic principle. For example, mental verbs, according to
the semantic principle, are compatible with any object noun.
However, 'know' varies in sense in the following examples
according to the noun with which it combines, whilst preserving
its ontological class.




Antrobus knew Murdo's address
Antrobus knew Murdo was lying
Such semantic shifts are too finely calibrated for detection by
the tools available to us here.
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7.4 Exceptions to the semantic coercion principle.
The reader will probably have noticed in passing a certain
number of exceptions to the principles of prediction and
coercion.
a) abstract adverbs and adjectives
As we saw above when characterising the prediction principles,
abstract adverbs and adjectives do not coerce the verbs and
nouns they respectively stand in relation to. Abstract
adjectives do not coerce nouns, probably because they are not
intersective and thus our minds do not need to engage in that
feature-unification meshing process that is necessary when we
are confronted with intersective adjectives and the nouns they
combine with, such as 'red hair'.
For example, the rather unusual 'adjective' 'John's', which is
abstract since it is not apprehensible by the senses (one
cannot apprehend, for instance, ownership), does not coerce
nouns with which it combines to form a noun phrase. The
following examples yield concrete, animate, mental and abstract
noun phrases respectively.
John's ping pong bat
John's mum
John's opinion







It may be argued that this merely demonstrates that the noun is
the syntactic and semantic head of a noun phrase, and it is
therefore not surprising that adjectives of any semantic class
should be coerced by the noun with which they combine. This
explanation is, however, undermined by the fact that, on other
occasions, as the coercion principle shows, nouns are
apparently coerced by adjectives, or at least some kind of
semantic negotiation goes on (inevitably the case in
oxymorons). The following noun phrases demonstrate the
anarchical potential of adjectives. The examples given are
exceptions to the general rule that an abstract adjective can
combine with any noun of an ontologically lower class without
anomaly or coercion of that noun. It will be evident that the
nouns in these examples undergo radical semantic change.




a technological brain (e.g. a computer),
b) materialisation
This is a rhetorical device beloved of, amongst others, the
advertising industry in which an abstract term is used to
denote a concrete object in the, perhaps mistaken, belief that
it acquires a sublimity thereby, for example,
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this delicious thatched home
these frilly ideas for Christmas




I call these materialisations because, according to the
semantic principle, the presence of an abstract noun should
translate the whole noun phrase up into its abstract dimension.
However, instead, it is materialised or realised in some
physical manifestation. Thus a 'home' is really abstract but is
materialised into a thatched building apprehensible by the
senses. Likewise, the ideas are realised as visible frilly
objects, the surprise is an incarnate one and the Christianity
physical jerks. The chocolate creation and liquid poetry might
be profiteroles and Bollinger '29.
Mental and animate nouns are also occasionally susceptible to
this kind of reification:
a metal mind
(for example, a computer) yields a concrete noun phrase rather
than a mental one. Likewise
a metal waiter
(for example, a trolley) yields a concrete noun phrase rather
than an animate one. The latter is a curious usage which one
could call anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism is present in






Ellipsis is responsible for the fact that no syntactically
correct concatenation of words is ever meaningless and
moreover can sometimes be construed not in accordance with the
above semantic principles. Wilks (Wilks 1973) agrees:
the space of meaningful expressions of a natural
language cannot be determined or decided by any set
of rules whatever - in the way that almost all
linguistic theories explicitly assume CAN be done.
That is because in common sense terms, a speaker [and
more interestingly for us, a hearer] always has
the option to MAKE any string of words meaningful by
the use of explanations and definitions. However any
working system of linguistic rules does implicitly
specify a class of acceptable expressions, and so,
indirectly, a class of unacceptable ones. The only way
of combining these two facts of life is to have a
modifiable system of linguistic rules...
More importantly an ellipsis may be the most immediate and
commonsensical reading.
Fr Blaney discussed the black issue
probably concerns apartheid ('the issue about blacks') rather
than an oil spillage, but it is not clear how we know this.
Indeed it seems rather tortuous when we have a perfectly good
concrete reading to do with spouting oil or some such thing.
The explanation is probably to do with the syntagmatic
requirements of the concrete sense of 'issue', for instance,
that it occur in some frame such as 'an issue of X from the Y',
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for example, 'an issue of gas from the faucet ' or the orotund
'issue of his loins'. Frequency of usage in the linguistic
community must also affect our interpretation of certain
phrases.
The soldier melted when Modeste sang 'Invictus'
is probably elliptical for 'the soldier's heart melted when
Modeste sang 'Invictus''.
I decided to know that I had rickets,
probably means, I decided to confirm that I had rickets by
talking to my GP, although it is an example of a fine grained
anomaly.
Not all words can be elided successfully, for example,
Beasley has worked hard on his gerunds
is not, fortunately for Beasley, elliptical for
Beasley has not worked hard on his gerunds
As has been pointed out to me, the appropriate context or
ironical intonation could derive the former sentence from the
latter. However this derivation is not ellipsis.
d) metaphor
In figurative usage, the semantic principle applies, for
example,
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the thirsty bucket winked at the merry pump
As we have seen, figurative usage occurs when mental
adjectives, adverbs and verbs (that is, ones concerning the
psyche or the cognitive, emotional and intentional life of
man) and animate adjectives, adverbs and verbs, occur in
conjunction with concrete (that is, appertaining to inanimate
matter) nouns, verbs and subject nouns respectively, resulting
in a realm of androids and android-like events, for example
the peevish bicycle
output the document eagerly
the scythe repented
the talkative bacon-slicer
the tree tossed its leaves skittishly
the waves danced
Such anthropomorphic beasts usually populate children's stories
and imaginative literature. Although the semantic principle
applies to figurative usage, the class figurative is evanescent
and more susceptible to coercion by an accumulation of
subsequent text than other semantic classes are. In
figurative usage the semantic principle may be overridden if
the metaphor that has been set up is immediately anaesthetised
by subsequent non-metaphorical material, for instance,
the thirsty bucket overflowed with fresh water
This is an example of the general rule that a sufficient
accumulation of linguistic counter-evidence can override the
semantic principle.
The phenomenon can occur when abstract and animate words are
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combined as we have seen.
justice walked down the street carrying her golden scales
justice walked down the street in the form of the master of the
rolls
The latter is an example of a materialisation, that is,
'bewigged justice' (compare 'frilly Christmas ideas'), and
thus an exception to the semantic principle. The former is part
of an extended conceit or figurative scena. Thus the class
figurative is degradable and shows less tendency to coalesce
for good, as befits metaphorical usage which exhibits language
at its most elastic. It is not that the principle is not
broadly applicable but rather that semantic constructions may
be deliberately violated to give increased pungency of
thought. Sometimes metaphor is heaped on metaphor. In
Wordsworth's famous lines,
Surprised by joy -impatient as the Wind
I turned to share the transport ....
Wordsworth uses the wind as a simile for himself in impatient
mood. Wind however is not impatient (pace Boreas and co)
except anthropomorphically and metaphorically so.
Metaphors can, of course, be present at all ontological levels.
In our crude hierarchy, 'trumpet major' and 'dog' would both
be classified as animate, and 'wooden' would be classified as
concrete. However, 'trumpet major' has heavy overtones of
functionality while 'dog' has not. I suggest that this is why
'wooden dog' would resolve into the category concrete (this is
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an example of a model and is dealt with below) while 'wooden
trumpet major', due to the greater functionality or
abstractness of 'trumpet-major', would resolve as animate.
e) lexicalisations or crystallisations of phrases.
Lexicalisations or crystallisations of phrases (for example,
sleeping policeman, straw man, iron lady, tin soldier) must be
considered as units as must all true idioms. Their resulting
classes are an evolutionary matter.
f) symbolic representation of the abstract
The symbolic representation of abstract objects like works of
literature and music affords them a concrete existence that
runs counter to the semantic principle. Abstract objects such
as songs, ideologies, novels, theories and ideas are often
accessible to us through the physical medium of text or musical
notation and also speech which is a physical medium. In this
way potentially anomalous physical references to abstract
objects are easily resolved. Thus
output a theory
under the semantic principle should yield an abstract verb
phrase meaning something like 'made public a theory' but a more
appropriate reading is 'printed a theory in physical symbols on
a piece of paper'. Compare also
the novel fell in the bath
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The dual status of 'novel' as an abstract object and a physical
one allows the resolution of the verb phrase as a concrete
verb phrase. Compare
tore up the song
Hippolyte told a story
what Mungo says is a lie
where songs, stories and lies have a conventional physical
realisation, the first as sheet music and the other two as
speech.
g) iconography.
Another kind of conventional code is iconography, especially
the making of models. Thus, reference to the Virgin Mary could
be to an icon of the Virgin Mary. Similarly, sculpted
likenesses are made of a large range of people, animals and
concrete objects reduced (or increased (the wooden horse)) in
scale. Thus the following examples of anomaly can be
painlessly resolved.
Raoul picked up the M.E.-109
the little shepherdess shattered into a thousand pieces
Caravaggio painted St. Jerome
h) oxymorons.
Oxymorons should be mentioned here since by definition the two
components of an oxymoron fall under the same semantic class.
This means that, according to the prediction principle, the
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two elements are compatible and the semantic class of the
oxymoron will be determined by syntax.
It is not clear what this could mean in the case of oxymorons.
Obviously, in one sense there is no problem since the two parts
of the oxymoron belong to the same class anyhow. However,
given a finer-grained ontological typology they would not. It
seems to me that, in those circumstances, semantic
classification of the whole phrase would be impossible since
the meaning of an oxymoron oscillates backwards and forwards
between two poles: it is the nature of the beast to arrest the
mind and paralyse thought.
It is interesting that, for some reason unknown to me, one
would not consider the last example below to be an oxymoron
although it seems to contain something of the oxymoronic about
it. However, one's intuitions are borne out by the fact that
it does not oscillate but one of its elements, namely 'water'






Chapter 8. Entailment and inference.
8.1 Making domain-independent inferences from known words.
The third semantic assumption we are setting out to demonstrate
is that domain-independent inferences can be made from the
basic words of English. This means that, regardless of the
subject matter being discussed, there are certain words that
are basic to, or have a high frequency in, the English language
and these occur in all domains and can be used to make
inferences about those domains even though there may be a high
incidence of unknown or technical words in the text as well.
Some justification should be given for attempting to account
for inference when so many of the standard clues to semantic
resolution are not ones at our disposal. I mean, of course,
intonation, stress, prosody and all kinds of physical gesture.
It seems to me, however, quite valid to consider textual
semantics on its own provided that the interpretations one
makes are not claimed to be true of spoken language.
It seems that often work is done on semantics without a
specific disclaimer as to its applicability to speech but the
dichotomy between the spoken and written word is an
unembarrassing one. There is no doubt that writers and readers
bring to bear on their respective activities different skills
of perspicuity and receptivity from those that they would bring
to bear when speaking and listening. A semantics of the
-286-
written word is a worthwhile endeavour.
The schema
X contains Y
may be realised as
the book contains a photograph
the theory contains an argument
the picture contains a skull
the bottle contains Vimto
and so on, but in all these cases a part-whole relationship may
be assumed. No matter what domain is under discussion, the
verb 'contains' suggests a particular kind of scenario in which
the parts of some whole or the contents of some receptacle or
frame are being discussed. Thus, certain domain-independent
inferences can be made and the questions
does X contain anything else?
what else does X comprise of?
what is X a part of?
and so on, are appropriate. (Of course where a word has more
than one sense, for example 'contains' in
the bucket contains two gallons
(that is, 'the bucket will hold two gallons'), we would expect
different inferences to be appropriate.)
There are many problems of course. One cannot expect always to
abstract relations cleanly from their arguments, irrespective
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of topic and focus. For example,
X is between Y and Z
might suggest a range of inferences about spatial properties
and adjacency. In many cases the question
what is the other side of Z?
would be appropriate. However, consider a conversation about
the contents of a room that included the sentence
Arthur is between Stanley and the wall.
To ask
what is the other side of the wall ?
would be to step outside the domain.
We will go on to consider in detail the kinds of domain=
independent inference that can be made from a corpus of basic
English words.
8.2 Logical entailments: making inferences with no turning
back.
We saw above that selectional preferences are important to this
work because we need to predict the meaning of unknown words
from known ones. Semantic coercion is important to this work
because sometimes language incorporates some kind of so-called
category mistake, as in the second example.
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Berensen travelled widely in Peoria
Berensen spoke widely of pyorrhoea
The third semantic mechanism important to this work is lexical
entailment or making inferences from propositions.
It is useful to distinguish two different schools of semantics
which, although not fundamentally incompatible, have not been
synthesised in a formal way. We might call these logical
semantics and lexical semantics. The former converts natural
language into logical form and is concerned with logical
entailments. (This is somewhat begging the question, as Quine
(Quine 1972) suggests, that logical form is the form of an
argument not a statement or a proposition, that is, your choice
of logical form will constrain the entailments you can
subsequently make. This however does not worry linguists since
one still has the opportunity to compare the entailments of a
logical representation of a sentence with one's own intuitions
about its entailments.) The latter is concerned with lexical
semantic entailments.
Logical semantics has its origins in Aristotle's work on the
syllogism (Ackrill 1987):
when you predicate this thing or that of another
thing as of a subject, the predicate then of the
predicate will also hold good of the subject. We
predicate 'man' of 'a man', so also of 'man' do we
predicate 'animal' therefore of this or that man,
we can predicate 'animal' too. For 'a man' is both
'animal' and 'man'...
Neither logical nor lexical semantics can give an exhaustive
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account of meaning on its own.
Cruse (Cruse 1986) uses the word 'entailment' to mean Lyons'
'pragmatic implication' (Lyons 1977) rather than a truth=
conditional notion. Cruse's strategy is contextual not
model-theoretic:
the meaning of any word form is in some sense
different in every distinct context in which it
occurs.
Cruse does not want to abandon compositional semantics (indeed
he says it is indispensable) but to emphasize how some semantic
traits come to the fore when a word is used in one context and
retreat in another context.
The meaning of 'butter', for example, in the sentence
Gladys poured the butter into a dish
is a valid one but atypical. It acquires the property of being
liquid because it is the object of 'pour'. This is not to say
however that its meaning has changed in context (a slippery
slope) but merely that we select some of its total possible
traits and give up others.
There may be 'mutual negotiation' between a number of words in
a sentence until each has a subset of semantic traits that is
compatible with all the others. (Such a negotiation is
achieved by term or graph unification in some parsing
machines.) The impossibility of this strategy solving
curiosities like 'swallow the lie', and how unification is
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inadequate in resolving anomaly, has been discussed above.
We should bear in mind that Cruses's entailment is a
cancellable inference dependent on context for its force.
Cruse's research method is to discover entailment by looking at
the degrees of normality and abnormality in ordinary language
expressions or diagnostic frames such as 'Xs and other Ys'.
When one gets used to this method one realises how delusive
abstractions are, as Cruse's examples show. Consider 'X is
colder than Y' and 'Y is hotter than X'. A lot of people
would consider that mutual entailment obtained between these
two sentences. However a judicious choice of noun-phrases sows
seeds of doubt, for example,
my fridge is colder than Glad's fridge
and
Glad's fridge is hotter than my fridge.
Types of entailment identified by Cruse are:
- unilateral entailment: 'X is a dog' unilaterally entails 'X
is a non-human animal'; 'animal' is a criterial trait of
'dog'; this is hyponymy;
- mutual entailment/logical equivalence: 'X began at 10 am'
entails and is entailed by 'X commenced at 10 am';
- contrariety: 'X is a dog' stands in a contrary relation to 'X
is a cat', that is, 'X is a dog' unilaterally entails 'X is
not a cat'; 'cat' is an excluded trait of dog;
- contradiction: 'X is dead' entails and is entailed by 'X is
not alive'.
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Since Cruse's notion of entailment is more akin to pragmatic
implication than to logical entailment, presumably the above
entailments must be deemed cancellable. It is clear that
entailment is not as dependable a notion as one might hope.
Can we discover any kinds of inference that are uncancellable?
A simple distinction can be made when making inferences,
namely, between logical ones and lexical ones. This dichotomy
may seem an over-simplification to some. Standard accounts of
inference would enumerate at least six different kinds of
inference. I have added more, in the knowledge that there are
many more varieties of 'jumping to conclusions'.
propositional calculus
for example, 'Vernon trembles and Arthur trembles'
implies Vernon trembles;
predicate calculus
for example, 'one man is not a plumber' implies that it
isn't true that all men are plumbers;
presupposition
for example, 'Vernon's wife is not a bookie' implies
Vernon has a wife;
'Wilton Catford wasn't at the maths convention' implies
Wilton Catford exists;
'Mrs Thrale knows Samuel Johnson is a Jacobite' implies
Samuel Johnson is a Jacobite;
'Ida Nettleship made Augustus John happy' implies
Augustus John was happy;
'Father Blaney's soutane barely reached his shins'
implies Father Blaney's soutane reached his shins;
'Gatting has done it again' implies Gatting has done it
before;
deixis




'it is Thursday' implies that it may be Thursday;
'James Joyce's wife is Norah Barnacle' implies that
Norah Barnacle's husband is James Joyce;
'Pitsligo is older than the Bonny Prince and the Bonny
Prince is older then Butcher Cumberland' implies
Pitsligo is older than Butcher Cumberland';
'I have exactly two' implies I have at least two and I have
at most two (see Hodges 1983);
lexical
for example, 'Bim is a goat' implies Bim is a mammal;
'Grapelli plays the fiddle' implies Grapelli plays the
violin;
'I can hear something if it makes a noise' implies that I
can hear something if it is noisy;
pragmatic
for example, 'Arthur had a pie but he didn't eat it'
implies Arthur usually eats his pies;
'I can do it in 10 minutes' implies I can do it in at
most 10 minutes;
'I can lose a stone by Christmas' implies I can lose at
least a stone by Christmas (Cruse 1986);
for example, 'some of them don't' implies some of them do;
'there is one sock on the meatsafe' implies there is only
one sock on the meatsafe;
for example, the advertising slogan for grey salmon: 'the
only salmon that doesn't go pink in the tin' implies all
pink tinned salmon is unnaturally pink;
for example, 'Blaney is not unmarried' implies Blaney is
married;
for example, 'Vern and Art picked it up and Art bit it'
implies Vern didn't bite it;
'Modeste touched my nose' implies that Modeste touched me;
irony
for example, 'Fons is an intellectual; he's even heard of
Plato' implies Fons isn't an intellectual;
hyperbole
for example, 'I am a greater thinker than Plato';
metonymy/synechdoche
for example, 'I drink a cup every night' implies I drink
the contents of a cup;
-293-
meiosis/litotes
for example, 'It was slightly imprudent to eat that haunch
of condemned veal' implies that it was foolhardy to eat
that haunch of condemned veal;
epizeuxis
for example, 'he was a long long time in there' implies he
was a long time in there;
prototypical
for example, 'Bimbo is a scottie' implies Bimbo can bark;
induction
for example, 'Vern quivers and Beat quivers and Art
quivers' implies everyone quivers.
We can preserve our dichotomy by dividing these inferences into
cancellable and uncancellable ones. Some would say that the
first six types of inference are not cancellable without
contradiction while the rest are cancellable. Here are some
example cancellations of the first six types of inference that
do not work.
Hippolyte and Victoire ate it but Hippolyte didn't eat it
this woman hasn't got one but all women have got one
Ida made John happy but he has always been as miserable as sin
I went here last Tuesday
it's Tuesday but it probably isn't
Bim is a goat but he isn't an animal
Here are some example cancellations of other types of inference
that do work.
Arthur had a pie but he didn't eat it but then he never eats
them
there is one sock on the meatsafe and another beside it
Vern and Art picked it up and Art bit it and Vern bit it too
Bimbo is a scottie but he can't bark
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Vern quivers and Beat quivers and Art quivers and Bim doesn't
quiver
None of these examples is contradictory.
Before considering cancellable inferences we will look at the
uncancellable ones.
Deixis is an interesting phenomenon. Deictic expressions
exert very powerful entailments that it is difficult to cancel.
One might say
I went to Dingwall and Cowdenbeath looking for work and ended
up here in Cowdenbeath.
This is infelicitous but perhaps acceptable. Likewise one
might say
I went to the lavatory before elevenses
while standing in the lavatory, though this is probably only
allowable because 'going to the lavatory' is a euphemism for
micturition.
Deictic expressions and temporal ones seem to provide some of
the strongest candidates for uncancellable inferences.
Violations of temporal linearity, although not meaningless,
have the status of puns.
A man from the Isle of Wight,
Travelling much faster than light,
Set off one day
In a relative way,
And came back the previous night.
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Compare also
last night, as if we hadn't had enough this morning, it rained
Another possible contestant for the uncancellable inference is
provided by paronymy.
Paronymy is the relationship between one word and another
belonging to a different syntactic category and produced from
the first by derivation, for example 'wide' and 'widen'. (We
might include here composition too, for example 'apple' and
'appletree'.) This is of obvious importance in an inferencing
machine as it is likely that one would want to make the same
inferences from a base form and from some of its paronyms or
composites. For example, 'noise', 'noisy', 'noised abroad'
and 'noisily' are all concrete terms in that they are
apprehensible by the senses. This is not invariably true
however. Some forms of a word are reserved for abstract usage,
for example 'noisome'. Parsing systems built on a feature based
formalism often associate some features with the stem that can
be adduced automatically to any word having that stem.
Epizeuxis of certain kinds has the effect of shifting a
sentence that might feasibly have been cancellable up the
scale to uncancellable heights, for example,
Father Blaney will never never blaspheme again
Metropolitan Antony had a long long beard
the marmalade is gone, gone
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8.3 Lexical entailments: making inferences and changing one's
mind.
Others would say the dichotomy really comes between the first
three and the rest: propositions incorporating deixis and
implying hyponymy relations being as synthetic as the rest.
Thus, we might be able to conceive of a situation where we
found a species we wanted to call a goat but not a mammal.
Indeed Quine in his famous paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'
(Quine 1951) argued that we could not allow the
analytic/synthetic distinction since scientific knowledge is
like an interconnected web with no part immune to revision in
the light of experience. Virtually any feature can be taken
away from a category (for instance, hardness could be taken
away from diamonds) but when some features are removed a global
re-organisation of one's knowledge is necessary. The
larger this re-organisation, the more analytic and defining
this feature is. There is a continuum of analytic to synthetic
truths rather than a dichotomy.
Austin was another who did not believe in the distinction. With
regard to the following
this noise exists
this smell might not have existed
he would say, one might call the former analytic since
existence is part of the meaning of 'this'. However, the latter
is not contradictory, therefore existence cannot be part of the
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meaning of 'this'.
Moore finds analyticity hard to detect. The following
what is good ought to exist
he describes as synthetic but impossible to conceive as being
false. He prefers the Kantian class of synthetic a priori
knowledge. Other examples of this are
pink is more like red than black
the noise existed but was not heard
Kripke takes a different line with natural kind terms referring
to them as 'rigid designators'. This would render terms like
'goat' and 'water' 'rationally unrevisable' in the sense that
once one has discovered that water in the actual world is H20,
then nothing would count as a possible world in which water
was not H20. Thus the term is 'epistemically necessary' (Putnam
1973). Putnam points out that, in a curious sense, words like
'water', have an unnoticed indexical component, that is,
'water' is stuff that 'bears a certain similarity relation to
the water around here'.
It appears that Cruse restricts himself to natural kind terms
and uses a contextual frame or schema to identify hyponyms,
namely, A is f(X), where f(X) is an indefinite expression and
a complement of the verb 'to be'. The alternative is 'f(X)
is necessarily f(Y)'. If 'A is f(X)' entails 'A is f(Y)' then
X is a hyponym of Y and Y is a superordinate of X, for example,
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'this is a dog' unilaterally entails 'this is an animal';
'this is a stallion' unilaterally entails 'this is a horse';
'this is scarlet' unilaterally entails 'this is red';
'this is a man who murdered' unilaterally entails 'this is a
man who killed'.
Other useful constructions suggesting hyponymy include
Xs and other Ys,
no X more Y than a Z,
all Xs except Ys,
I like Xs - mostly Ys.
Cruse claims they can be indicative of other relations however,
for example, under his definition of hyponymy
the following do not qualify,
dogs and other pets,
there is no weapon as versatile as a knife.
This seems to me to be slightly debatable. An alternative
reading would be that the presence of a hyponym-suggesting
construction (for example, 'and other') actually coerces the
noun phrases into a relation of hyponymy (not a natural kind
relation of course). Thus, we must take our speaker to be
speaking only of pet-dogs in the former and only of
weapon-knives in the latter. Why else would he use the
construction 'and other'?
The coercive power of words is central to the present thesis. I
tried to convince a colleague once that the frame 'He's an X
but he isn't a Y' implied Yness was an expected trait of Xs.
Such is the coercive power of 'but' that no matter how absurd
the values for X and Y suggested, the rule obtained. 'Stan is
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a traffic warden but be isn't a plumber' can only make sense
in an appropriate discourse context where plumberhood is a
natural concomitant of trafficwardenhood. (Stan while issuing
parking tickets is asked to plug a leak in a milk tanker.)
Cruse points out interestingly that the direction of entailment
is reversed when the hyponym and superordinate fall within the
scope of a negative or universal quantifier, or they form part
of a conditional clause or other expression of contingency, for
example,
'it isn't red' entails 'it isn't scarlet';
'all animals are forbidden' entails 'all dogs are forbidden';
'without the red ones there will still be too many' entails
'without the scarlet ones there will still be too many';
'if it's red it won't do' entails 'if it's scarlet it won't
do' .
In the following two examples neither the hyponym nor the
superordinate falls within a negative, there are no universal
quantifiers or conditionals and so the hyponym precedes the
superordinate:
'I don't like this scarlet one' entails 'I don't like this red
one' ;
'I like this scarlet one' entails 'I like this red one'.
I am not sure about Cruse's point concerning universals
though; for one thing the scope of the universal quantifier is
the same in both of the following:
'all animals are forbidden' entails 'all dogs are forbidden';
'all pimpernels are scarlet' entails 'all pimpernels are red';
namely
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for all X (animal(X) -> forbidden(X));
for all X (pimpernel(X) -> scarlet(X)).
However, in the former entailment the superordinate precedes
the hyponym as Cruse predicts while in the latter it is the
other way round. It seems from this and subsequent examples
that Cruse's idea of scope is not logical scope but something
more like immediate adjacency, or what he calls 'field of
action'. He says that if any two of the above features
(universal quantifier, negative, conditional) co-occur then
entailment is in the 'normal' (that is, hyponym-superordinate)
direction. However consider the following:
'it isn't true that all dogs have fleas' entails 'it isn't true
that all animals have fleas';
'it isn't true that all dogs have parasites' entails 'it isn't
true that all dogs have fleas'.
Consider also:
'dogs don't have parasites' entails 'dogs don't have fleas',
for all X for all Y (dog(X) and parasite(Y) -> not have(X,Y))
I am not sure what Cruse would predict here. Two of his
features are simultaneously applicable (that is, negative and
universal); a conditional is also present if one accepts
predicate calculus' rendering of universals in terms of
conditionals. Cruse says the presence of three of the
features yields the superordinate to hyponym order. This is his
example.
'if not all vehicles are forbidden I shall go' entails 'if not
all cars are forbidden I shall go'
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This is complex logically but it does seem that it is not
enough to talk of features being simultaneously applicable. We
need to know the scope of these features as logical operators
before we can predict hyponymy relations.
To leave the scope of quantifiers for a moment, Cruse points
out appositely that detecting quantifiers in the first place
can be tricky. The following show how implicit universal
quantification (in 1 and 3) and implicit existential
quantification (in 2 and A) govern what entailments are
possible.
1 'it is important to avoid red socks' entails 'it is important
to avoid scarlet socks';
2 'it is important to buy red socks' does not entail 'it is
important to buy scarlet socks';
3 'flowers are prohibited' entails 'dandelions are prohibited';
A 'flowers make an acceptable present' does not entail
'dandelions make an acceptable present'.
Two points should be made. It is certainly true that we
disallow entailment in 2 and A but it is not proscribed by
logic. It is comparatively easy to contrive a context where it
was important that whenever one saw any red socks one should
buy them up. This would then include the scarlet ones too
(likewise the dandelion bouquet: 'you said you wanted flowers
darling and these are flowers').
The second point is that, presuming that such sentences are not
ambiguous and that one has a parser that can render such
sentences into logical form correctly (and that is to presume
a lot), then there is no ambiguity about what can or cannot be
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entailed. It is flippant to dismiss these wonderful examples
though. The flowers example could be explained nicely by
Rosch's prototypical concepts. A dandelion is not plumb in
the middle of the prototypical concept of flower but rather
peripheral. In the socks example (example 2) there seems to be
an implied existential quantifier, that is 'some socks'. 'I
like some red socks' doesn't entail 'I like some scarlet
socks' .
It has been suggested to me that a negatively charged verb
suggests a universal reading of a sentence. Positively charged
verbs however do not always suggest an existential reading. The
two fragments (imagine them as memos on the kitchen wall) 'buy
prunes' and 'avoid prunes' are indeed existential and universal
respectively. However, in the following examples the positively
charged verbs suggest universal readings.
it is the gallery's policy to buy Picassos offered to it for
sale (i.e. all Picassos offered to it for sale)
stamp library books when they are issued (i.e. all library
books)
It is harder to find examples of negatively charged verbs that
suggest existential readings. The following examples however
suggest existential readings ('certain records', 'some pupils'
and 'some weight' respectively):
successful runners break records






might seem to force an existential reading ('certain
imperatives') to defeat its paradoxicality, but this is a
mistake. It is the implied universal ('all imperatives') that
enables us to recognise it as a paradox in the first place!
Cruse gives some examples of curious entailments which
cease to become problems when rendered into logical form.
For example, he says that there is not the expected entailment
between the following.
Mary was disappointed to receive a rose
Mary was disappointed to receive a flower
This is because, despite the apparent reference to an
existential rose, there are implied universals in both
sentences, that is,
Mary was disappointed to receive any rose
Mary was disappointed to receive any flower
or,
for all X (rose(X) -> kindofthingMarydisappointedby(X))
for all X (flower(X) -> kindofthingMarydisappointedby(X))
Cruse has told us that universals reverse the direction of
hyponym-superordinate so we should not expect entailment here.
Hyponymy is one of Cruse's four types of entailments. However,
Cruse's entailments are only binding in certain situations,
the most convincing being the mutual entailment of synonymy.
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While 'commence' and 'begin' usually belong to different
linguistic registers, nevertheless this entailment is fairly
uncontroversial. The others are slightly less so.
'Dog' in vulgar usage can be applied to a man or a woman;
'cat' is sometimes used disparagingly of a woman. Thus a dog
might be human and also a cat! Likewise all that is not alive
is nevertheless not necessarily dead. As we saw above,
negation does not commit itself to any particular axis.
Thus, the process of detecting hyponymous relations in
fragments of natural language can be tortuous and we must
accept that the effort may not pay anyway in that hyponymous
relations may always be cancellable.
Another lexical relation that generates cancellable inferences
is taxonymy. Taxonymy is similar to hyponymy. Cruse suggests
taxonyms are akin to natural kind terms, and non-taxonymic
hyponyms to nominal kind terms. (Natural kind terms share with
proper names the property of being rigid designators. This
means their referents would retain their labels whatever
changes to their nature came about, for example, 'cat',
'horse'; contrast 'stallion', 'spinster'.)
Taxonymies can be characterised by the good category principle
(Cruse 1986; Rosch 1978). Subdivision is based on categories
with the highest possible degree of resemblance between
co-members and the maximum possible distinctiveness between
different categories.
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Certain general characteristics of taxonomies are suggested by-
Cruse. They typically have no more than five levels. For
example:
Most everyday words are at the generic level and most branches
end at this level. Every branch does not necessarily have
nodes at every level. This may be because of conceptual gaps
(for example, 'animaldog'-'spaniel'; 'birdfieldfare')
or because of lexical gaps ('possessions' - 'wearables' -
'wristwatch').
Rosch has named those items regarded as better examples of a
category than others as 'prototypes'. (Prototypicality should
not be confused with common usage: 'think of an odd number' is
far more likely to prompt '3' or '5' than '24681'.) For
instance, Cruse claims that a bag of clothes may include shoes
but not to the exclusion of anything else. Some really
prototypical elements must be present (like trousers)
and they will somehow carry the more peripheral members of the
category which are optional.
This seems slightly debatable. A bag containing shoes and a
hat would be a bag of clothes, although shoes and galoshes
might not be. However, it all depends on the diversity of











things like saucepans and tinned fruit it would seem quite in
order to classify a bag of shoes as clothes.
Co-taxonyms are, by and large, incompatibles but this is less
true for verbs. Cruse points out that they seem to be more
context-dependent than nouns.
Items at the higher levels of a taxonymy may often be
mass-nouns (for example, 'cutlery') although lower levels
contain count-nouns (for example, 'fork').
Taxonyms may be indicated by the frames
X is a kind/type of Y
Xing is a way of Ying
Thus
a spaniel is a kind of dog
gliding is a way of flying
(However, note that 'a spinster is a kind of woman' is
felicitous but does not to refer to a natural kind term.)
Taxonyms are not always hyponyms, again suggesting a lattice.
Consider,







Sometimes there are lexical gaps where conceptually we could do
with a word. This is linguistically quirky but not an
insuperable hurdle. For instance, Cruse points out that there
is no superordinate of the right category for 'knife', 'fork'
and 'spoon' but only the quasi-superordinate mass-noun
'cutlery'.
Similarly, there is no superordinate for 'red', 'blue',
'yellow' and so on. 'Coloured' might seem to do but in some
circumstances this would include 'black', for instance, if one
were sorting glass for salvage into clear glass and coloured
glass, black glass would be considered coloured. Again the
context elucidates. Where we expect transparent objects then
black ones are deemed coloured. Where we expect the colours of
the spectrum then black objects are deemed not coloured.
It seems that an analysis of taxonyms is fraught. The process
of distinguishing them from hyponyms is attended with problems;
there may be linguistic gaps that render inference impossible
and, moreover, taxonymies, like hyponymies, do not generate
uncancellable entailments.
The lexical relation meronymy or parts-explosion can also
generate inferences, for example,
'the bee is on John's elbow' entails
'the bee is on John's arm',
Meronymy generates a kind of branching hierarchy. Cruse tells
us that the relation is transitive, asymmetric and catenary.
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Parts (that is, components as opposed to smithereens) are
autonomous (that is, they have an identity independently of
the thing they're a part of), have non-arbitrary boundaries
and a function with respect to the whole.
He also observes that a meronymy should consist of elements of
the same type. We have a choice. For example, the human body
could be defined anatomically or systemically (that is
'head'-'body'-'legs' or 'muscles'nervesbloodvessels').
The most inclusive term is never missing in a meronymy as it
may be in a taxonymy although it may be the same as one of the
parts, for example the part of a teapot that holds the tea is
the teapot.
Meronymies vary in a number of ways. They may be non-concrete
(for example, processes); they may be poorly differentiated
(the members of a team); they may be undifferentiated (the
members of a unit of measure); they may have no structural
integration (the stones in a heap). They may also vary between
count-nouns and mass-nouns. Cruse identifies four types,
namely,
count-count (for example, tyre-car);
count-mass (for example, grain-sand);
mass-count (for example, steel-car);
mass-mass (for example, milk-custard).
It is clear that these examples are very different. The third
partakes of the mass-form distinction identified by Aristotle
as exemplified in a marble statue (the statue is the form; the
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mass is marble). This of a very different nature from the
parts-explosion (tyre-car) kind or the disintegration
(grain-sand; milk-custard) kind and the random-disintegration
(cake-crumb) kind.
Meronymies may not have a constant relation all the way down
the hierarchy. Now it is clear that some items stand in a
strict part-whole relation while others do only partially. The
tell-tale constructions (both of which must be present), that
Cruse suggests, are
Xs are parts of Ys
Ys have Xs
Examples that fit one frame but not the other, such as
sounds have pitches
his beard and moustache are part of his attraction
are not examples of meronymies.
A composite frame is:
the parts of an X include the Ys, the Zs etc.
Here is an example.
fingers are parts of hands; hands have fingers
indices are parts of books; books have indices
The former shows strict meronymy, the latter only partial
meronymy because there are books that don't have indices and
indices that are not part of books. There are of course hands
that do not have fingers in the same way that there could be
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non-stripy tigers (suffering from alopecia) but it is useful
here, as elsewhere, to distinguish natural kind terms from
others.
Sometimes the frame produces odd results.
the house has a door
the door has a handle
We cannot say however that the house has a handle. A handle
may be more properly defined as an attachment. (Compare
head-ear; arm-hand; door-handle.) Transitivity is affected by
such relations. For instance, Cruse claims
'Fred has a head; the head has ears' entails 'Fred has ears'
but
'I touched the ears' does not entail 'I touched the head'.
It seems a slightly moot point whether touching someone's ears
involves touching their head. It is certainly true that one
can say, without contradiction,
touch Fred on the ears not on the head
Curiously enough, what is not a moot point is that to touch
Fred's ears is to touch Fred.
Temporal structures may also have parts which do not
necessarily satisfy the above conditions for meronymy. Here
are Cruse's excellent examples.
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the most popular part of the show is the strip-tease
the run-up is part of the action of bowling
the best part of the show was the decor
learning to be patient is part of growing up
bowing is the hardest part of playing the violin
being slim is part of being fit
Christmas pudding is part of Christmas
Groups are a bit like meronymies, for example family,
orchestra, congregation. They have functional cohesion, for
instance,
a juror is part of the jury
Classes are also similar. They have a cohesion by virtue of
attributes.
a bishop is part of the clergy
Collection-membership is similar.
a forest has trees
a library has books
Cruse says there are four possible meronymic relations between
the holonym and the meronym, namely
they both necessarily co-occur ('body' and 'ear');
the whole can occur on its own ('newspaper' and 'leader');
the part can occur on its own ('fungus' and 'lichen');
they can both occur on their own ('university' and 'museum').
At this point we may be feeling rather confused but suspect
that there is some cognitive structure that would represent
these relations. It seems that a lattice would suffice with
two kinds of link in it, namely 'has part of' and 'has








This approach will handle Cruse's other examples but not
one that he does not mention, namely mutually exclusive parts,
for example
the car has a hatchback or a boot but not both
Other associated frames are
X is an ingredient of Y
X is a constituent of Y
We saw that 'the door has a handle' and 'the house has a door'
do not entail 'the house has a handle'. Suffice it to say
that meronymy, like hyponymy, is a cancellable inference.
However, for our purposes it is significant that the questions
what is X a part of?
what are the parts of Y?
may yield varied and numerous answers.
8.4 Exploiting inferences.
Our aim is to generate inferences from the user's input. This
means we cannot afford to restrict ourselves to logical
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entailment. We would also like to make lexical inferences
('motherchild'), presuppositions, expected traits
('dog'-'bark') and so on. We may even find speech act theory
is applicable to some input to the extent that typed input
shares some characteristics of spoken language.
Now, this may not seem a problem in principle. It surely just
means building a bigger inference engine and having more
rules. The difficulty is knowing where in the system shown
below to include the inference engine. (Upper case refers to
bits of machine; the lower case is data.)
string->PARSER->phrase structure tree->LOGICAL MACHINE->logical
form
Suppose we have the following chatty input and can parse it.
Vernon is I grant you a plumber but all plumbers really hate
water
It is clear that a logical inference can be made from scalar
particles (for example,'even1 ) although they do not affect
truth conditions. Here we can infer that Vernon hates water.
Other inferences can also be made, for instance, that plumbers
are expected to like, or be dispassionate about, water. The
trouble is, by the time the system has made its logical
inferences, that is, after the logical form has been built, it
is too late to make the lexical ones. Here is a fairly
uncontroversial predicate calculus rendering.
plumber(vernon) and [ allX(plumber(X) -> hates_water(X)) ]
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What has been lost? The answer Is the following constructions:
'I grant you', 'but' and 'really'. Other words of this kind
include 'although' 'still' and so on. They are lost because
in truth conditional semantics their inclusion makes no
difference to the truth value of the proposition. It is clear
that we shouldn't wait until this stage to make our lexical
entailments. Can we move our inference engine backwards to an
earlier point in the analysis of the string? This isn't
possible either. One cannot make logical inferences until
ambiguities of quantifier scope and so on have been sorted out
and this has not been done at the phrase structure tree stage.
The solution is that the parser and grammar should be
sophisticated enough to handle these linguistic and semantic
complexities.
It should be said that the representation of some inferences is
not trivial. Leech (Leech 1983) claims that the process by
which implicatures are recovered
is not a formalised deductive logic but an informal
rational problem solving strategy
and that
all implicatures are probabilistic.
Levinson (Levinson 1983) claims that in some respects
implicatures
appear to be quite unlike logical inferences and
cannot be directly modelled in terms of some semantic
relation like entailment.
-315-
Compare also Brown (Brown 1983) and de Beaugrande (de
Beaugrande 1981). It is not clear though that implicatures
might not be represented as lexical information albeit of a
complex nature.
It is also worth pointing out that human inferring is not
restricted to these rather mechanical processes. 'Jumping to
conclusions' implies not only speed and athletic ability but
also distance. Someone's response to my utterance may require
a tortuous ratiocinative process on my part to wrench it into
the semblance of relevant discourse, for instance (Sperber
1986),
would you like to buy a flag for the royal national Lifeboat
Institution?
no thanks, I always spend my holidays with my sister in
Birmingham
Some propositions produce curious entailments for which no
principled account can easily be given, for instance,
the astronaut entered the atmosphere again
when Diggins knocked the stirrup-pump over he picked it up
again
this is the red pencil
These are certainly a problem because they confuse entailment.
One might argue that the first example is almost idiomatic.
(The assumption is that it is the astronaut's first space
trip.) It is clearly not literally true. To redefine 'enter'
as 'to be inside' is to misuse the word. But, under normal
conditions, to do something again entails we have done it
already. It could be suggested that 'again', like some
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metaphors, is selective as to the features of the action that
are being repeated. Thus the astronaut didn't enter again but
was inside again. The second example would have a similar
explanation.
I am not sure about this. If this is the case why is it untrue
to say 'I have had apple crumble again today' when I have only
ever had apple pie before. It seems possible that 'again' is
comparable to other words with a logical function like 'not'.
There was widespread usage before the twentieth century of
double negatives for emphasis rather than for the cancellation
effect that is taken for granted now (except in vulgar usage:
'I didn't never take it').
The third example is more interesting. It is correct usage
(and,more to the point, has only one standard predicate
calculus rendering) but is ambiguous. This also confuses
entailment and is an example of a much wider problem namely
the ascription of properties to wholes when they are only
properly ascribable to parts. This problem is akin to metonymy,
for example 'I drank three bottles'.




The adequacy of the theory.
There seem to be philosophical grounds for believing in the
fundamental premise of this theory: the supremacy of abstract
over concrete senses. For one thing everything has an
abstract dimension, functionality or significance to human
beings (this is true even of the most apparently inert concrete
masses like sand), while not everything has a concrete
manifestation. Thus at a very fundamental level, unification
of abstract and concrete will always yield the former.
The other main reason is more an evolutionary one. Some words
have both a physical and an abstract dimension because they
have acquired the latter through longstanding metaphorical
usage, for instance, 'warm' and 'cold' were used to name
sensations before they were extended to refer to personality
traits. Reference to sensation is earlier historically and
also earlier in the child's acquisition of vocabulary.
To what extent can the principles of semantic prediction and
coercion, outlined above, be part of a theory?
A scientific theory or research programme should provide
(Lakatos 1978) :
a set of rules invariant over time and context;
a method of falsifying these rules;
a mechanism for prediction;
empirical evidence in support;
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the absence of a simpler theory of equal explanatory power;
a description or classification of the domain over which the
rules obtain;
a classification of the complement of the domain.
Nowhere has it been claimed that the above theory is a
scientific one. Demands for supporting evidence and
falsification techniques are, in my opinion, inappropriate when
the subject under examination is language, an exceedingly
curious phenomenon unlike most in the natural world. Granted,
human language shares with human locomotion that unruly element
called human will. But it is yet to be demonstrated that there
are any ruly elements in language, in the way that human
locomotion is constrained by, say, rules of gravity, and surely
if any rules were proffered, the imp of the perverse could
immediately break them. We do not have this licence with the
rules of gravity. Thus, it is not clear what could constitute
proof that a given semantic interpretation was the correct one.
For example, the coercion principle in our theory predicts that
the following sentence concerns an abstract process.
Beasley exposed the drug-trafficking
This seems intuitively correct but what would constitute
'empirical evidence in support'? Perhaps a subsequent clause
such as 'over the telephone' would do? One cannot literally
expose things over the 'phone because it isn't a visual medium.
However, one can expose pictures over the mantelpiece so,
conceivably, one can expose some concrete realisation or
physical depiction of drug-trafficking over the telephone.
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This is an unlikely reading but we have got no proof either
way. For the same reasons, falsification techniques are
inappropriate too.
How are the other criteria satisfied? The absence of a simpler
theory of equal explanatory power has been addressed in Chapter
5 where the inadequacies of other theories are discussed. A
description of the domain and its complement is given in
Section 4.7. The 'mechanism for prediction' forms part of the
'set of rules invariant over time and context' which is
provided in Chapters 6 and 7. Thus, the concerns of empirical
science have been embraced while its claims are viewed with
some scepticism.
Improvements to the theory, bearing in mind its higher level
aim of intelligent knowledge elicitation, would include
principles of resolution of fine-grained anomalies, a facility
for non-monotonic resolution due to an accumulation of counter=
evidence, top-down discourse schemata and a mechanism for
inter-sentential inference.
We have discussed the strategy of the program under those
circumstances where some of the user's input is known to the
program. On occasion no words of the user's input are known.
Where no words are known, the system takes the first unknown
word F, say a one place predicate, goes to the top of the
lexicon lattice and asks the user whether the word is a noun,
adjective or intransitive verb.
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On other occasions all the words in the user's input are known.
Under these circumstances inferences of the kind discussed in
Chapter 8 are invoked, or, failing these, so-called 'external'
questions are formed. These relate not to the semantic
relations of intra-sentential words but to logical relations of
entities in the domain under discussion. Here are some
questions from Nida (Nida 1975) that might be deployed when
all the user's input is known.
What is X like?
How is it used?
What does the entity look like?
What does the entity sound like?
What does the entity feel like?
What does the agent do?
Where does the agent live?
How does the agent act?
How is the artifact made?
What is the artifact made of?
What is the artifact used for?
Who brings about this event?
How does he do it?
With what does he do it?
To whom does he do it?
Where does he do it?
Who can be an X?
What can be an X?
Can you do something Xly?
Can you go X?
Can you talk Xly?
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Appendix 1. Table of influence and coercion.
The theory provides the following information for each word in
its basic English lexicon:
a) the class and part of speech of the word;
b) which part of speech it combines with to yield which part of
speech;
c) what class it predicts for the part of speech it combines
with;
d) what parts of speech/classes it coerces to produce what:
e) what parts of speech/classes coerce it to produce what;




A = animate; M = mental; C = concrete; B = abstract;
F = figurative.
n = noun; v = verb; adj = adjective; adv = adverb
An -> C means that when the word in question is combined with
an animate noun it yields a concrete phrase.
Table of influence and coercion.
1 Item. Concrete adjective
2 Structure it gives in composition. Adj + Noun -> NP
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. concrete
or animate
4 Categories coerced by it. None.
5 Categories that coerce it. Mn -> M; Bn -> B
6 Verbal description. In a conflict between adjective and
noun, a concrete adjective is always coerced by higher
categories.
7 Examples.
wooden traffic warden -> A
green thoughts -> M
cast-iron theory -> B
the empire, in its pinafore -> B
metal theory -> B (i.e. theory concerning metal)
metal man -> A (i.e. scrap metal merchant)
a black humour -> M
black humour -> B
a black thought -> M (e.g. a thought about blacks)
a black campaigner -> A (e.g. a campaigner for blacks)


























tin soldier -> C (e.g. the tin soldier melted)
tin soldier -> F (e.g. the tin soldier chuckled)
metal mind -> C (e.g. the computer)
metal theory -> C (e.g the steam engine is theory in metal)
metal waiter -> C (e.g. a trolley)
Item. Animate adjective
Structure it gives in composition. Adj + Noun -> np
Categories it predicts for word it combines with. animate
Categories coerced by it. None
Categories that coerce it. Mn -> M; Bn -> B
Verbal description. An animate adjective is compatible with
an animate noun but coerced by higher categories
Examples.
a talkative man -> A
Exceptions.
a talkative memory -> C (e.g. a machine)
a hairy idea -> A (a puppy)
a hairy theory -> C (e.g. velcro)
Item. Mental adjective
Structure it gives in composition. Adj + Noun -> np
Categories it predicts for word it combines with. mental or
animate
Categories coerced by it. Cn -> F
Categories that coerce it. Bn -> B
Verbal description. A mental adjective is alright with an
animate or mental noun. It coerces a concrete noun and is
coerced by an abstratc noun.
Examples.
contrite man -> A
contrite mind -> M
contrite bucket -> F
contrite theory -> B
contrite bucket -> A (e.g. Alf was awash with tears; he was a
contrite bucket of them)
Exceptions.
sad bucket -> C (metaphorical usage)
contrite bucket -> B (dematerialised e.g. BandAid is a
contrite bucket of amotions)
contrite bucket -> C (the dustbin outside Oxfam is a contrite
bucket for money from the conscience stricken)
Item. abstract adjective
Structure it gives in composition. Adj + noun -> np
Categories it predicts for word it combines with. word
Categories coerced by it. None
Categories that coerce it. Cn -> C; An -> A; Mn -> M; Bn->
B;




john's hat -> C
john's mum -> A
john's theory -> B
john's memory -> M
8 Exceptions.
technological man -> C (e.g. a computer)
mathematical milestone -> B
1 Item. Animate noun
2 Structure it gives in composition. Adjective + noun -> np
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. word
4 Categories coerced by it. None
5 Categories that coerce it. None
6 Verbal description. An animate noun is compatible with
every adjective and thus is not coerced and does not coerce
any adjective.
7 Examples,
wooden man -> A
traditional man -> A
vainglorious trafficwarden -> A
sweaty newsreader -> A
8 Exceptions.
tin soldier -> C
straw man -> B
technological man -> C (e.g. a machine)
1 Item. Concrete noun
2 Structure it gives in composition. Adjective + noun -> np
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. concrete
or abstract
4 Categories coerced by it. None.
5 Categories that coerce it. Ma -> F; Aa -> F
6 Verbal description. This combines successfully with
concrete and abstract adjectives; it is coerced by a
mental and animate adjectives into the figurative class.
7 Examples,
traditional bucket -> C
contrite bucket -> F
grumbling bucket -> F.
8 Exceptions. The same observations concerning ellipticality,
metaphorical use and dematerialisation.
1 Item. Mental noun
2 Structure it gives in composition. Adj + noun -> np
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. mental or
abstract
4 Categories coerced by it. Ca -> M; Aa -> M;
5 Categories that coerce it. None




green mind -> M
sweaty mind -> M
traditional mind -> M
8 Exceptions. As above
1 Item. Abstract noun
2 Structure it gives in composition. Adj + noun -> np
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. abstract
A Categories coerced by it. Ca -> B; Aa -> B; Ma -> B
5 Categories that coerce it. None
6 Verbal description. This coerces all the adjectives in the
categories below it.
7 Examples.
metal theory -> B
grumbling theory -> B
contrite theory -> B
8 Exceptions. As above
1 Item. Concrete verb
2 Structure it gives in composition. Verb + Np2 -> vp
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. concrete
or animate
A Categories coerced by it. None.
5 Categories that coerce it. Mnp2 -> M; Bnp2 -> B.
6 Verbal description. This is a category true members of
which are rare, for instance the neologisms like 'output'
and 'autoprint'.
7 Examples.
output a bottle -> C
output a man -> C
output hostility -> M (e.g. generated an aura of being
hostile)
output wealth -> B (e.g. output goods that represented
wealth)
melted the soldier -> A (e.g. softened the soldier's heart)
melted the soldier -> C (e.g. melted the tin soldier)
8 Exceptions.
output a theory -> C (e.g. printed a theory on paper)
1 Item. Animate verb
2 Structure it gives in composition. Verb + np2 -> vp
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. concrete
or animate
A Categories coerced by it. None
5 Categories that coerce it. Fnp2 -> F; Mnp2 -> M; Bnp2 -> B
6 Verbal description. This is alright with concrete or
animate np2s; any np2 in a higher category (including F
because that contains one M element) coerce it.
7 Examples.
argue with the tin soldier -> F
-325-
rummage through the mind -> M
smash the theory -> B
8 Exceptions. As above
1 Item. Mental verb
2 Structure it gives in compi
3 Categories it predicts for
4 Categories coerced by it.
5 Categories that coerce it.
6 Verbal description. This
7 Examples.
loved the dustbin -> M
loved the chiropodist -> M
loved the daydream -> M
loved the propaganda -> M
8 Exceptions. None
sition. Verb + np2 -> vp
word it combines with. word
None.
None
can combine with anything.
1 Item. Abstract verb
2 Structure it gives in composition. Verb + np2 -> vp
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. word
4 Categories coerced by it. None.
5 Categories that coerce it. None.
6 Verbal description. This is compatible with every object
noun because it appertains to some abstract dimension of
that noun.
7 Examples.
vitiated the bucket -> B (e.g. its existence)
vitiated the consultant -> B (e.g. his diagnosis)
vitiated the thought -> B (e.g. its truth)
vitiated the theory -> B
8 Exceptions. As above
1 Item. Concrete vp
2 Structure it gives in composition. Vp + npl -> s
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. concrete
or animate
4 Categories coerced by it. None
5 Categories that coerce it. Mnpl -> B; Bnpl -> B
6 Verbal description. This is a rare category exemplified,
strictly speaking, only in, for example 'output the
document', 'autoloaded the disc'.
7 Examples.
the machine output the document -> C
the man output the document -> C (e.g. caused the machine to
output the document);
dogged determination output that document -> M (e.g. made the
man make the machine output that document);
8 Exceptions. As above.
1 Item. animate vp
2 Structure it gives in composition. Vp + npl -> s
-326-
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. animate
4 Categories coerced by it. Cnpl -> F
5 Categories that coerce it. Mnpl -> M; Bnpl -> B
6 Verbal description. This is alright with animate npls;
other npls coerce or are coerced by it.
7 Examples.
the escalator pursued the man -> C
the janitor accosted the man -> A
the memory moved the man -> M
the verdict undermined the man -> B
8 Exceptions. As above
1 Item. Mental vp
2 Structure it gives in composition. Vp + npl -> s
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. animate
or mental
4 Categories coerced by it. Cnpl -> F
5 Categories that coerce it. Bnpl -> B
6 Verbal description. This is all right with animate or
mental npls but coerces Cnpl into its figurative dimension;
it is coerced by abstract npls.
7 Examples.
the bucket knew the ... -> F
the man knew the.. -> M
his reason knew the ... -> M
the theory knew the ... -> B
8 Exceptions. As above
1 Item. Abstract vp
2 Structure it gives in composition. Vp + npl -> s
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. word
4 Categories coerced by it. None.
5 Categories that coerce it. None
6 Verbal description. This is compatible with every category
in its abstract dimension.
7 Examples.
the bucket vitiated ...-> B (e.g. its existence vitiated...)
the man vitiated ...-> B (e.g. his presence vitiated...)
the memory justified ...-> B (e.g. its occurrence
justified...)
the ubiquity of the bastinado justified... -> B
8 Exceptions. As above
1 Item. Concrete adverb
2 Structure it gives in composition. Adv + s -> s
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. concrete
or animate
4 Categories coerced by it. None
5 Categories that coerce it. Ms-> M; Bs -> B
6 Verbal description. This is coerced by mental and abstract
sentence but is compatible with animate and concrete ones..
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7 Examples.
Alf thought of Beat mechanically -> M
the lemma undermined the theory mechanically -> B
Stan coughed noisily -> A
the tea-urn clattered noisily -> C
8 Exceptions. As above.
1 Item. Animate adverb.
2 Structure it gives in composition. Adv + s -> s
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. animate
and concrete
4 Categories coerced by it. None.
5 Categories that coerce it. Ms -> M; Bs -> B
6 Verbal description. This is coerced by abstract and mental
sentences but is compatible with animate and concrete
sentences; the apparent coercion of a mental sentence by
an animate adverb is elliptical.
7 Examples.
Alf thought sweatily -> M
the lemma vitiated the argument sweatily -> B
the rocks glistened sweatily -> C
Stan embraced Glad sweatily -> A
8 Exceptions.
Humph thought sweatily -> A (e.g. ...thought, coming out in
sweat...)
1 Item. Abstract adverb.
2 Structure it gives in composition. Adv + s -> s
3 Categories it predicts for word it combines with. Word.
4 Categories coerced by it. None.
5 Categories that coerce it. None.
6 Verbal description. The abstract adverb is compatible with
every category.
7 Examples.
the water flooded the oubliette thoroughly -> C
Alf dried the puppy thoroughly -> A
Tim resented the archdeacon thoroughly -> M
the evidence disproved the hypothesis thoroughly -> B
8 Exceptions. None
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Appendix 2. The program.
The following text is that of a small Prolog program to
demonstrate the Principles of Prediction and Coercion as
outlined in Chapters 6 and 7. The program incorporates a
sample lexicon and a simple grammar adapted from a dialogue
program written by Pereira and Shieber (Pereira and Shieber
1987) which handles nouns, adjectives and transitive verbs.
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fie **************************************************** ★f
/* Operator precedences. */
:-op(900,fx,[not]).










f-k **************************************************** * J
/* */
:- nl,
write('Type hello, to begin please.'),
nl.
fie -kieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieie ★ f











fie ieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieieie ★ f
/* hasdescendant(Y,X) where Y is a clas3 that has a */




subsumes (Z, X) ,
hasdescendant(Y,Z).
fie * f
/* subsumes(X,Y) where X is the superordinate class of Y */
















































































































J * ************************************************** *J
/* predicts(W,X,Y, Z) where part of speech X of class */
/* W predicts class Y for part of speech Z */






predicts(mental, [nounl, npl], [abstract,mental], [vp]) .














































predicts(abstract, [nounl,npl], [abstract], [novm2,np2]) .
predicts(concrete,[noun2,np2],[animate,concrete],[nounl,npl]).





/* coercedclass(X,Y,Z) where conflicting classes X */














/* combinedpos(X,Y,Z) where part of speech X and */
/* part of speech Y combine to form part of speech Z*/
combinedpos(noun,adjective,npl).
combinedpos(adjective,noun,npl).










































/* semax(X,Y) where X is logical form and Y is the */
/* input sentence and its parts of speech */
/* Gets unknown adjectivel */
/* Looks for known nounl */
semax(Assertion,Pospeechlist)
/* semantics(X,Y)
/* If input is 'X subsumes Y' or 'X is a Y' assert









/* semax (X,Y) */
/* Gets unknown nounl */
/* Looks for known noun2 */





J k * J
/* semax(X,Y) */
/* Gets unknown adjective2 */





J ic * j
/* 3emax(X,Y) */
/* Gets unknown nounl */







/* Get3 unknown noun2 */





f k kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kj
/* semax(X,Y) */
/* Gets unknown noun2 */









/* Gets unknown transitive_verb */
/* Looks for known noun2 */










f-k kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk * J
/* semax(X,Y) */
/* Gets unknown transitive_verb */
/* Looks for known noun2 */








/* Gets unknown nounl and there is no adjectivel */















/* Gets unknown nounl and there is no adjectivel */
/* Looks for known transitive_verb. There i3 a known */













/* Gets unknown transitive_verb */
/* Gets known noun2 */







/* semax (X,Y) */
/* Gets unknown nounl */
/* Gets known transitive_verb */
/* No known noun2 */
semax(Assertion,Pospeechlist)




/* Gets unknown noun2 */
/* Looks for known nounl */





J★ *********************************************** -k J
/* semax(X,Y) */
/* All previous tests failed */
/* Get unknown word and its p.o.s. and subclasses */
/* of its p.o.s. and ask which of latter should */





/* No unknowns */
/* Looks for known functor; gets it3 subclasses */














write(' No semantic analysis. ').
J k *********************************************** ★j
/* numberitem(01dword,Oldlist,Newlist,Newword) */
/* Numbers parts of speech in the p.o.s. list */
numberitem(X,[X|Xs],[W|Xs],W).
numberitem(X,[Y|Ys],[Y|Zs], W) : -
X \== Y,
numberitem(X,Ys,Zs,W).
numberitem (X, [A | B] , [A | B] , W) .
jk kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk * j
/* getpredictor(W,X,Y,Z) */







/* getcombinedclass (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) */
/* Gets class of linguistic phrase from the class of */






combinedclass(Kpos,Kclass,K2pos,K2class,Combpos, Head, Upos) ,
same (Kpos,Head,Combclas3,Kclass) .
















/* Gets the lowest available ontological */






J * **************************************** */
/* nextto(X,Y,Z) */
/* Finds word in a list next to input word. */
nextto(X, Y, [X,Y|_] ) .
nextto(X,Y, [_| Z]) :-
nextto(X,Y, Z) .
fie *J
/* getu (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) */
/* Gets an unknown lpp clause */








/* Gets an unknown 2pp clause */











/* Get a known clause of p.o.s. Kpos with */












J k it**************************************** * J
/* getanyk(X,Y) */


















/* same (A, A, B, B) */
same (A, A, B, B) .
fk kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kj
/* combinedpos(A,B,C,D) */
/* Gets p.o.s. of a linguistic phrase from p.o.s's of */
/* its parts */
combinedpos(transitive_verb,np2,vp,transitive_verb,_).
combinedpos(adjective2,noun2,np2,noun2,transitive_verb).







/* Checks a functor for presence in the */





/* Gets a subterm from the logical form. */

















/* Tests for unknown functor: unknown if */





/* Get subclasses of part of speech of */
/* unknown functor and ask which latter */





























ironoot ([] , []) .
ironoot(X,[X]).
J k ★ f
/* lextranslatecls(X,Y) */
/* This scans the input string and makes a li3t */






/* e.g. lextranslate([bucket],L). */




lextranslate([] , []) .
fk kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kJ












/* Parts of the grammar following are amended */
/* from Pereira and Shieber's dialogue program. */
/* See Prolog and Natural Language */
/* Analysis. Pereira FCN and Shieber SM CLSI 1987*/
/* p 212. */
fk kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kf
/* Operator precedences. */
- op(500,xfy,&).
- op(510,xfy,=>).
- op (1, fx, >) .
fk kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kf
/* hello */












/•k kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk -k /
/* talk(Sentence,Reply). */
/* This parses the user's input sentence to FOL */
/* and FOL to Horn clause if pos3, and replies */
/* appropriately. */
/* Take sentence; get its list of p.o.s.'s; parse */
/* it; get its list of parse p.o.s.'s; remove */
/* brackets from latter; match p.o.s. list and */
/* parse p.0.3. list;merge sentence with parse pos*/
/* list; remove brackets; clausify the If from the*/
/* parse; reply with the If. */













reply(Type, FreeVars, Clause, Reply,Pospeechlist2).
talk(_Sentence, error(' Please go on.')).
j k kkkkkkkk-kkkkkkkickkkkkk-kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk-kk-kk k J
/* tidyverbs(Pospeechlist,X) */








/* e.g. merge([dulce,decorum] , [et,est],L). */









/* Inputtype is assertion. */
/* Freevars are the free variables (to be interpreted */
/* existentially) in the clause. */
/* Assert assertion to the database. Do semantic */












/* This outputs the reply generated by the last predicate*/
















/* This loops through the poss. answers outputting */













I * a********************************************** ★i
/* parse(Sentence, LF, Type). */
/* Type is assertion. LF and Type are both */
/* outputs. */
/* The first clause parses an assertion: a finite */
/* sentence without gaps. */
/* e.g. parse([every,dog,likes,bones],M,K, L). */
parse(Sentence, LF, assertion, Skeleton)
s(LF, nogap, Skeleton, Sentence, []).
jk ★J
/* clausify(FOL, Clause, Freevars). */













f-k ************************************************ it f
/* clausify_literal(X,Y) */
clausify_literal('L,L).
J * ********************************************************* * J
/* Grammar. */
/* Typical order of and vals for args: */
/* (Verbform, FOLlogicalforn, Gapinfo) where */
/* verb form is e.g. finite,nonfinite etc (for main verbs) */
/* gap info is nogap or */
/* gap(Nonterm, Var) where */
/* Nonterm is nonterminal for gap */
/* Var is the LF variable the filler will bind. */
J-k kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kj

















optrel(N3AN4 , Pose) .
np((XAS1)Aall(X,(S2=>S1)),nogap,Posl) —>
detlessnoptrel(XAS2,Posl).






npisamare((XAS)AS, gap(np, X),[]) —> [].
I ie "k f






/* VP clauses * */
/* is a man */
vp(finite, XAS, Gaplnfo,[copi|Pos2]) —>
copisamare(copi),
npisamare((XAP)Aexists(X,S&P), Gaplnfo,Pos2).
/* is good food */
/* is a good man */
vp(finite, XAS, Gaplnfo,[copi|Pos2]) -->
copisamare(copi) ,
np((XAS1)Aall(X, (S=>S1)) , Gapinfo,Pos2) .
/* likes a woman */




npCVP^S, Gaplnfo, Pos2) .
*1
*/
vp(Form, XAS, Gaplnfo,[transitive_verb|Pos2]) —>
tv(Form, X~VP,transitive_verb),
ap(VP"S, Gaplnfo,Pos2).
/* likes a good woman
/* likes good women
f-k kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk *j
/* AP clauses */
adjp (AAA, []) —> [].
/* e.g. old */
adjp((XAS1)A(XA(S1&S2)),adjective) —>
adj(XAS2,adjective) .





/* OPTNPREPP clauses */
optnprepp(NAN,[]) —> [].
f k kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kJ




/* NB The verb entry arguments are: */
/* 1 nonfinite form of the verb, */
/* 2 third person singular present tense form of the */
/* verb, */
/* 3 past tense form of the verb, */
/* 4 past participle form of the verb, */
/* 5 present participle form of the verb, */
/* 6 logical form of the verb. */
adj (LF, [])-->[] .
adj(LF,adjective) —> [A], {adj(A, LF)}.
copisamare(copi) --> [COP], (copisamare(COP)}.
det(LF,det) --> [D], {det(D, LF) }.
detisamare(LF,det) --> [DETIS], {detisamare(DETIS, LF)}.
n(LF,noun) —> [N], {n(N, LF)}.
347
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relpron(rel) —> [RP], {relpron(RP)).
tv(nonfinite, LF,transitive_verb) —> [TV], {tv(TV, _,
tv(finite, LF,transitive_verb) —> [TV], {tv(_, TV,
tv(pfinite, LF,transitive_verb) —> [TV], {tv(_, _,
tv (past_participle, LF,transitive_verb) —> [TV], {tv(_, _,
tv (pres_participle, LF,transitive_verb) —> [TV], {tv(_, _,
fit **************************************************** ★J
/* PARSERS LEXICON */














det ( every, (X"S1)"(X"S2)" all(X,S1=>S2) ).
det ( a, (X"S1)"(X"S2)"exists(X,S1&S2) )
det( an, (X"S1)"(X"S2)"exists(X,S1&S2) )




detlessn( concrete, X" 'concrete(X)).
detlessn( animate, X" 'animate(X)).
detlessn( mental, X" 'mental(X)).
detlessn( abstract, X" 'abstract(X)).
/* N */
n( man, X" 'man(X) ).
n( bucket, X" 'bucket(X) ).
n( thought, X" 'thought(X)
n( mind, X" 'mind(X) ) .
n( theory, X" 'theory(X) ).
/* T */
tv(follow,follows, followed,
followed, following, X"Y" ' follows(X,Y) ).
tv(vitiate,vitiates, vitiated,
vitiated, vitiating, X"Y" ' vitiates(X,Y) ).
tv(avoid,avoids, avoided,




output, outputting, XAYA x outputs(X,Y) ).
tv(despise,despises, despised,
despised, despising, XAYA v despises(X,Y) ).
J k kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk *J
/* Empty words */
detlessn(A,D)
n(A,D) .










adj (A, D) : -
n (A, D) .
tv(nomatch,nomatch,nomatch,nomatch,A,E):-
stepl (A, B, C, D) ,







step3 (B, C, D, CADA VB) .
/* cone(Listl,List2,List3). */
/* Concatenate a list. */
/* e.g. cone([dulce,et] , [decorum, e3t] , L) . */






/* Words is set of words from the input delimited by spaces and
349
350
/* ended by a newline. */
/* Spaces are ignored. */
/* Everything else starts a word so get the word, pack the chars. */












/* Exit if input is ~ */












/* Chars is the list of input characters delimited by */
/* spaces or newlines. */
/* A space ends a word. */
/* A newline ends a word. */
/* All other characters are added to the list. */
read_word(C, [], C) space(C),
I
















/* Char is the ASCI code for the newline char. */
newline(10).




/* e.g. getsubclasses(top,M). */
/* M=[abstract,animate,concrete,mental] */
getsubclasses(X,V)





/* e.g. askwhichsubclass(tractor,[substance,machine]). */



















write(' to the dictionary.').
/* askforrefinement(X,Y) */
/* e.g. askforrefinement(animate,[human,animal]). */






write('What sort of '),
write(X),





/* e.g. askwhethersubsume(machine,tractor). */
/* Please type machine subsumes tractor if you */










write('if you want to extend the dictionary.').
/**************************************************/
/* getsubclassesandaskforrefine(X) */
/* e.g. get3ubclassesandaskforrefine(animate). */
/* What sort of animate do you mean: */
/* [human, animal]? */
getsubclassesandaskforrefine(W):-









/* e.g. getsubclassesandaskwhich(top,fish). */















/* Further semantic analysis is impossible; invoke */
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